UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA
LAW REVIEW
Founded 1852

Formerly
AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
© 2017 University of Pennsylvania Law Review

VOL. 165

FEBRUARY 2017

NO. 3

ARTICLE
THE PRESIDENT AND THE DETAINEES
AZIZ Z. HUQ†
Entering the White House in 2009, President Barack Obama committed to closing
the military detention facility at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba. Eight years later, the facility
remains open. This Article uses the puzzle of why Obama’s goal proved so recalcitrant
† Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I am indebted to Ruixi
Mao, Charles Zhang, Morgan Miller, and Dan Marcin—former and present research professionals at
the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics—for their extensive help with preparing and
analyzing data for this Article; Joey Burton, the Institute’s former director, graciously enabled their
assistance. Several research assistants also did invaluable work. I am especially grateful to Steve
Donohue for his extensive work hand-coding documents. Melissa Wu, Caitlin Foley, Sam Geloso,
Paxton Williams, and Cecilia Wang also did terrific work. I received valuable comments on this project
from Adam Cox, David Cole, Adam Chilton, Ben Grunwald, Jonathan Hafetz, Rebecca Ingbar,
Jonathan P. Jackson, Andrew Kent, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Cian Murphy, David Pozen, Eric Posner,
Daphna Renan, Daniel Richman, Stephen Schulhofer, and Matt Waxman. Workshop participants at
King’s College London, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Columbia Law School, the University of
Chicago Law School, and the 2015 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies all provided insightful
comments. Finally, I am very grateful to Brian Ruocco and other editors at the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review for their careful and painstaking work on this Article. The Frank Cicero Jr. Fund provided
support for this research. All errors remain my own. The author can be contacted at huq@uchicago.edu.

(499)

500

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 165: 499

as a case study of separation-of-powers constraints upon presidential power. Deploying a
combination of empirical, doctrinal, and positive political science tools, it isolates the
salient actors and dynamics that impeded Obama’s goal. Its core descriptive finding is
that a bureaucratic–legislative alliance was pivotal in blocking the White House’s
agenda. This alliance leveraged its asymmetrical access to information to generate
constraints on the President. The most significant of these constraints operated through
political channels; statutory prohibitions with the force of law were of distinctly secondary
importance. The analysis, furthermore, sheds light on why individualized judicial
review, secured through the mechanism of habeas petitions under the Constitution’s
Suspension Clause, had scant effect. Contrary to standard approaches to the
Constitution’s separation of powers, the case study developed here points to the value of
granular, retail analysis that accounts for internally heterogeneous incentives and
agendas instead of abstract theory that reifies branches as unitary and ahistorical entities.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 20, 2009, Barack Obama was sworn into office as the 44th
President of the United States. His campaign platform included a pledge to
shutter the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay. A century-old U.S.
military facility on the southeastern littoral of Cuba’s Oriente Province,1
Guantánamo had been used to house individuals seized in extraterritorial
counterterrorism operations since January 2002.2 As early as August 2007,
then-candidate Obama committed himself to dispersing those individuals
and winding up detention operations at the Cuban base.3 In the wake of his
November 2008 victory, his campaign team reiterated that goal, signaling the
President’s ambition of making a “sharp break” with the George W. Bush
Administration.4 Yet on his departure from office, forty-one individuals
remained in custody at Guantánamo.5 Far from achieving its ambition, by
2016 the Obama Administration had downgraded its aspirations to a goal it
had already achieved: a detainee population in the double digits.6 A policy
1 See JONATHAN M. HANSEN, GUANTÁNAMO: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 12-15, 50 (2011)
(describing the geography and location of Guantánamo Bay).
2 See generally KAREN GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO’S FIRST 100
DAYS (2009) (providing a narrative account of the start of detention operations at Guantánamo).
3 Malathi Nayak, Factbox: Has Obama Delivered on His 2008 Campaign Promises?, REUTERS
(Oct. 28, 2011, 11:08 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/28/us-usa-campaign-obama-prom
ises-idUSTRE79R3M920111028 [https://perma.cc/T58N-9HF6].
4 Peter Finn, Guantanamo Closure Called Obama Priority, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/11/AR2008111102865.html [https://pe
rma.cc/L6J2-SPNP]. The President’s policy was effectuated through an executive order issued days
after his inauguration. See Exec. Order No. 13,492 § 3, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009).
5 See N.Y. TIMES: THE GUANTÁNAMO DOCKET, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo
[https://perma.cc/HU9H-FFTT] (last updated Jan. 23, 2017).
6 See Hannah Fairfield et al., How Will Obama’s Plan to Close Guantánamo Work?, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/23/us/guantanamo-bay-obama.html
[https://perma.cc/5JRL-UN59] (describing the decline in detainee population from 242 to sixty-one
during Obama’s presidency); see also Charlie Savage, Frustrated in Efforts to Close Guantánamo Prison,
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once perceived as a signature legacy of the George W. Bush Administration
had become a keystone of the Obama legacy.7
The persistence of the Guantánamo detentions ought by rights to be a
puzzle for constitutional law. A common theme in recent public-law
scholarship is the increasing, even “unbound[ed],” power of the executive
branch,8 in contrast to a polarized and “gridlocked” Congress.9 As a matter of
constitutional structure, Presidents’ unified and hierarchical control over the
executive branch ought by rights to enable efficient and rational policymaking
of a kind that can easily elude the multitudinous and disputative Congress.10
In the Guantánamo case, it is also a result of the substantive law at issue.
Discretionary executive legal and policy authority is customarily thought to
be at its zenith in the national security domain.11 Correspondingly, the case
for judicial and congressional deference to the Executive is commonly
thought stronger on security matters than on ordinary regulatory issues.12
Officials Look to Reduce Population, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/us/
politics/president-obama-guantanamo-bay-closing-plans-detainees.html [https://perma.cc/MD92-9BAR]
(describing the Administration’s efforts to reduce the detainee population at Guantánamo Bay after
encountering difficulties with shutting it down completely).
7 Charlie Savage, President’s Plan for Guantánamo Is Seen Faltering, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2015, at
A1. A recently edited collection evocatively makes the same point through its title. See OBAMA’S
GUANTÁNAMO: STORIES FROM AN ENDURING PRISON (Jonathan Hafetz ed., 2016) [hereinafter
OBAMA’S GUANTÁNAMO].
8 ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 4-5 (2010); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 141, 184-85 (2010) (describing an “institutional presidency . . . on the
march” and positing that “[t]he Constitution is now governing a system in which an institutionalized
presidency rules through a politicized White House that dominates the cabinet secretaries and sets
the agenda for Congress”).
9 See Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1772
(2015); see id. at 1762-72 (describing congressional polarization and its effects on the policy opportunities
available to administrative agencies); see also Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2065, 2076-77 n.66 (2013) (discussing how party concentration in a branch affects
institutional checks).
10 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2339 (2001)
(concluding that structural features of the executive branch enable “cost-effectiveness, consistency,
and rational priority-setting”).
11 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 682 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court’s “duty to defer to the Executive’s military and foreign policy judgment is at its
zenith” in conducting war, especially with congressional authorization). Some commentators have
discerned few legal limits to the President’s authority in this context. See John Yoo, Transferring
Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1184 (2004) (arguing that “the authority to determine the
handling of military detainees is conferred on the President by the Commander in Chief Clause,
which is located in Article II of the Constitution”). But this is a minority position.
12 See Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CAL. L. REV. 887, 895-99
(2012) [hereinafter Huq, Structural Constitutionalism] (collecting sources that posit that view). In
other work, I have challenged this conventional wisdom. See Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security
Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 236-40 (pointing to evidence of continuity in judicial
deference levels between security matters and other matters).
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And even apart from the presidency’s structural and legal advantages, the
White House has a demonstrated capacity to shape the policy environment
though informal “rhetorical” strategies that “‘go over the heads’ of Congress
to the people at large.”13 Whether assessed in terms of institutional structure,
law, or politics, the White House would seem at a distinct advantage to other
political actors.
The Guantánamo detentions themselves illustrate each of these advantages.
To begin with, the executive branch under President Bush undertook a series
of swift and unilateral policy decisions about how to process and detain
individuals captured in the Afghanistan–Pakistan theater with little input
from Congress or the courts. Those policy decisions were reached in a context
uncluttered by perceived legal constraints.14 And just as the White House was
shaping facts on the ground and contouring the legal landscape, it was also
molding the public narrative about detainees on the basis of its lopsided
access to information about what was happening at the Cuban base.15
But if one President could unilaterally create a prison at Guantánamo,
why couldn’t a subsequent Chief Executive end it? This question cuts to the
13 JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 4 (1987); see also SAMUEL KERNELL,
GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 10-47 (4th ed. 2007) (describing
the incentive for Presidents to shun bargaining with Congress and instead influence Congress by
appealing directly to the public).
14 See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorneys
Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens
Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Dec. 28, 2001), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/
documents/20011228.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2X2-C9JW] [hereinafter Philbin/Yoo Memorandum]
(concluding that federal districts courts could not properly exercise federal habeas jurisdiction over
an alien detained at Guantánamo Bay); Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen., and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of
Def., Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002),
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/documents/20020109.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW8D-MLXS]
[hereinafter Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum] (concluding that international treaties regarding the
treatment of individuals detained by U.S. forces do not apply to members of al Qaeda).
15 For some examples of shaping the political narrative from different points in time, see Katharine
Q. Seelye, Detainees Are Not P.O.W.’s, Cheney and Rumsfeld Declare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at A6
(reporting the Vice President and Defense Secretary of the Bush Administration positing that the
Geneva Convention does not apply to Guantánamo detainees); Joby Warrick, A Blind Eye to
Guantanamo?; Book Says White House Ignored CIA on Detainees’ Innocence, WASH. POST (July 12,
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/11/AR2008071102954.html
[https://perma.cc/666N-ZF52] (reflecting on new information that the Bush Administration
ignored CIA evidence that up to a third of detainees at Guantánamo may have been mistakenly
imprisoned); Margot Williams et al., Voices Baffled, Brash and Irate in Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
6, 2006, at A1 (noting that the executive branch has withheld voluminous amounts of information
regarding the detainees—including the names of detainees and the evidence against them). To
identify this asymmetry is not to imply that executive branch conduct was necessarily improper. It
is standard fare for officials to use their privileged access to information to shape political debate.
In the national security context, the asymmetry between officials and the general public is much
wider than on other matters.
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heart of the idea of the separation of powers. Whereas the establishment of
the Guantánamo detentions was characterized by swift and unilateral
executive action, the subsequent phase of Guantánamo’s operation was
characterized by increasing levels of interbranch involvement. First courts,
and then Congress, intervened. Between 2004 and 2008, the Supreme Court
issued several opinions regulating military detention in ways that increasingly
pinched on executive branch discretion.16 These rulings culminated in 2008
in Boumediene v. Bush, which extended the Suspension Clause of Article I,
Section 917 to Guantánamo.18 As a result of Boumediene, federal judges in the
District of Columbia began adjudicating individual challenges to detention.
In doing so, they exercised retail superintendence of a policy that until then
had been under near-exclusive executive branch suzerainty. Further, they
started to fill gaps and ambiguities in what until then had been a skeletal
statutory definition of lawful detention authority.19 In 2009, Congress too
entered the fray by enacting restrictions on detainees’ transfers20 and by
refining the lawful bounds of detention authority.21
Until now, neither the causes nor the consequences that these judicial and
legislative interventions have had for presidential discretion have been
carefully studied. A body of existing scholarship, to be sure, focuses on the
early role played by private and public-interest lawyers who challenged
detentions. In a 2010 article, for example, I presented data on changes in the
overall detention population, and argued that habeas suits from 2004 onwards
operated as “shots across the bow,” pushing the executive to adopt policies
characterized by “professionalism and reliability” rather than ad hoc and
unreliable decisionmaking.22 Subsequently, commentators from divergent
16 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (extending the constitutional writ of
habeas corpus to Guantánamo Bay detainees); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631-32 (2006)
(invalidating first-generation military commissions and requiring that Guantánamo detainees are
tried before a “regularly constituted court affording all of the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536-38 (2004)
(holding that a U.S. citizen detained as an enemy combatant has a due process right to judicial
review of grounds for his military detention); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2004) (extending
statutory habeas jurisdiction to Guantánamo Bay detentions).
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
18 553 U.S. at 798.
19 See infra subsections II.C.1–3 (describing post-Boumediene jurisprudence in federal courts).
20 See, e.g., Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103, 123 Stat.
1859, 1920 (2009) (barring the use of federal funds for the transfer of prisoners from Guantánamo
unless certain conditions are met); see also infra text accompanying notes 67–70 (discussing statutory
limitations on transfer enacted by Congress beginning in 2009).
21 See National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562
(2011) (affirming that the President has the authority to detain those involved in certain terrorist activities).
22 For an early account of post-Boumediene judicial review, see Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is
Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 422-23, 426-27 (2010) [hereinafter Huq, What Good is Habeas].
For an argument that an expectation of litigation influences outcomes in the national security
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political and policy perspectives have argued that legal challenges from civil
society can motivate changes to security policy. In 2012, for example, Jack
Goldsmith characterized civil litigation as an element of a larger ecosystem
of transparency that constrains the presidency.23 From the other side of the
political spectrum, David Cole in 2016 enthusiastically celebrated “[t]he
Power of Citizen Activists to Make Constitutional Law.”24 These encomiums
to civil society as an effectual and needful friction on governmental power,
however accurately they may depict Guantánamo’s early years, do not
explain—and, indeed, do not purport to explain—the persistence of Guantánamo’s
prison in the context of an active separation of powers. It is necessary to look
beyond the invisible hand of Toquevillian civil society to explain why the
detentions persisted as long as they did.
My aim in this Article is to cast light on that puzzle with a close empirical
study of the effects of interbranch dynamics upon Guantánamo policy. First,
the Guantánamo prison is, for better or worse, a synecdoche for a much larger
constellation of controversial counterterrorism policies associated with
President George W. Bush. Celebrating the mobilizations that sought to
apply constitutional limits to those operations—and thus to end practices that
many believe to be immoral and unwarranted—is surely worthwhile,
especially given the seeming risk today that many of those policies will be
revived. But it is also important to understand how and why this particular
cluster of controversial policies persisted long after being roundly rejected as
inconsistent with shared legal and normative commitments. Why Guantánamo
persisted, in short, is an intensely specific question—but one that should
matter to us not only as scholars, but also as citizens. Second, the case study
of the Guantánamo detentions casts light on how our separation of powers
works in practice. Although I do not develop here a new theory of the
separation of powers,25 I do identify several important causal mechanisms
context, see Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy
Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 843-49 (2013).
23 See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY
AFTER 9/11, 161-77 (2012) (describing how the “ecology of transparency ensured that the clashes
between military and civilian lawyers spilled into the public realm”). Goldsmith’s book is trenchantly
critiqued both for its factual errors and flawed arguments. See generally Baher Azmy, An Insufficiently
Accountable Presidency: Some Reflections on Jack Goldsmith’s Power and Constraint, 45 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 23 (2012).
24 See generally DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS
TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016).
25 In separate works, I have developed more stylized “theories” of the separation of powers that
focus on (1) the dynamic, consensual character of many of our national institutional arrangements and
(2) the key role of institutional and normative pluralism for thinking about our separated branches.
See Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1618-44 (2014)
[hereinafter Huq, Negotiated Separation of Powers] (articulating a bargaining-based model of
interbranch and federal–state interaction); see also Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of
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through which interbranch interactions flow—mechanisms that have received
insufficient attention in legal scholarship. I also hope to drill down on a quite
specific policy question for which precise quantitative data is available. I do
so in order to see if anything can be learned about how the three branches of
the federal government interact and about what elements of interbranch
behavior might predict the effect of such interaction.
This exercise yields two complementary payoffs. The first is discrete and
historical in nature; the other is normative and doctrinal. This Article’s threshold
contribution is a new and more fulsome positive account of the persistence of
the Guantánamo prison. This descriptive effort snaps into focus causal
mechanisms that until now have been largely ignored. Conventional wisdom
blames the persistence of Guantánamo on growing concern about detainee
recidivism during President Obama’s first term26 and ensuing public opposition
to President Obama’s closure plan.27 This opposition is typically understood as
a freestanding dynamic that arose exogenously to derail White House plans.
More careful empirical analysis, however, suggests that opposition based on
recidivism-related fears cannot be explained by external events. There was no
change in the risk posed by the marginal detainee slated for transfer from the
lame–duck Bush Administration to the Obama Administration. And there was
no external shock, such as a high-profile act of violence by a former Guantánamo
detainee, that justified the pivot in public or congressional mood.
This Article offers a different explanation. President Obama’s agenda, I
argue, was derailed by an interbranch alliance between the military bureaucracy
Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 407-16 (2016) (developing a theoretical account
of the separation of powers that seeks to justify doctrinal cycling between rules and standards). I draw
upon these more stylized and abstract approaches as relevant here since both underscore the dynamic
and multitudinous character of national institutional arrangements in the same way that the current
study does. Nevertheless, the ambition of this Article is not to “prove” in some mechanical way the
claims proffered in that theoretical work.
26 For illustrative versions of this argument, see, for example, HOUSE ARMED SERVS. COMM.,
LEAVING GUANTANAMO: POLICIES, PRESSURES, AND DETAINEES RETURNING TO THE FIGHT
11-12, 64 (Jan. 2012), https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/
themes/rep_armed_services/largedocs/leaving_guantanamo_web_3_27.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5D
8-RW7Q], noting that the threat of detainee recidivism would continue if President Obama’s closure
plan was implemented.
27 For illustrative versions of this argument, see, for example, Jennifer Daskal & Steve Vladeck,
Where Did Things Go Wrong? Three Key Moments that Shaped Obama’s Failed Guantánamo Policy, JUST
SECURITY (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/27514/wrong-key-moments-shaped-obamas
-failed-guantanamo-policy/ [https://perma.cc/25FD-2LZ6], which discusses how several key decisions
on Guantánamo policy early in the Obama Administration fueled political opposition to closing the
prison, and Marty Lederman, The Insoluble Guantánamo Problem (Part One: The President’s Successful
Transformation of U.S. Detention Practices . . . and the GTMO Exception), JUST SECURITY (Nov. 12,
2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/27549/guantanamo-problem-remains-insoluble-part-one-preside
nts-successful-transformation-u-s-detention-practices-gtmo-exception/ [https://perma.cc/76PU-TLVQ],
which presents the Obama Administration’s detainee policy as successfully transformative and limited
only by “the strong opposition of important national security critics in the Republican Party.”
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and a legislative faction hostile to the new President’s agenda. The alliance
was catalyzed by dynamics internal to the executive. That is, a conflict between
the President and his putative subordinates diffused out from Article II into
a larger separation-of-powers context to become an interbranch affair. That
military–legislative alliance then injected the recidivism question into public
discourse via strategic disclosures, asymmetrical leaks, and elite-level policy
entrepreneurship. The alliance’s effort to change the politics of detainee
transfers succeeded in precipitating legislative limits on transfer. But the
efficacy of these statutory limits did not rest on any law-like constraining
element. Instead, their causal force hinged on the extent to which they
provided leverage for the bureaucracy to resist the White House’s agenda.28
External politics fostered to maximize concern about detainee transfers thus
enabled an internal politics inimical to President Obama’s aims. In stark
contrast to the robust effect of bureaucratic–legislative alliances, post-Boumediene
federal courts played a minor role aiding the President—and arguably did
more to entrench rather than to dissolve the prison doors at Guantánamo.
Motivated by institutional concerns, the judiciary conspicuously declined
invitations to use law to salve frictions generated by the bureaucratic–legislative
alliance. To the contrary, while discrete judicial review was playing a role in a
de minimis proportion of detainee transfers, federal judges’ pronouncements
on the substance of detention law exceeded the government’s positions and
practice in their hostility to detainees. The internal logic of Article III thus
led judges to exhort confinement while eschewing even the tender drams of
mercy titrated out by the executive. In brief then, this account aims to render
lucidly and in granular detail what others have pitched only in abstracted and
theoretical terms: in the national security domain, the political branches’
authorities “overlap” and “the freedom with which each branch may exercise
its constitutional authority is affected by the existence and employment of
the other branch’s powers.”29
This Article’s second contribution leverages the distinctive separation-ofpowers context of the Guantánamo detentions—a trajectory from unilateral
28 This element of my account is underscored by a recent article by Connie Bruck. See Connie
Bruck, The Guantánamo Failure: Who’s Really to Blame?, NEW YORKER, Aug. 1, 2016, at 34. Bruck
emphasizes “a highly charged series of political maneuvers, involving nearly every part of the
Administration” in explaining why Guantánamo remains open. Id. In particular, she emphasizes the
Pentagon’s resistance to releases. Id. My account is consistent with her findings, although I identify
a distinct set of causal mechanisms, including strategic leaks, political entrepreneurship, and judicial
self-defense.
29 H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective,
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 542 (1999); see also id. at 529 (arguing for an “executive primary” view
of the separation of powers in which the President has “primary constitutional authority” over
national security). Powell’s point is about the law, however, whereas my argument here concerns the
operation of the branches in practice—i.e., the law on the ground rather than the law on the books.
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executive branch policymaking to three-branch contestation. It asks whether
lessons can be drawn about how interbranch engagement impinges on
presidential power from this trajectory.
Consider three inferences with potentially wider and more generative
consequences that might be extracted from my descriptive account, each of
which clash or contrast with some leading account of the separation of powers.
First, the descriptive account cultivated here points toward the need to
understand the separation of powers, and its constraining effect upon
presidential authority, in terms of actors both within and outside the
branches. There is a dense, and systematically significant, ecosystem of internal
and external interest groups, ideological factions, and institutional actors that
Jon Michaels and I elsewhere label the “thick political surround.”30 Dynamic
interactions between diverse elements of the thick political surround (such as
bureaucrats and legislative factions) can check presidential initiatives even
when bilateral interbranch interactions (between the executive branch and
Congress) cannot. The account offered here thus draws attention to the
institutionally granular determinants of interbranch relations. These help
explain how Presidents can be thwarted even absent divided government. It
also identifies endogenous political dynamics—as distinct from the civil-society
actors championed by Goldsmith and Cole—as pivotal.31 If anything, actors
internal to the government exercise a distorting influence upon the substance of
public preferences through a selective, and arguably misleading, stream of
disclosures. Accounts of civil society as a molding force in structural constitutional
law should account for this possibility.
Second, the persistence of Guantánamo has implications for our understanding
of how legal constraints on the presidency are produced in the first instance,
as well as why they are efficacious. Once again, it is worth drawing attention
to the endogenous, as opposed to the external, nature of legal constraints on
executive power. The observed constraints on President Obama did not
obtain their purchase through any coercive potentiality.32 Rather, the limiting
force of legal rules depended on the availability of political costs to the presidency.
Law enabled internal bureaucratic political actors to impose political costs,

See Huq & Michaels, supra note 25, at 391.
The claim advanced here is descriptive, rather than normative. In contrast, Gillian Metzger
has recently argued that there is a “duty to supervise . . . based on Article II [that] demands
supervision by and within the executive branch [as] . . . a basic precept of our federal constitutional
structure.” Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1842 (2015)
[hereinafter Metzger, Constitutional Duty]. The thrust of my descriptive claim is that this duty to
supervise is difficult for the President to carry out, even when his or her formal and informal powers
might seem at their zenith.
32 Cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 52 (2015) (arguing that “coercion
resurfaces as the likely most significant source of law’s widespread effectiveness”).
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depending on what the White House did. By exploiting this leverage, those
internal actors placed effective barriers on the realization of a presidential goal.
Third, leading analyses of the separation of powers focus on the deflating
effect of partisan dynamics upon the separation of powers.33 My descriptive
account contains space for the congressional Republican opponents of
President Obama, supporting these claims about the theoretical importance
of partisan dynamics. But an exclusive focus on partisan incentives does not
illuminate why national security bureaucrats contrived to undermine the
White House. Equally, it fails to explain and elucidate observed judicial
frailty. When the Boumediene Court extended the reach of the Suspension
Clause to Guantánamo, tasking district courts with the management of retail
habeas litigation, it forcefully underscored the federal bench’s role in serving
as a beneficial separation-of-powers check on executive discretion and a shield
of individual liberty.34 By supplementing arguments about partisan effects,
therefore, this study highlights the role of institutional incentives in determining
the consequences of interbranch engagement. Attention to the institutional
incentives of the federal judiciary, and not partisan motives, helps us understand
the gap between Boumediene’s soaring rhetoric and the more ambiguous legacy
of judicial intervention on the ground. More ambitiously, my account might
be understood to suggest that institutional incentives can induce officials to
engage in political entrepreneurship that has the effect of accelerating
partisan competition. Acting to pursue their own narrow institutional agendas,
officials can deepen polarization across a wider political landscape.35
These three claims—the decisive influence of a thick political surround;
the contingency of legal constraints upon political dynamics; and the
independent effects of institutional incentives—all concern the mechanisms

33 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2312, 2312-16, 2326-37 (2006) (emphasizing the possibility of convergence in policy preferences
of the executive branch and the legislature during periods of unified government).
34 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (“The Framers’ inherent distrust of
governmental power was the driving force behind the constitutional plan that allocated powers
among three independent branches. This design serves not only to make Government accountable
but also to secure individual liberty.”); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)
(plurality opinion) (“[U]nless Congress acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows
the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance,
serving as an important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in the realm of detentions.”);
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004) (citation omitted) (noting that “[e]xecutive imprisonment”
without judicial review is “oppressive and lawless” and that “th[e] Court has recognized the federal
courts’ power to review applications for habeas relief in a wide variety of cases involving executive
detention, in wartime as well as in times of peace”).
35 This vector of polarization is distinct from (and indeed almost the mirror of) “the partisan
genealogy of executive federalism” described in recent scholarship. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen,
Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953, 975 (2016). The two phenomena, though,
are complementary.
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through which the separation of powers affects policy outcomes. They gesture
toward the value of case studies as a way to better grapple with, and
understand, the diverse, conflictive, heterogeneous, and well-lived-in
landscape of our national political institutions. They are a reminder that the
separation of powers ought not to be reduced exclusively to traceries of texts or
to palimpsests of practice with “historical gloss,”36 shorn of the unpredictable,
heterogeneous, and dynamic system that one observes in practice.37 There is a
value instead in disentangling the role of more granular institutional actors.
The case study developed in this Article employs a mixed-methods approach
that blends different strands of qualitative and quantitative analysis.38
Drawing upon doctrinal exegesis, positive political science tools, and
econometric instruments, it develops a fine-grained account of how policy
decisions unfurled over time. Most importantly, I exploit here an archive of
765 classified “detainee assessments”—one for all but fourteen detainees
released by the Wikileaks organization, which documents the conclusions
reached by the government about individual detainees, and which allows for
a quite granular trajectory of detainee policy over time to be mapped. The
Wikileaks archive, as well as other data sources, are explained in the Appendix.
By using econometric as well as doctrinal and institutional tools, I hope not
only to show that Guantánamo need not be treated as a “black hole,”39 but
also that understandings of interbranch dynamics can be built on surer
foundations than anecdote and a priori theory.
My argument proceeds in three steps. Part I of the Article develops a richly
textured historical account of policymaking concerning the Guantánamo prison
over time, placing President Obama’s ultimately unavailing efforts at closure
into a wider historical context. In Part II, I dive deeper by offering more precise
estimates of the effects of bureaucratic, legislative, and judicial interventions
upon the White House’s ambitions. By combining different analytic threads,
my aim here is to offer a new causal account of the persistence of Guantánamo
as a policy conundrum. Picking up threads intimated in this account, Part III
then explores the central role of interbranch alliances, the interaction of
political and legal checks, and the powerful effects of institutional incentives.
While briefly touching upon the specific legal options available to an

36 On the concept of “historical gloss,” see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical
Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 419-20 (2012).
37 I do not mean to suggest that scholars uniformly fail to attend to observed institutional
practice. For a useful study of institutional practice of decisionmaking process in the national
security field, see Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking,
38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359, 377-403 (2013).
38 On mixed-method approaches more generally, see JOHN W. CRESWELL & VICKI L. PLANO
CLARK, DESIGNING AND CONDUCTING MIXED METHODS RESEARCH 1-18 (2007).
39 Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 1, 13 (2004).
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administration wishing to draw down the Guantánamo detentions, this Part
concentrates on the considerations necessary for a nuanced, more accurate
understanding of the separation of powers in the trenches.
I. ANATOMIZING A BLACK HOLE: THE TRAJECTORY
OF THE GUANTÁNAMO PRISON
In January 2002, the U.S. government began transferring roughly 640
men, most of whom were captured in Afghanistan or Pakistan, to a U.S.
military base on the southeastern littoral of Cuba’s Oriente Province called
Guantánamo Bay.40 The ensuing Guantánamo detainees comprise only a
scintilla of the United States’ domestic incarcerated population.41 And they
also proved to be only a small proportion of those held in U.S. detentions
across the Iraqi, Afghan, and other theaters of the 9/11 Wars.42 Despite their
dearth of numerosity, the Cuban detentions quickly became a cynosure of
political and legal controversy.43 As a result, the Guantánamo detentions are
of interest not simply because of the legal puzzles they generated or the moral
quandaries they raised, but also because they were a public focal point,
crystallizing and refracting expectations, anxieties, and aspirations about
presidential power, the Constitution, and the separation of powers.44
This Part develops a novel, empirically grounded narrative of the prison’s
development. I aim principally to illustrate the ebb and flow of overall
detainee population over time, as different branches adopted multifarious
postures toward the prison. As a methodological matter, this means collecting
and analyzing data for the whole population of detainees. Until now, much
leading legal scholarship on military detention has relied upon evidence often

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471 (2004).
See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 39 (2006) (reporting
the significant increase in the American incarceration rate over time).
42 On the Afghan detentions, see Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87-88 (D.C. Cir. 2010); on
the Iraqi detentions, see Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military Detention Debate: Firsthand
Perspectives from the Other War, 2003–2010, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 549, 553 (2011).
43 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay
on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 353-54 (2010) (stating that the Court’s rulings
“drew broad attention” whenever they concerned “cases involving the habeas corpus rights of citizens
and noncitizens detained by the Executive Branch without judicial trials as terrorist suspects”).
44 My focus in this Article is on the legal and institutional implications of the Guantánamo
detentions. There are also vital moral questions raised by the fact that many of those detained had no
connection to terrorism and were tortured while in custody. See LAUREL E. FLETCHER & ERIC
STOVER, THE GUANTÁNAMO EFFECT: EXPOSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DETENTION
AND INTERROGATION PRACTICES 62-68 (2009) (reporting a study that interviewed fifty-five former
detainees and found thirty-one alleging abusive interrogations); see also MOHAMEDOU OULD SLAHI,
GUANTÁNAMO DIARY 191-263 (Larry Siems ed., 2015) (describing, with redactions but still in
harrowing detail, a litany of coercive interrogation methods used at Guantánamo against one detainee).
40
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derived from litigation.45 But inferences drawn from litigation outcomes are a
perilous foundation for legal and institutional analysis. Only sixty-eight of 780
detainees litigated a habeas petition to a final district court order. The selection
of litigated cases, which is less than ten percent of the whole population, is
unlikely to reflect the population as a whole. At a minimum, it excludes
detainees who were released earlier and detainees who anticipated they would
lose their habeas action.46 Stepping away from the familiar pages of the
Federal Reporter gets us some illuminating distance on policy in the large.
To orient the reader, I begin by roughly periodizing detention policy into
three slices, each of which reflects a different separation-of-powers arrangement.
I then present evidence of how policy changed across those distinct institutional
dispensations. Finally, I ask how the rate of detainee transfers and releases
fluctuated between different partisan administrations and institutional
dispensations. In effect, my inquiry homes in on the puzzle of which constellation
of interbranch dynamics is most conducive to individual liberty.
A. The Phases of Detention Policy
Since 2002, control over policy decisions touching on the Guantánamo
detentions has moved through three phases. Each corresponds to a different
separation-of-powers permutation: exclusive executive branch control;
executive branch control with judicial supervision; and three-branch policymaking.

45 For scholarship focusing on the courts, see, for example, Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held?
Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 805-48 (2011) [hereinafter Chesney,
Military Detention], evaluating detention standards by analyzing post-9/11 habeas litigation; Jonathan
Hafetz, Detention Without End?: Reexamining the Indefinite Confinement of Terrorism Suspects Through the Lens
of Criminal Sentencing, 61 UCLA L. REV. 326, 344 (2014), addressing the “overlap between military
detention and [criminal] prosecution”; and Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE L.J.
1415, 1446-48 (2012), discussing jurisdictional redundancy by examining the cases where the line between
Article III proceedings and military detentions is not strict. There are contrasting views of the case law.
Compare William R. Payne, Note, Cleaning Up “The Mess”: The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the Burden
of Proof in the Guantanamo Habeas Cases, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 873, 874 (2013) (describing the
Circuit Court’s work as “admirable”), and Adam R. Pearlman, Meaningful Review and Process Due: How
Guantanamo Detention Is Changing the Battlefield, 6 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 255, 274-79 (2015) (providing
a generally positive summary on how the D.C. Circuit helped shape the government’s detention policy),
with Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451, 1488 (2011)
(criticizing the D.C. Circuit for failing to “take seriously Boumediene’s effect”).
46 Another factor that generates selection bias in litigation is the manner in which detainees
secured lawyers. Lacking the ability to contact counsel directly, detainees often depended on relatives,
frequently in the Middle East, or other detainees to act as “next friends” to secure representation. See,
e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 55-57 (D.D.C. 2002) (discussing how petitioner’s mother joined
the suit to request that a court order the government to allow counsel, among other requests); see also
JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 44-48 (2006)
(describing the process of identifying petitioners in early habeas cases). The haphazard quality of this
process renders the basis for selection into litigation even more opaque.
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1. Exclusive Executive Branch Control
The first period of Guantánamo detention policy ran from early 2002 to the
first part of 2008. It was characterized by an executive branch near-monopoly
on policy. To begin with, the detentions rested only notionally on a statutory
footing. Congress enacted what proved ultimately to be Guantánamo’s
legislative basis seven days after the September 11, 2001 attacks—a general
authorization of military force.47 That authorization lacked a specific textual
reference to detention.48 A more detailed legal foundation for detention
operations had to await a presidential executive order dated November 13, 2001.49
The executive initially styled policy so as to minimize other branches’
influence. On December 28, 2001, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) issued a legal opinion concluding that federal court
jurisdiction in habeas corpus did not extend to the Cuban base.50 Government
lawyers vigorously defended this jurisdictional Maginot line until 2008’s
Boumediene decision. Their resistance to judicial supervision guaranteed
Article II control of the terms and scope of the detentions until then. The
Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel also calibrated the terms upon
which prisoners could exit custody at the Cuban base through a March 2002
memorandum endorsing forcible transfers of prisoners to other sovereign
states.51 Similarly, questions of detainee treatment fell within exclusive
executive branch control. In December 2002, then–Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld famously authorized a suite of novel tactics for
interrogations at Guantánamo, including sleep deprivation, stress positions,
and sexualized humiliation.52 These measures—including what is properly
described as torture, whether that term is used in either a colloquial or a legal
sense—neither rested upon nor subsequently secured Congress’s approval.

47 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)) [hereinafter 2001 AUMF].
48 Some have argued that the measure implicitly referenced detention authority. See Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2047, 2094 (2005) (arguing that the 2001 AUMF should be interpreted in light of “international laws
of war [which] permit the detention of enemy combatants without trial until the end of hostilities”).
49 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3
C.F.R. § 918 (2001).
50 Philbin/Yoo Memorandum, supra note 14.
51 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel,
Dep’t of Def., The President’s Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer Captured Terrorists to the
Control and Custody of Foreign Nations 1-2 (Mar. 13, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
opa/legacy/2009/03/04/memorandumpresidentpower03132002.pdf [https://perma.cc/367Q-52H9].
52 Lt. Gen. Randall M. Schmidt & Brig. Gen. John T. Furlow, Investigation into FBI Allegations
of Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility 4, 18-19 (June 2005), https://www.the
torturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/schmidt_furlow_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WS6Y-C73R].
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Over this period, to be sure, Congress did enact legislation touching on
the Guantánamo prison. But the ensuing statutes’ net effect was to insulate
executive policymaking from external oversight. For example, in 2005,
Congress eliminated federal-court jurisdiction over detention-related claims
arising in Guantánamo, instead channeling review into a narrow appellate
forum without factfinding authority.53 A year later, it withdrew Article III
forums for criminal adjudication in favor of Article I military tribunals with
tightly constrained federal-court oversight.54 A single provision in the 2005
intervention purported to reign in coercive interrogation measures.55 But this
prohibition was undermined by subsequent executive branch interpretation.56
Between 2001 and 2009, no statutory text spoke to the scope of detention
authority, the manner of processing detainees, or the triggers for release.
2. The Emergence of Judicial Supervision
In the second period of Guantánamo policymaking, the Supreme Court
added a layer of judicial review via habeas actions in D.C. district courts.
Individual detainees had filed habeas corpus petitions as early as 2002. But it
was not until 2004 that the Supreme Court ruled on the Guantánamo
detainees’ statutory access to the federal courts in Rasul v. Bush.57 Parrying
Rasul, Congress enacted jurisdiction-stripping legislation in 2005 and again
in 2006.58 It was not until 2008 that a federal appellate court reached the
substantive merits of a detention decision.59 The Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit issued a ruling in Parhat v. Gates, a challenge to detention filed under
the streamlined jurisdictional alternative to habeas created in 2005, rejecting
53 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)) [hereinafter DTA] (eliminating habeas jurisdiction and
allowing review only in the D.C. Circuit for a limited suite of issues).
54 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2241 note (2006)) [hereinafter MCA].
55 DTA, supra note 53, § 1005(e).
56 Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, to John A. Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency, Application of the
War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda
Detainees 21-23 (July 20, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/2007_07
20_OLC_memo_warcrimesact.pdf [https://perma.cc/48UB-KFTH].
57 See 542 U.S. 466, 483-85 (2004) (extending statutory habeas jurisdiction to Guantánamo
Bay detainees).
58 See MCA, supra note 54; DTA, supra note 53.
59 The litigation culminating in Boumediene, however, included earlier district court cases
discussing the scope of detention authority. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d
443, 481 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that detainees stated claims for violations of Fifth Amendment due
process rights); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 320-23 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that nonresident
detainees outside the United States had no cognizable constitutional rights).
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the government’s claim to detain lawfully a group of Chinese nationals held at
the Cuban base.60 But Parhat proved a false start. It was followed, a mere
eight days later, by the Supreme Court’s Boumediene holding that detainees at
Guantánamo benefited from the privilege of habeas corpus under the
Suspension Clause of Article I, Section 9. Boumediene invited case-by-case
adjudication of individual liberty claims in federal district court. In effect, it
also instructed trial judges to start limning the metes and bounds of
substantive detention authority as a legal matter. Judge Richard J. Leon published
the first district court decision on the merits of a habeas petition about six
months later, on December 30, 2008.61 This decision came almost seven years
after the first habeas petition was filed, and more than four years after Rasul.
The glacial pace of judicial intervention, in other words, hardly bespeaks an
activist court champing at the bit of Article III’s furthest bounds. Rather, the
incremental and hesitant involvement of federal courts hints at a reluctant
“judicial passivity”62 in the teeth of a problem that might seem politically and
practically resilient to judicial superintendence. We shall see, in due course,
more evidence of this passivity in regard to the Guantánamo problem.
The Boumediene litigation, of course, did not occur in a political vacuum.
Rather, it occurred in the context of a presidential election in which both
candidates committed to closing the Cuban prison.63 Two days after his
inauguration, President Obama promulgated an executive order requiring “a
prompt and thorough review of the factual and legal bases for the continued
detention of all individuals currently held.”64 The order envisaged that
532 F.3d 834, 853-54 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
See Sliti v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing the merits and ruling on a
Guantánamo detainee’s habeas corpus petition); see also Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C.
2008) (assessing another habeas case on December 30, 2008). An earlier decision issued by Judge
Ricardo Urbina did not address the scope of detention authority, in part due to concessions by the
government responding to the want of lawful authority to detain. In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee
Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2008), vacated, Kiyemba v. Obama, 559 U.S. 131 (2010).
62 Daniel Meltzer invokes the term to describe the Court’s “refus[al] to take responsibility for
shaping a workable legal system in the everyday disputes that come before the judiciary without
great fanfare.” Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 343.
I adapt and expand on his usage.
63 See Kate Zernike, McCain and Obama Split on Justices’ Guantánamo Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (June
13, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/us/politics/13candidates.html [https://perma.cc/7ED
S-K6HV] (noting this shared goal). The candidates, nevertheless markedly diverged in their
responses to Boumediene. See John Bentley, McCain Rips Supreme Court Decision on Guantanamo, CBS
NEWS (June 13, 2008, 6:42 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mccain-rips-supreme-court-dec
ision-on-guantanamo/ [https://perma.cc/GA59-5M7H] (quoting McCain’s statement that Boumediene
is “one of the worst decisions in the history of this country” and Obama as stating that Boumediene
“is an important step toward reestablishing our credibility as a nation committed to the rule of law,
and rejecting a false choice between fighting terrorism and respecting habeas corpus”).
64 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4897-98 (Jan. 22, 2009); see also id. (calling for
closure of the Guantanamo detention facilities).
60
61
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detentions would end “as soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from
the date of this order.”65 That was January 2009.
3. Guantánamo as a Three-Branch Problem
The third phase of the Guantánamo detentions was marked by Congress’s
return to the fray. To be sure, as I have already noted, Congress had not
previously been silent; it had intervened to curb habeas review in 2005 and
2006.66 But these statutes merely buttressed exclusive executive branch
control of detention operations at Guantánamo. They offered little by way of
specific policy guidance concerning the scope of detention authority or the
appropriate rate of releases. It was only in 2009, in the wake of Obama’s
election, that Congress began to express preferences in respect to the law.
From that time on, it attached riders to each of the annual omnibus military
authorization statutes—all essential to keep funding flowing for the
Pentagon—that regulated executive options for transfer and release. The
precise impact of these riders varied from year to year. Some limited transfers
of detainees from Guantánamo to the U.S. mainland; others outright banned
such transfers.67 Most of the riders limited transfers to third countries,68 or
installed per se bars on transfers to countries, such as Yemen, thought to be

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 53–54.
See Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103(b), 123 Stat. 1859,
1920 (2009) (stating that available funds may not be used to transfer Guantánamo detainees to the
United States); see also Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 511, 125 Stat.
786, 833-36 (2011) (limiting funds for building facilities for detainees in the United States);
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55, § 532, 125 Stat.
552, 637-38 (2011) (prohibiting funds for transferring detainees to the United States); Ike Skelton
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, §§ 1032–1034, 124 Stat.
4137, 4351-54 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (imposing restrictions on
transfers of Guantánamo detainees to the United States); Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 9011, 123 Stat. 3409, 3466-68 (2009) (disallowing funds for
transferring detainees to the United States). Congress also enacted restrictions on the use of funds
to refurbish a prison facility in downstate Illinois to house detainees. See Ike Skelton National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 1034(a)–(b), 124 Stat. 4137,
4353-54 (2011) (prohibiting the use of appropriations to create facilities to house detainees in the
United States); see also Charlie Savage, House Panel Rejects a Plan to Shift Detainees to Illinois, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2010, at A18 (discussing this prohibition in the context of the Obama Administration’s
plan to buy and renovate a prison in Illinois for this purpose).
68 See, e.g., Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103(e), 123 Stat.
1859, 1921 (2009) (allowing transfers to third countries if the President submits to a report regarding
risk and terms of transfer fifteen days prior); see also Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 1033, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351-52 (2011) (codified in
scattered sections of the U.S. Code); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub.
L. No. 112-81, § 1028, 125 Stat. 1298, 1567-69 (2011) (delineating requirements for certifications to
transfer detainees to foreign countries).
65
66
67
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incapable of managing transferred detainees69 (a prohibition that, it should
be noted, points toward legislators’ belief that transfers often would not be,
and should not be, an end to detention). In 2012, moreover, Congress installed
a revised, newly explicit definition of detention authority to supplement the
sparse text of the 2001 AUMF.70 Whereas Congress had previously secured
executive branch control, in short, from 2009 onward it cabined and channeled
Article II discretion.
In summary, the institutional history of Guantánamo policy falls into
three periods. There have been eras of exclusive executive control, judicial
supervision of executive policymaking, and three branch interaction. The
precision of my periodization should not be overstated. Federal courts did not
abruptly pivot from noninvolvement to deep engagement: they drifted into
engagement over a period of years in a way that suggests antipathy toward
entanglement in a controversial and difficult policy domain. Substantial
congressional involvement might be traced back to 2005 (when the first
jurisdiction-stripping legislation was enacted) or 2006 (when a first iteration
of military commission legislation was passed into law). I have treated these
measures differently from post-Boumediene regulation of transfers and
redefinitions of the scope of detention authority.71 The latter are distinct, in
my view, because they reflect legislators’ preferences about detention, rather
than merely an expiating effort to shunt matters into the President’s hands.72
Despite these complications, a general trend emerges: what began as a matter
of exclusive executive suzerainty over time became increasingly entangled in
judicial and congressional interventions to the point where today it seems fair
to describe Guantánamo as the responsibility of all three branches.
B. Detention Policy on the Ground
As the locus of control over policymaking shifted, so too did the substance
of that policy. A simple measure of that substance is the rate of transfers or
releases from Guantánamo. Subject to some caveats,73 the rate of transfers
69 National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, §§ 1027–1028;
125 Stat. 1298, 1566-69 (2011). On the subsequent termination of transfers to Yemen, see Peter Finn,
Return of Yemeni Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Is Suspended, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2010, 5:25 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/05/AR2010010502850.html [https://p
erma.cc/74AQ-TYE3].
70 Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note); see
also Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Section 1021 of that statute, which fits on a
single page, is Congress’ first—and, to date, only—foray into providing further clarity on that
question [of the scope of detention authority].”).
71 See supra text accompanying notes 53–54.
72 See supra text accompanying notes 67–70 (citing and discussing post-Boumediene legislation
limiting transfers).
73 See infra text accompanying notes 101–04.
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can be taken as a rough proxy of detention policy. Most detainees were
brought to the Cuban prison in 2002 and 2003. Hence, by 2004, transfers and
releases were the dominant determinant of changes to the aggregate
population. Of course, each detainee transfer raises a different set of risks and
costs. Nevertheless, in order to understand why and how President Obama’s
ambition of closing the prison faltered, it is still useful to isolate a single,
simple parameter (transfer rate) and to examine how its value ebbs and flows
as the institutional context of detention policy changes.
I therefore present here an empirical overview of detention policy from its
inception in 2002 to early 2016. This overview highlights the timing of pivotal
shifts in transfer/release policy. In turn, this temporal focus invites further
consideration of how these shifts related to changing separation-of-powers
dynamics. I start by presenting three different empirical analyses, each
providing a slightly different perspective on the problem. On the basis of this
accumulated evidence, I then offer some threshold inferences about how
changes at the separation-of-powers level correlated with, or diverged from,
changes in policy on the ground.
To start with, Figures 1a and 1b capture the long arc of detention policy.
Each figure presents changes over time in aggregate levels of detention at
Guantánamo and the marginal probability of transfer/release. Both flag four
watersheds of judicial and legislative involvement with vertical lines. The first
is June 28, 2004, when the Supreme Court handed down Rasul v. Bush.74 This
was the first colorable signal that judicial superintendence of the Guantánamo
detentions might be in the offing. The second is June 29, 2007, the date the
Boumediene detainees’ petition for rehearing was granted after an initial
certiorari filing had been rejected.75 The third is June 12, 2008, when Boumediene
was handed down.76 The majority opinion left open many important
questions.77 But it plainly resolved any question about the existence of judicial
review.78 The fourth is June 24, 2009, when the first legislative limit on
transfers was enacted.79 Once again, this is surely not a precise marker of the
exogenous shock to executive branch control. The White House no doubt
anticipated the restrictive legislation long before it reached the President’s
desk. Still, it provides a useful, if concededly rough, benchmark for analysis
of such effects, whether observed before final enactment or in its wake.
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 551 U.S 1161 (June 29, 2007).
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
See, e.g., id. at 787 (“The extent of the showing required of the Government in these cases is
a matter to be determined.”).
78 See id. at 798 (“The determination by the Court of Appeals that the Suspension Clause and
its protections are inapplicable to petitioners was in error.”).
79 Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103, 123 Stat. 1859, 1920-21 (2009).
74
75
76
77
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Figure 1a shows how three parameters changed over time. These
parameters are first, the overall detainee population at Guantánamo, net of
entrants and transfers, at a given point in time; second, the aggregate number
of detainee entries up to a point in time; and third, the aggregate number of
detainee releases up to a point in time. Figure 1b presents a parameter that is
often used for understanding population change over time: the Kaplan–Meier
survival function. The Kaplan–Meier measure is commonly used to
understand the temporal dimensions of a treatment in medical studies, where
treatment and control populations are characterized by different rates of survival
or death across a bounded study period.80 The shape81 of the Kaplan–Meier
curve represents the proclivity of the government at any given instance to
release further detainees. It thus precisely captures the government’s evolving
attitude toward detainee transfers.

80 The Kaplan–Meier function is used in studies with censored data—i.e., where subjects are only
observed for a certain time and the event of interest (e.g., death or recovery) might occur after the end of
the study. It is a step function with jumps at the observed event times, where the size of jumps depends
on the number of events (here, releases) observed at each event time ti, and also on the pattern of censored
observations prior to ti. See E.L. Kaplan & Paul Meier, Nonparametric Estimation from Incomplete
Observations, 53 AM. STAT. ASS’N J. 457, 458 (1958). For an example of the use of Kaplan–Meier curves in
legal scholarship, see, for example, Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis:
An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414,
1454-60 (2012), which utilizes the Kaplan–Meier function to estimate survival time in days from the
proposal of a federal rule to the issuance of the final rule.
81 I use the term “shape” here because, strictly speaking, a Kaplan–Meier curve does not have a gradient.
As a step-function, its derivation is either zero (between observations) or undefined (at observations).
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Figure 1a: Population Change and Institutional Dispensations in the
Guantánamo Detentions (2002–2015)82

Figure 1b: Kaplan–Meier Curve for Guantánamo Detentions (2002–2015)83

82 The data for Figure 1a was gathered as follows: The New York Times’ archive of pages on individual
detainees was scraped with a Python script to acquire data associated with individual data, including the
dates of transfer in and (where available) out of custody at the Cuban base. See infra Appendix.
83 The Kaplan–Meier functions presented were created using data aggregated from Wikileaks
and the individual-level data of the New York Times.
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The second snapshot isolates the timing of discrete decisions to add or
subtract to the net population of the Cuban base. Then, Figures 2a and 2b
isolate respectively the timing of government decisions to bring new
detainees to the base and to move detainees out of custody at the base. Each
bar represents the number of releases in a three-month period.
Figure 2a: Dates of Detainees’ Transfer into Custody at Guantánamo

Figure 2b: Detainees’ Transfer Out of Custody at Guantánamo
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This data, as I have already cautioned, should be taken with a pinch of
salt. The dates captured in Figures 1 and 2 do not necessarily reflect either
the absolute beginnings or definitive ends of detention. At the front end,
many detainees were in the custody of the United States or one of its allies
prior to their arrival at Guantánamo. In the Afghan theater, the process of
triaging detainees to the Cuban facility was institutionalized. From 2002, a
dedicated Detainee Review Board comprising ten officials rendered decisions
about whether individuals seized in that theater should be held in Afghanistan
or transferred to the Cuban base.84 Of course, such triaging is not instantaneous.
Detainees are thus necessarily in U.S. custody for some time before transfer
from the theater of battle.
At the back end, the decision to move an individual out of custody does
not quite equate to a decision that a detainee should not or cannot be held.
The government’s consistent practice during both the Bush and Obama
Administrations was to designate a person released from Guantánamo as “no
longer [an] enemy combatant[].”85 This is, I suppose, by definition not someone
who had been erroneously detained or someone whose detention could never
be justified as a matter of law. Obviously, such nomenclature has the advantage
of never having to concede error. Perhaps as a collateral benefit (from the
government’s perspective), it invites the further detention of an individual by
a receiving state. Indeed, some detainees were transferred to the custody of
another sovereign and moved immediately into further detention (and in some
instances harsh treatment).86 Saudi Arabia, for example, created the Prince
Muhammad bin Nayif Center for Counseling and Care, a custodial facility at
which at least 120 former Guantánamo detainees have been held.87 Other
84 See Jeff A. Bovarnick, Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to
Legitimacy, 2010 ARMY LAW. 9, 9, 16 (2010) (“As a detainee’s case was presented, the members of
the [Detainee Review Board] would form a consensus regarding whether the detainee met the
criteria of an enemy combatant . . . . If the detainee was determined to be an enemy combatant, the
next question was whether the detainee met the criteria to be sent to GTMO.”).
85 See Qassim v. Bush, 382 F. Supp. 2d. 126, 127-28, 127 n.3 (D.D.C. 2005) (describing the
operative nomenclature of release).
86 See Ken Silverstein, Pentagon Memo on Torture-Motivated Transfer Cited, L.A. TIMES (Dec.
8, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2005/dec/08/nation/na-torture8 [https://perma.cc/L9UVA8M6] (noting that the United States has delivered detainees to countries that are believed to still
practice torture).
87 See Charles E. Berger, A Rehab Model for Gitmo Detainees, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/20/opinion/la-oe-berger-closing-gitmo-yemen-20131120 [https://p
erma.cc/83RN-EL6N] (reporting that 120 Saudis formerly detained at Guantánamo were later held
in Saudi Arabia); see also Ellen Knickmeyer, Saudi Center Aims for ‘Life After Jihad,’ WALL ST. J.:
MIDDLE EAST (Apr. 24, 2013, 6:08 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2013/04/24/saudi-rehabcenter-aims-to-shape-life-after-jihad/ [https://perma.cc/5XLA-43XX] (describing conditions in that
rehabilitation facility). Of the first 146 detainees released, one report asserts that only seventeen
were transferred to the continuing custody of their own governments. Robert M. Chesney, Leaving
Guantánamo: The Law of International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 661-62 (2006).
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states notorious for their harsh and arbitrary penal systems, such as Gadhafi-era
Libya, also received detainees and proceeded to detain them further under
onerous conditions.88 Yet there is no public data on these periods of custody.
As a result, the information presented here is the best available account of
detention policy in a specific location.
A third snapshot provides a tighter temporal focus on the period from
January 2007 to December 2009. During this three-year window, the
executive’s control over Guantánamo policy eroded with the addition of retail
judicial supervision and then congressional intervention.89 It was thus a
pivotal moment for President Obama’s ambition, as well as a key opportunity
to understand the policy-level effects of the separation of powers. Mindful of
the heterogeneity of the prison population, it is useful to begin a closer
assessment of the evolution of detention policy at this key point by
distinguishing between detainees in terms of their perceived dangerousness.
Each of the classified detainee assessments released by Wikileaks contains an
evaluation of a detainee’s “risk” on a four-tier scale of none, low, medium, and
high.90 Whatever their underlying accuracy, these classifications plausibly
reflect the government’s own internal assessments of the security-related risk
presented by a detainee. They also contain important information on the
perceived relative riskiness of different detainees. To provide a context in
which the subsequent analyses can be better understood, Table 1a breaks down
the distribution of risk values by nationality across the whole detainee population.

88 See Ron Nordland & Scott Shane, Libyan, Once a Detainee, Is Now a U.S. Ally of Sorts, N.Y.
TIMES: THE GUANTÁNAMO FILES (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/world/gua
ntanamo-files-libyan-detainee-now-us-ally-of-sorts.html [https://perma.cc/4KNA-QKHY] (reporting on the
transfer of Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamuda bin Qumu, who was transferred to Libya in 2007).
89 See supra Section I.A.
90 For more details, see infra Appendix.
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Table 1a: Risk and Nationality Correlations

None

Low

Medium

High

Missing
Data

Total

Afghanistan

52

39

75

45

8

219

Saudi Arabia

4

1

59

68

2

134

Yemen

0

3

36

76

0

115

Pakistan

21

7

29

14

1

72

Algeria

0

1

8

17

0

26

China

0

2

19

1

0

22

Other Citizenship

10

12

51

106

13

192

Total

87

65

277

327

24

780

My analysis below uses those risk values, but it is important to flag two
reasons for caution. First, a careful reading of the 765 assessments released
by Wikileaks suggests that the risk assessments relied upon a plurality of
sources, including interrogations of the detainee being evaluated,91 other
detainees’ inculpatory statements, physical evidence obtained during the
capture of detainees, and other nations’ intelligence agencies. Although the
accuracy of information from these sources may vary greatly, the assessments
do not reflect overt weighting or discounting of evidence. In particular, the
assessments are consistently silent as to when evidence was obtained by either
American92 or foreign93 interrogators through coercion or torture.
Second, there is sometimes a large disconnect between the narrative
account of a detainee’s history and an ultimate risk assessment. For example,
the detainee assessment for Abd al Rahim Janko concludes that he may have
been a spy recruited by the United Arab Emirates to penetrate al Qaeda; that
he was certainly imprisoned and tortured by al Qaeda for two years; and that
he had been “substantially exploited” by the time the assessment was written.
Nevertheless, the assessment finds he “remains an enemy combatant,” a
“medium” risk to the “US, its interests, and allies,” and a “[high] threat from
91 Indeed, most assessments contain a section describing the detainee’s own version of the
events leading to his detention. Table 1a uses data from the New York Times on detainees for whom
no assessment is available.
92 See, e.g., William Glaberson, Detainee Was Tortured, a Bush Official Confirms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2009, at A22 (describing interrogations of Mohammed al-Qahtani at Guantánamo in 2002 and 2003).
93 See, e.g., David J.R. Frakt, Prisoners of Congress: The Constitutional and Political Clash over
Detainees and the Closure of Guantanamo, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 179, 210-13 (2012) (describing the use
of evidence supplied by Binyam Mohammed, who was interrogated under torture in Moroccan
custody before being moved to Guantánamo).
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a detention perspective.”94 It is hard to reconcile this conclusion with the
government’s own account of Janko’s history. Indeed, Janko later sought
judicial review, and in 2009 the district court ordered his release based on the
“inescapable” conclusion that he was no longer an enemy combatant.95 This
suggests that even when the facts in an assessment are uncontested, the
document’s ultimate taxonomical conclusion may not logically follow.
With these caveats in mind, Table 1b breaks down the three-year period
into six-month increments to highlight how release policy modulated over
time. For each six-month period, I report the number of detainees released.
I also show how the composition of released pools of detainees changed over
time in terms of perceived riskiness. I do not include figures for 2010 because
those quarters would contain a surfeit of empty cells. This Table thus provides
a snapshot into how the volume and composition of outflow from the Cuban
base changed during a crucial period. This then sets the stage for the more
granular analysis of the ‘why’ of detention policy in the next subsection.
Table 1b: The Elements of Detainee Release Policy Between 2007 and 2009

Detainees
released
Change (%)
from initial
population

1/1/2007–

7/1/2007–

1/1/2008–

7/1/2008–

1/1/2009–

7/1/2009–

6/30/2007

12/31/2007

6/30/2008

12/31/2008

6/30/2009

12/31/2009

38

84

14

22

12

37

-8.84

-23.27

-4.69

-8.33

-5.37

-13.54

Percent of Detainees in Each Risk Value Category
No risk

0

0

0

0

0

0

Low risk

0.84

0.76

0.79

0.85

0.91

0

Medium risk

27.56

23.57

22.83

22.13

22.27

22.16

High risk

71.51

76.43

76.38

77.02

77.27

77.84

94 See Detainee Assessment for Abd al Rahim Janko 2 (on file with author); see also
Memorandum from D.M. Thomas, Jr., Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, to Commander, U.S. Southern
Command, Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SY-000489DP (S)
(June 30, 2008), https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/pdf/sy/us9sy-000489dp.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW2G24H6] (reporting the detainee assessment brief for Abd al Rahim Janko).
95 Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 125-30 (D.D.C. 2009). Janko was not the only
detainee allegedly held as a spy by the Taliban before his transfer to the Cuban base. See Tim Golden,
Expecting U.S. Help, Sent to Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/10/15/us/15gitmo.html [https://perma.cc/6X5N-NNJK] (detailing the 2011 detention of
former–Taliban prisoner Abdul Rahim Al Ginco in Guantánamo).
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C. The Implications of Detention Policy’s Trajectory
With these analyses in hand, it is appropriate to consider what inferences
can be drawn about the effect separation-of-powers shifts had on granular
policy decisions (here, the rate of transfers or releases) on the ground. I draw
four somewhat disparate inferences from this population-level data related to
the separation of powers, partisan change, and underlying policy-based constraints
in shaping detention policy. Although heterogeneous, these inferences
provide some insight into different causal elements of policy changes.
First, Guantánamo policy was characterized by a rapid intake of prisoners
followed by a long, drawn-out process of releases. More than 740 of the 780
detainees known to have passed through Guantánamo were brought to the
Cuban base in the camp’s first two years of operation.96 But by the end of
2004, the Bush Administration had largely ceased using Guantánamo as a
facility for newly seized detainees.97 The one exception to this policy occurred
in 2006, when a group of twelve so-called “high value detainees” were moved
to Guantánamo from secret CIA facilities known as black sites.98 This late
burst of activity, however, is best understood as a shuffling of existing
custodial arrangements catalyzed by the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision to
extend minimal international humanitarian law coverage to all detainees.99 It
is not evidence of Guantánamo’s use to house new captures after 2004. In
effect, the in-flow to Guantánamo had ceased at least four years before partisan
change came to the White House. This is somewhat in tension with celebratory
accounts of the Obama Administration as an agent of policy change.100
Rather, after 2004, the central policy choice facing both the Bush and Obama
Administrations was instead whether or when to release existing detainees.
Second, neither partisan change in the White House nor the instigation of
post-Boumediene judicial review had an immediate catalytic effect on the rate
of transfers and releases. Contrary to liberal criticism, the data shows that the
Bush Administration took a relatively aggressive stance toward detainee-release
policy. In three of the four years of Bush’s second term, upwards of one hundred
detainees were released. At least initially, the Obama Administration followed
the Bush Administration’s approach by persevering in a relatively robust
See supra Figure 1a.
See supra Figure 1a.
See Morris D. Davis, Historical Perspective on Guantánamo Bay: The Arrival of the High Value
Detainees, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 115, 119 (2009) (detailing the transfer of detainees from the
CIA to the DOD in Guantánamo).
99 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 (2006) (holding that Common Article 3 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions applies to military operations against al Qaeda).
100 See Lederman, supra note 27. In addition, Lederman gives the Obama Administration credit
for formalizing changes to interrogation policy that had been, in fact, made on the ground several
years earlier by the Bush Administration. Id.
96
97
98
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release policy.101 This once more suggests that—notwithstanding presidential
campaign promises—the partisan transition from a Republican to a Democratic
White House was characterized by continuity rather than change.102
Moreover, it is very hard to discern any instantaneous effect of judicial or
congressional intervention upon detention policy. The key watersheds of
judicial and legislative change, that is, are not associated with sharp changes
in the rate of transfers. Instead, Figures 1a and 1b illustrate a more subtle and
gradual change in the rate of transfers, which gradually diminishes over 2009
and falls to zero in 2010. Hence, if anything, the beginning of the Obama
presidency marked a slowdown in efforts to disperse the detainee population,
although not quite a sudden halt.
Third, Figure 2b and Table 1b together permit more precise identification
of one important and puzzling inflection point in detention policy. Only in
the first quarter of 2010—almost one year into President Obama’s tenure in
the Oval Office—did the rate of transfers and releases drop precipitously to
almost zero. This collapse in departures from Guantánamo is plainly attributable
to the Obama Administration—not the Bush Administration. Furthermore,
it occurred some time after judicial and legislative intervention.
This collapse also presents a puzzle that is critical to my analysis: Why
did the flow of releases and transfers collapse at that time? This question is at
the heart of the puzzle identified at the Article’s outset, and is a focal point
for much of what follows.
Fourth, and related to the last point, the data presented above allows us to
rule out one potential theory about the policy change. This alternative theory
would proceed as follows: prior to early 2010, the government faced a pool of
detainees who, by its own determination, presented a low risk of recidivism.
In 2010, following years of low-risk detainees being transferred or released,
that pool of lower-risk detainees dried up. The marginal detainee was
perceived as far more risky. Hence, the rate of transfers necessarily shifted
into a lower gear, despite the Obama Administration’s contrary intentions.
Yet this theory does not stand up to scrutiny. In particular, Table 1b
suggests that the collapse in releases and transfers cannot be attributed to
changes in the perceived characteristics of the marginal detainee next in line
101 See supra Figure 1a.
102 This continuity is stressed by many. See CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA’S
POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY 35 (2015) [hereinafter SAVAGE, POWER WARS] (“[A] range of people across

the ideological spectrum would voice, with increasing intensity, what became a defining accusation
not just of the moment, but of the entire presidency: Obama was acting like Bush.”); see also James P.
Pfiffner, The Constitutional Legacy of George W. Bush, 45 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 727, 728, 733-38
(2015) (“As senator, Obama often criticized Bush on constitutional and policy grounds. But when he
became president, although he curbed some of President Bush’s excesses, he adopted similar policies and
extended some of them regarding indefinite detention, electronic surveillance, and signing statements.”).
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for release over time. Consider the bottom half of Table 1b, which illustrates
the relative composition of the released detainees by their assigned risk values
in their classified detainee assessments. These rows show that from the
beginning of 2007 onward, high-risk individuals comprised an overwhelming
majority of the released detainees. By 2006, almost all the no-risk and low-risk
detainees had already been transferred out.103 Thereafter, the proportions of
medium- and high-risk detainees in each batch of transferred or released
detainees remained quite stable. Rather, across all periods, the modal
transferee had been classified by the government as presenting a “high-risk.”
Although it is at least possible that other unobserved detainee characteristics
might have caused a sudden contraction of releases in 2010, a threshold
examination of the government’s own data belies the suggestion that there
was a shift in the characteristics of the marginal detainee that explains the
collapsed release rate in 2010.
Anecdotal evidence also confirms that the shift in release patterns in early
2010 did not result from a change in detainee characteristics. Soon after
entering the White House, President Obama established an interagency
taskforce to reanalyze evidence respecting each detainee and to recommend
appropriate individual dispositions. In its final report, issued in mid-2009,
the Obama Task Force identified 126 of the 240 detainees then in custody as
“approved for transfer.”104 The Task Force indicated that “for most of the
detainees approved for transfer, there were varying degrees of evidence
indicating that they were low-level foreign fighters affiliated with al-Qaida or
other groups operating in Afghanistan.”105 But almost six years later, in
December 2015, forty-eight of the 107 detainees still in custody were cleared
for transfer.106 While a decision to transfer is not an admission of erroneous
detention, as previously noted,107 the persistence of significant numbers of
individuals identified as amenable to release in late December 2015 once more
implies that earlier shifts in the rate of transfers cannot be attributed to a
dearth of eligible candidates.
See supra Table 1b.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL., FINAL REPORT: GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE 2-3
(2010) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
105 Id. at 16.
106 Charlie Savage, 17 Guantánamo Prisoner Transfers Said to Be Pending, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2015, at A25. The tally of 107 detainees is derived from the data presented in Figure 1. Accord
Timeline, N.Y. TIMES: THE GUANTÁNAMO DOCKET (Oct. 20, 2016), http://projects.nytimes.com/
guantanamo [https://perma.cc/YE84-2TDV].
107 Clearances for transfer, however, are treated as “protected” information that cannot be
disclosed, or discussed by, detainees’ counsel. See, e.g., Ameziane v. Obama, 699 F.3d 488, 498 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (explaining that even foreign governments must obtain this information through official
U.S. government channels and, as a result, counsel for detainees were barred by law from pointing
out that, even if there was a legal justification for their client’s detention, the government itself
identified no compelling policy justification to that end).
103
104
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In summary, an analysis of population-level data concerning the Guantánamo
detentions provides an important threshold insight about the policy effects
of the separation of powers. Surprisingly, partisan change within the
executive was associated with fewer, rather than more, releases. Perhaps more
surprisingly, the involvement of multiple branches was not associated with
any easing of release policy. And the collapse of the detainee outflow in 2010
cannot be explained by changes in the marginal detainee’s characteristics.
Understanding why President Obama’s agenda failed must be determined
through a more granular examination of interbranch dynamics in the critical
period between 2009 and 2010.
II. DETENTION POLICY WITHIN AND BETWEEN THE BRANCHES
This Part analyzes in detail the behavior of each branch in order to evaluate
how each one influenced the marginal rate of releases from Guantánamo
between 2009 and 2010. The ultimate aim of this analysis is to illuminate the
effect of interbranch dynamics on presidential power. Three lines of inquiry
are developed. These concern, respectively, the roles of the executive (and, in
particular, the military bureaucracy responsible for detention policy),
Congress, and the judiciary.
The central claims advanced in this Part can be summarized briefly at the
outset. I demonstrate that the military bureaucracy engaged in a rational
triaging of detainees with transfers and releases through early 2010. Partisan
change in the White House precipitated a departure from this trajectory, even
though, as Part I suggested, the substance of detainee policy and relative
detainee characteristics next in line for transfer remained largely unchanged.
The ensuing collapse in transfers is also poorly explained by the diplomatic
difficulty of obtaining agreement from a potential transferee country. Rather,
that collapse was propelled by an alliance between the military bureaucracy
and Congress—one initiated, importantly, by the former rather than the latter.
On the one hand, the bureaucracy catalyzed legislators’ policy entrepreneurship
by stoking public fears of detainee recidivism through strategic epistemic
disclosures. On the other hand, Congress responded to military bureaucratic
concern about detainee recidivism by legislating platforms for further
resistance within the executive. Elites within Congress and the bureaucracy
at the same time fueled public concern about recidivism. Finally, the Article
III courts consistently resisted any large checking function. Rather, they drew
up a substantive law of detention more capacious than what was sought by
Department of Justice litigators or implemented by military bureaucrats.
This account suggests that interbranch dynamics can impede a high-profile
presidential agenda—albeit not in the way the Boumediene Court and
sympathetic commentators seemed to anticipate. It further highlights the need
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to account for not only the legal effects of the separation of powers—which here
are meager—but also to consider closely the specific institutional channels
through which interbranch dynamics unfold. In particular, my analysis suggests
that Article II cannot usefully be viewed as creating a unitary entity. Rather,
it has engendered an internally heterogeneous institution comprised of factions
capable of allying with other branches to successfully resist presidential
agendas. It demonstrates that interbranch conflict, though not inherent to the
separation of powers, can emerge organically from intrabranch politicking.
Correlatively, my analysis points toward the limits of social action as a
catalyst of constitutional and legal change. To the extent habeas litigation
provided the most apparent lever for civil society to extract policy change,
insiders in the government were able to defang external critics. As a result,
change and continuity in this period flowed from dynamics internal to the
state rather than the external political surround.108
A. The Executive and the Rate of Detainee Transfers
Judicial and congressional influences on detention policy arose against a
background of unilateral executive decisions. Understanding their effects
requires a baseline account of that executive decisionmaking. To that end, this
subsection explores a series of alternative explanations for the dynamics
mapped in Part I. I begin by rejecting two potential explanations. First, I
present an empirical analysis of how military decisionmakers’ transfer
decisions were shaped by concerns about recidivism risk and diplomatic
constraints—two forms of “private” information that might explain how and
why the rate of transfers changed over time. This empirical analysis strongly
suggests a baseline rationality in transfer and release decisions that informed
policy through 2010. Given my baseline findings about bureaucratic rationality
and efficiency, it is implausible to explain the Guantánamo prison’s persistence
by suggesting that military commanders responsible for the Cuban base’s
operation consistently dragged their heels. Moreover, I consider and reject
the possibility that the decline in transfers under President Obama was driven
by diplomatic constraints, in the sense of growing difficulties in finding
countries that would accept transferred detainees. Something more is needed
to explain the volte-face of 2009 and 2010.
Finally, I draw on both theoretical and secondary sources to posit a more
promising explanation. A pivotal explanatory factor appears to be a sharp
uptick in resistance to transfers from the military bureaucracy. This attitudinal
shift within the bureaucracy was precipitated not by a shift in underlying
108 In contrast, social forces may have been more effective earlier in the evolution of Guantánamo
policy. See supra text accompanying notes 17–22.
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operational policy. Rather, the most plausible explanation links it to partisan
rotation at the executive branch’s summit. This internal shift provides a first
element of the larger account I aim to assemble in this Article.
1. Determinants of Executive Release Decisions
A central argument for executive control of policymaking, and national
security policy decisions more generally, is the executive’s comparative
institutional advantage in gathering and analyzing information.109 Arguments
from epistemic superiority assume that the executive not only has access to
information that other branches lack, but also that it employs such information
in an unbiased and effective fashion to make discrete policy decisions.
Whether separation-of-powers constraints on executive initiatives are
warranted depends on whether such presumptions are accurate or misleading.
In the detention context, the executive has privileged access to two kinds
of information not generally available to other branches or external actors.
First, it has information about the risk a given detainee poses based on his past
actions, his statements during custody, and his behavior in custody. Second, it
possesses information obtained via diplomatic channels about the willingness,
or lack thereof, of other nations to receive a potential transferred detainee and
engage in whatever further custodial or surveillance measures U.S. officials
believe to be appropriate. The classified detainee assessments reflect, in part,
the executive’s epistemic stocks, since they contain nationality data (which
relates to the possibility of transfer) and risk values. So the question arises:
Did the executive use this information to pursue a rational transfer policy?
Figures 3a and 3b provide snapshots, respectively, of how recidivism risk
and diplomatic constraints influenced detention decisions. Both figures
report results from the same ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis.
The population analyzed in this regression comprises all detainees who have
been released through 2015; it excludes detainees remaining in custody at the
close of the study period (December 2015).110 The dependent variable (i.e.,
what is being explained) is the time in detention until release for the subset
of the population who have, in fact, been released. The OLS regression
specification that was used measures the correlation between a former
detainee’s prior time in detention and dummy variables for risk assessments
109 For arguments from comparative epistemic competence, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein,
Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 62, summarizing “noteworthy” judicial opinions offering
“broad pronouncements about the need to defer to the executive” on matters of national security,
and Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1204
(2007), arguing that the executive is “in the best position” to weigh competing interests, thus
warranting significant deference to executive decisions.
110 Analyses of the complete population do not generate meaningfully different results.
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and nationality. For ease of interpretation, I do not present the full regression
specification or results here. Rather, Figures 3a and 3b present the marginal
effect of each covariate on the duration of time before release in percentage
terms. Stated in plain English, the dot in each line presents the average
percentage change in the duration of detention when a specific trait is
attached to a detainee, holding all other traits constant.111 The bars around
each dot represent the ninety-five percent confidence interval for that estimate.112
A confidence interval containing zero (marked with a vertical line on Figures
3a and 3b) implies that the effect of that trait is statistically insignificant.
Figure 3a: Marginal Effect of Risk Assessments on the Duration
of Time Before Release (in percentage terms)

111 I use a baseline of no-risk and Afghan nationality. I use Afghan nationality as a baseline
because it is the most frequently encountered nationality, and Afghan detainees tended to be released
quicker than other nationalities.
112 There is, in effect, only a one-in-twenty chance that the true effect of a trait lies outside
those bounds.
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Figure 3b: Marginal Effect of Detainee Nationality on the Duration
of Time Before Release (in percentage terms)

Consider each analysis in turn. Figure 3a shows how the assignment of
low-, medium-, and high-risk values within a detainee’s assessment correlates
with the expected duration of detention. In each case, the effect of moving a
detainee from no-risk (holding all else constant) is statistically significant.
The assignment of medium- and high-risk values to a detainee, indeed, both
have quite large effects on extending custody: both are associated with more
than a doubling of the time before release. This suggests—not surprisingly—that
the government’s internal evaluations of security risk had a large effect on its
decisions to release or detain individual detainees.
Figure 3b in turn suggests that risk evaluations are not the only determinants
of release—nationality matters too.113 The largest statistically significant
effects are associated with Chinese nationality (which in practice comprises a
group of ethnic Uighurs) and Yemenis. Other nationalities do not evince as
large effects on detention duration. Although leading journalistic accounts of
detention stress the difficulties in resettlement posed by detainees of these
nationalities above all else,114 the Yemeni and Uighur detainees comprise but
a small fraction (fifteen percent and three percent, respectively) of the overall
113 Together, risk values and nationality on release suggests that the former predicts about sixty
percent of the variance in outcomes, while the latter predicts about thirty-five percent of the variance.
114 See SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 104, 300 (describing the White House’s reluctance
to transfer Yemeni detainees in 2010 due to troubling security conditions in their home country).
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detainee population. All but seven of the Uighurs, moreover, had been
transferred from the Cuban base before the end of 2009.115 For the remaining
eighty-two percent of the detainee population, nationality seems to matter
much less, if at all, to the duration of detention.
It is possible to dig a bit deeper on the contours of bureaucratic rationality.
In that vein, Figure 4 decomposes the detainee assessments produced each
year based on the organizational affiliations identified in those assessments.116
I use data on three categories of affiliations: Taliban; al Qaeda and its affiliates;
and no affiliation at all.117
Figure 4: Detainee Assessment Production and the
Mix of Affiliations (2002–2009)

Figure 4 provides some evidence of risk-based triaging of detainees for
bureaucratic processing between 2002 and 2009. It seems reasonable to
presume that al Qaeda was generally viewed as a more dangerous affiliation
than a Taliban affiliation, and that either affiliation signaled a greater risk than
the absence of any affiliation. Applying that presumption to Figure 4 suggests
David Johnston, 6 Uighurs Leave Guantánamo for Palau, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at A22.
This information was obtained by parallel machine-coding and human-coding all 765
assessments for the affiliations and actions assigned therein to the individual detainee. For more
details, see infra Appendix.
117 To put these categories in perspective, seventy-six assessments identified a Taliban affiliation;
402 identified an al Qaeda affiliation; and 146 identified an affiliation with another organization
covered by the AUMF. In contrast, 205 assessments contained no affiliation at all.
115
116
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that, prior to either judicial or legislative involvement, the military prioritized
the triage of detainees who presented the best case for release. Individuals
with no discerned affiliation to al Qaeda or the Taliban were moved out of
custody first.118 Those associated with al Qaeda and its affiliates were kept in
custody longer.
The data presented in Figures 3a, 3b, and 4 point toward two conclusions
about the quality of executive action even prior to legislative or judicial
intervention. First, military decisionmaking on detention was characterized
by a baseline rationality evident both in the way individuals were triaged for
processing and also based on overall patterns of observed releases.119 Such
rationing may have reflected an effort to better allocate detention-related
resources by weeding out detainees without a compelling case for continued
custody. Further, this rationing also reflects the significant fiscal burden of
detention. Each year an individual is in detention at the Cuban base costs the
government roughly $800,000.120 Between 2011 and 2013, during a period of
fiscal austerity across the federal government, the Cuban detentions cost
taxpayers $1.42 billion.121 In short, even a bureaucracy with no interest in the
identification of false positives may have felt constrained to transfer or release
detainees who posed no risk.
Second, this data undermines yet another alternative explanation for the
drop in the transfer rate identified in Part I.C. Recall that I have considered
and rejected the hypothesis that transfers fell in frequency because of a
change in the marginal detainee’s recidivism-related risk. An alternative
possibility is that the shift observed in 2009 and 2010 flowed from a change
in the diplomatic costs of transfer. Diplomatic frictions might arise because
countries to which detainees would be transferred based on their nationality
(e.g., Pakistan, Afghanistan) are either unwilling to receive their nationals or
are perceived by the United States as unable to take appropriate precautions.
The data, however, does not support this hypothesis. There are two
nationalities—Yemeni and Chinese (i.e., Uighur)—for which nationality does
118 Of note, 169 assessments identify no affiliation and no action by the detainee that could warrant
detention. These detainees were still held between 137 and 2925 days, for an average of 733 days.
119 Cf. THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY 5-6 (1991) (identifying
“techno-bureaucratic rationality” as a method of rationality “that recognzied the limitations [posed
by] inadequate data, unquantifiable values, mixed societal goals, and potential realities”).
120 See Carol Rosenberg, Guantánamo: The Most Expensive Prison on Earth, MIAMI HERALD
(Nov. 8, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantan
amo/article1938974.html [https://perma.cc/4EJU-RZEN] (explaining that the average annual cost
of $800,000 for each of the 171 detainees makes Guantánamo the most expensive prison in the world).
121 See Ken Gude, Guantanamo: America’s $5 Billion Folly, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec.
3, 2013, 8:57 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2013/12/03/80270/gua
ntanamo-americas-5-billion-folly-2/ [https://perma.cc/Z4NH-ULZE] (describing the total cost of
Guantánamo over a three-year period).
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large work in explaining changes in the timing of release. But, as I have noted,
neither Yemenis nor Uighurs comprised a large fraction of the residual
detainee population at the beginning of 2009. By that time, all but seven of
the Uighurs had been transferred from the Cuban base.122 Of the remaining
population, only thirty had Yemeni nationality, which implicated severe
diplomatic constraints because of their nationality and the perceived
deterioration in the Yemeni security situation.123
Another explanation related to changing costs of transfer might be
hypothesized. This alternative explanation would focus on the possibility that
transfers in 2009 and 2010 required the cooperation of third countries—i.e.,
countries besides the United States that did not have nationals at Guantánamo,
which might have cooled to the prospect of housing Guantánamo detainees
in late 2009 to 2010. Traces of this dynamic appear in press accounts of efforts
to relocate Uighur detainees at Guantánamo. But there are reasons to doubt
that it supplies a persuasive explanation for the more global slow-down in
transfers. To start, it is puzzling that third countries would increase diplomatic
resistance to transfers in the wake of the unilateralist President Bush’s departure
and the arrival of the more multilateralist President Obama. It seems more
plausible to think that failures in diplomacy flowed from shifts in U.S.
behavior—such as increased internecine conflict within the bureaucracy, or a
waning of diplomatic efforts—than to external changes. Finally, recall that
Figures 1a and 1b showed that the rate of transfers picks up slowly in 2014. It
is hard to understand why third countries’ views on Guantánamo would
calcify in 2009 (as the soon-to-be-Nobel-winning President Obama came to
office) and then soften in 2014 (absent any external stimulus).
In summary, neither changes in the riskiness of the marginal detainee nor rising
diplomatic costs well explains the collapse in transfers in 2009 and 2010. The
empirical data, instead, is consistent with a body of anecdotal evidence—presented
below—that attributes significance to the military bureaucracy’s attitude toward
President Obama’s project of closing Guantánamo.
2. Bureaucratic Incentives in Times of Partisan Change
The empirical portrait developed so far presents a puzzle: if transfer
policy reflected a risk-based triaging, constrained by diplomatic concerns in a
handful of cases, and neither risk nor diplomatic barriers explain the decline
in transfers, what can explain the collapse in observed transfers from
Guantánamo? I develop a tentative answer to that question here by going

See supra text accompanying notes 113–15.
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 104, at 18 (recognizing the difficulties of transfers to
Yemen given the country’s unstable security situation).
122
123
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beyond the limited stock of empirical data to explore the shifting tenor of
bureaucratic behavior during the political transition between the Bush and
Obama Administrations.
A body of evidence points toward a shift in bureaucratic dynamics within the
executive branch after the partisan transition of 2009, which played a critical
role in slowing the rate of transfers. According to multiple independently
sourced news reports during that period, the diplomats tasked by the Obama
White House with arranging and expediting transfers encountered new
internal resistance. “Since Obama took office in 2009,” those officials encountered
a pattern of delays and obstructions by the military bureaucracy that hindered
transfers.124 That bureaucracy, as Connie Bruck has elaborated in a detailed
journalistic account, was driven by a belief that the prison was “an asset too
important to lose.”125 The special envoy responsible for negotiating such
transfers between 2009 and 2012 sought and was reassigned to another
position “because the Pentagon was not permitting any [transfers].”126 His
successor from 2013 to 2015 also reported that his diplomatic efforts remained
focused on those cleared for release in 2009, at the very beginning of the
Obama Administration.127
In some instances, it appears the resistance to certain transfers did not
rest on any colorable policy justification. For example, the high-profile
transfer of detainee Shaker Aamer was arranged with the United Kingdom in
2013 but remained in limbo for more than two years because the Pentagon
blocked “the return of Aamer and two longtime Guantánamo Bay detainees.”128
Similar efforts to release a Mauritanian detainee, Ahmed Ould Abdel Aziz,
were blocked by military bureaucrats wielding a “shifting array of objections.”129
Ultimately, in November 2013, the President had to personally promise to
“help” diplomats in “bureaucratic fights” to get transfers moving again.130 In
short, conflict between agencies undermined the President’s agenda.131 And
124 See Charles Levinson & David Rohde, Special Report: Pentagon Thwarts Obama’s Effort to
Close Guantanamo, REUTERS (Dec. 29, 2015, 5:19 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-gitm
o-release-special-report-idUSKBN0UB1B020151229 [https://perma.cc/3347-WYUL] (noting how officials
at the Pentagon used bureaucracy to interfere with President Obama’s aspiration to close Guantánamo).
125 Bruck, supra note 28, at 36.
126 SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 495.
127 Janet Reitman, Inside Gitmo: America’s Shame, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.
rollingstone.com/politics/news/inside-gitmo-americas-shame-20151230 [https://perma.cc/5T4F-NEG4].
128 Spencer Ackerman, Pentagon Blocking Guantánamo Deals to Return Shaker Aamer and Other
Cleared Detainees, GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2015, 1:30 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/
aug/13/pentagon-blocking-guantanamo-transfer-shaker-aamer [https://perma.cc/79TH-QBSC].
129 Bruck, supra note 28, at 43.
130 SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 511-12. Tellingly, Savage also asserts that the
reappointment of a transfer envoy “blindsided” relevant Pentagon officials. Id.
131 In the international affairs literature, scholars have posited that “differences in bureaucratic
culture” may have undermined the possibility of a coherent policy agenda. Daniel W. Drezner, Ideas,

538

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 165: 499

while the available evidence does not permit more fine-grained identification
of which entities within the sprawling military apparatus engendered this
resistance, it at least provides a threshold reason for identifying the military
bureaucracy writ large as a source of resistance to Guantánamo’s closure.
President Obama faced bureaucratic resistance from within the military
with respect to a number of other counterterrorism policies. Anecdotal evidence
also identifies bureaucratic resistance as a friction on his efforts to manage
the military campaign in Afghanistan.132 Interestingly, the leading account of
this campaign isolates leaks as a key tool employed by bureaucrats to
undermine the President.133 Similarly, security studies scholars Conor Keane
and Steve Wood have identified disabling bureaucratic conflict in other parts
of the counterterrorism mission at roughly the same moment that transfers
from Guantánamo came to a halt.134 In their penetrating empirical study,
Keane and Wood show that the military’s post-conflict reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan were undermined by conflict between “several practically incompatible
conceptions predominating within disparate agency silos.”135 In addition to
documenting pervasive coordination problems, Keane and Wood underscore
the persistence of a “war fighting rather than a whole-of-government strategy,”
which led to unsustainable and often counterproductive reconstruction efforts.136
In a similar vein, Keane has charted the conflict between military and civilian
agencies over counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, with Pentagon officials
treating what was to become the Taliban’s principal income source as “an
unwelcome diversion from eliminating the remnants of al-Qaeda’s leadership.”137
The possibility of bureaucratic resistance as a constraint on presidential
power is also consistent with both historical and theoretical accounts of an
entrenched and occasionally recalcitrant national security bureaucracy that
has developed in path-dependent ways—occasionally at odds with the
preferences of its executive branch overseers.138 These accounts diagnose the
Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 733, 737 (2000). For the
classical account of the relation between interagency conflict and foreign policy, see generally
GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971).
132 See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD, OBAMA’S WARS 192-95 (2010) (describing Obama’s frustration
that the “White House was losing control of the public narrative” on the Afghan campaign due to
military officials’ leaks).
133 Id.
134 Conor Keane & Steve Wood, Bureaucratic Politics, Role Conflict, and the Internal Dynamics of
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, 42 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y. 99, 103 (2016).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 105.
137 Conor Keane, The Impact of Bureaucratic Conflict on US Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,
12 FOREIGN POL’Y ANALYSIS 295, 302 (2016).
138 See generally AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JSC,
AND NSC (1999) (identifying the path-dependent historical development of key national security
agencies as an explanation for their limited capacities and reach).
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divergence in preferences between the White House and the military in terms
of a principal–agent problem that afflicts the regulatory state more generally.139
Samuel Huntington famously sketched a model of civilian and military
leadership driven by conflicting imperatives, by an internal competition for
control, and by diverse interactions with each other and with society.140 He
also anticipated the possibility that elements of the military bureaucracy
dissatisfied with presidential leadership might try to obtain a more favorable
audience in Congress.141 As I shall develop below, it is precisely this sort of
“divide and conquer” strategy that elements of the military bureaucracy
appear to have played here.
To be sure, the two-principal problem is endemic across the regulatory
state. But it is plausible to posit that the degree of agency slack in the military
and national security contexts is especially acute. Military leaders have their
own sources of public prestige—and thus can more effectively resist presidential
initiatives by appealing directly to the public.142 As the example of detention
amply shows, military bureaucracies also have access to distinctive epistemic
resources that political actors lack. As a result, “[b]ureaucratically sophisticated
mid-level officers inside the Pentagon are able to effect the adoption of their
policy judgments in the Executive Branch and Congress ‘against the wishes
of civilian leaders to the contrary.’”143 Additionally, the effective domain of
military-bureaucratic independence has expanded over time. Writing in 2002,
the distinguished military historian Richard Kohn worried that “the American
military has grown in influence to the point of being able to impose its own
perspective on many policies and decisions.”144 At least in the detention
context, Kohn’s words seem prescient.

139 See Huq, Structural Constitutionalism, supra note 12, at 911-16 (describing bureaucratic constraints
on presidential control of national security matters); see also Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in
American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1816 (2012) (“Agencies
are disciplined not solely by the constraints of rationality, legal doctrine, and political power, but
also by the social and institutional environments in which they are embedded.”). See generally Kagan,
supra note 10, at 2299 (noting that “agency resistance to presidential preferences [in] . . . the form
of inertia” has been recognized as a basic fact of the federal regulatory state).
140 See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND
POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 80-97 (1957) (outlining how civilian control can be
defined vis-à-vis its essential role with the military).
141 See id. at 182-83; see also id. at 415-16 (criticizing the National Security Act of 1949 for
allowing direct bureaucratic access to Congress).
142 See, e.g., Russell F. Weigley, The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control From
McClellan to Powell, 57 J. MIL. HIST., Oct. 1993, at 28 (referring to General Powell writing a New York
Times op-ed piece and directly appealing to the public about his opposition to the Bosnian intervention).
143 Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers, 90 TEX. L. REV.
797, 798 (2012).
144 Richard H. Kohn, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today, 55
NAVAL WAR C. REV., Summer 2002, at 9; see also PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY,
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3. The Causes of Bureaucratic Resistance
Neither the aforementioned news sources nor these accounts of
contemporaneous internecine institutional conflicts that disabled a
counterterrorism mission explain the reasons for the sudden spike in
bureaucratic “intransigence.”145 This section offers hypotheses about why
bureaucratic attitudes toward Guantánamo shifted so abruptly. Given the
available evidentiary record, it is not possible to adjudicate fully between
these hypotheses, even though the key role of certain elements within the
military bureaucracy seems clear. Moreover, it is important to flag once more
that the available data does not conduce to more fine-grained parsing of
exactly which elements within the Pentagon bureaucracy played a pivotal role
in shifting bureaucratic attitudes. With these caveats, it is still possible to
isolate three hypotheses about the specific causal mechanism at work.
First, it is striking that the rupture in bureaucratic behavior described
here arose in the wake of partisan change in the White House, rather than in
response to some immediate change in policy (i.e., the presidentially required
rate of releases).146 I focus here on partisan change within the executive in
part because the anecdotal evidence points in that direction, and in part
because the shift in bureaucratic behavior appears unrelated to other changes
to the separation-of-powers environment.147 Further, as I explore below, the
evidence suggests that this internal change led to shifts in legislative behavior
rather than vice versa.148 As Part I demonstrated, the Bush and Obama
Administrations pursued substantially similar policies, with the former
overseeing a higher rate of detainee releases. It seems unlikely, therefore, that
simple “ideological opposition”149 at the discrete policy level alone explains
the bureaucratic opposition. After all, military officials were being tasked with
roughly the same task of identifying detainees for release both before and after
the 2008 election.150 Instead, one way of interpreting the time trends illustrated
in Figure 1a is that partisan change at the presidential leadership level was
OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 58-68 (2003) (describing principal–agent
dynamics in the military context).
145 See Ackerman, supra note 128. Bruck identifies the Defense Department’s concern with
casualty risk as the reason for its recalcitrance. Bruck, supra note 28. But this does not explain why
the Pentagon’s resistance to transfer changed with Obama’s entry into office.
146 Cf. Kohn, supra note 144, at 33 (documenting military resistance to institutional reform
during the Bush and Clinton Administrations).
147 See supra Section I.A.
148 See infra text accompanying notes 168–74.
149 See Reitman, supra note 127 (quoting an unnamed Administration official to the effect that
“there are people working on this issue within the government who are ideologically opposed to
closing the facility”).
150 See supra Figure 1a (showing that the number of releases remained consistent before and
after the 2008 election).
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associated with different levels of cooperation within agencies even holding
roughly constant the pro-release orientation of policy both before and after 2008. If
the substance of detention policy seems not to be a dispositive influence, this
leaves open the possibility that the identity of the commander-in-chief may
have influenced the degree of bureaucratic resistance to detainee transfers.
The available data does not directly explain why the identity of the
President might have altered bureaucratic preferences, even though granular
policymaking did not evince change in the expected direction. Two
mechanisms, which may be complementary rather than mutually exclusive,
merit serious consideration. The first possibility is that relevant military
bureaucrats anticipated ex ante a lower degree of across-the-board cooperation
and support from a Democratic rather than a Republican President given the
Republican Party’s historical association with more robust support for the
armed services.151 That the senior ranks of the military are also “more
conservative” than their historical predecessors152 could only have exacerbated
worries about the divergence of interest that partisan change would bring.
Anticipating conflict with the White House—say, over staffing, funding, or
prosecutions in alleged torture cases—military bureaucrats might treat the
President’s detention-related agenda item as a valuable bargaining chip, not
to be frittered away lightly.
Another possibility builds on the “Nixon goes to China” effect described
by political scientist Robert Goodin.153 Goodin pointed out that when “an
action is somehow out of character for a particular politician, then, for that
very reason there are fewer external obstacles to that politician’s performing
it.”154 Although Goodin did not explain why this might happen, one possible
causal mechanism turns on credibility. A politician taking a counterintuitive
position can more credibly claim to be pursuing a position based on its
intrinsic merits rather than ideological grounds. On this logic, it was the very
fact that President Obama might have been expected to take liberal positions
on Guantánamo that rendered his embrace of those positions less credible
and less persuasive than President Bush’s. President Obama’s credibility
problem, moreover, may have been exacerbated by the fact that his 2008
agenda took the categorical position that Guantánamo had to be emptied
completely.155 Coming from a Democratic President, an unqualified declaration
151 See Michael T. Koch & Skyler Cranmer, Testing the “Dick Cheney” Hypothesis: Do Governments
of the Left Attract More Terrorism than Governments of the Right?, 24 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI.
311, 312 (2007) (noting that Republicans tend to be associated with greater support for the military).
152 Thomas E. Ricks, The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July 1997, at 66, 70.
153 Robert E. Goodin, Voting Through the Looking Glass, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 420, 421 (1983).
154 Id.
155 See supra text accompanying notes 3–4.
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that the military had lost control over a policy’s pace and structure may have
been especially galling to elements within the Pentagon.156
This highlights a rather ironic possibility: had Obama muffled or obscured
his intended position on the Guantánamo detentions—had he lauded the
Bush Administration’s approach and signaled his intention to hew to that
course—it is possible that he would have faced less internal resistance from
the military bureaucracy in pursuing the same goal that he in fact explicitly
endorsed. There is some evidence of this at the retail level. The case of Shaker
Aamer, for example, demonstrates that the very fact that a specific case was
high profile might engender more—rather than less—resistance from
bureaucratic actors.157 By taking a salient position, President Obama may have
engendered greater internal friction. This dynamic contrasts with recent
studies of administrative agency resistance, where the salience of an issue
seems to increase presidential power.158 The dynamic of detention policy
points to the alternative possibility that an issue’s salience can undermine a
President’s ability to steer the bureaucracy.
The second possible explanation for the bureaucratic turn focuses on the
preferences of specific Cabinet-level officials. For example, some evidence
suggests that the Secretary of Defense’s resistance to personally certifying the
legality of transfers, as required under legislative restrictions on detainee transfers,
has played a role in generating delays.159 At the same time, the wide range of
156 I have focused here on Obama’s partisan identity. What, though, of his race? For example,
“dozens of studies show that out-group antagonisms—measured by racial resentment, anti-Black
stereotypes [and] . . . anti-Muslim attitudes, and even living in areas with many racist google
searches—were [significant] . . . predictors of opposition to Obama in 2008.” Michael Tesler, The
Conditions Ripe for Racial Spillover Effects, 36 ADVANCES POL. PSYCHOL. 101, 101 (2015). Moreover,
the President’s race influences judgments on specific policies. Opposition to a healthcare policy
innovation rises substantially in experimental studies when it is associated with President Obama
rather than President Clinton. Michael Tesler, The Spillover of Racial Attitudes into Health Care: How
President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 690-91
(2012). We lack studies of bureaucratic personnel necessary to test the hypothesis that bureaucratic
opposition to President Obama’s Guantánamo policies was in part a reaction to his race. And the
likelihood that post hoc interviews with agency officials would yield falsifiable results is vanishingly
small. Hence, no firm evidence exists to confirm or reject this possibility. All that can be said here
is that the homology between these race effects associated with Obama and the dynamics of
Guantánamo policymaking over time is rather striking.
157 See Ackerman, supra note 128 and accompanying text.
158 See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755,
1761 (2013) (“[Agency] [s]elf-insulation may thus be most prevalent for the broad set of regulatory
actions that are not clearly salient or high profile; actions that are already high profile are likely to
come to the attention of the White House through other means.”).
159 See Richard Bernstein, A Detainee Freed, but Not Released, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/24/us/24iht-letter.html [https://perma.cc/A7V7-PCBA] (documenting
delays in the release of a detainee even after a judge found his continued detention at Guantánamo
unlawful); Adam Goldman, Once Deemed Too Dangerous to Release, Saudi Detainee at Guantanamo Bay
Prison Has Been Repatriated, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
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delaying tactics that has been observed at several levels of the bureaucracy—e.g.,
resisting the release of medical records necessary for a transfer by citing the
privacy interests of the still-detained custodial subject—suggests that the
preferences of specific individual officials cannot supply a full explanation for
the bureaucratic attitude.160
Finally, military resistance to transferring Guantánamo detainees arose at a
time when the prosecution of detainees in Article III courts was becoming a
more remote possibility. Although one detainee from the Cuban base had
been transferred to the United States mainland for criminal trial,161 other
proposed transfers foundered due to bipartisan opposition.162 The elimination
of an Article III trial as a practical option might have raised the expected cost
of closing Guantánamo—a policy that would necessarily have entailed the
dispersion beyond U.S. control of some detainees perceived as being extremely
dangerous. Rather than hazard this outcome, elements of the military
bureaucracy may have applied the brakes.
4. Conclusion
The evidence presented here suggests that bureaucratic processing,
triaging, and transferring detainees from the Cuban base was characterized
initially by a measure of rationality. Those individuals who presented the least
threat seemed to have been prioritized for release, at least where diplomatically
feasible. That rationality, however, foundered after President Obama came
into office—but not because the marginal detainee suddenly became too risky
national-security/saudi-detainee-at-guantanamo-bay-prison-has-been-repatriated/2015/09/22/b28c2
8cc-6156-11e5-b38e-06883aacba64_story.html [https://perma.cc/8ZKF-B6ND] (noting that Defense
Secretary Ashton B. Carter has been criticized for the pace at which he approves detainee transfers);
Tim Mak & Nancy A. Youssef, The Pentagon Is Keeping Half of Gitmo Locked Up—Against the White
House’s Wishes, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/09/hes-keeping-half-of-gitmo-locked-up-against-the-white-house-s-wishes.html [https://perma.cc/A795-6D
XV] (observing that then–Secretary of Defense Carter was under political pressure to approve
detainee transfers and reduce the number of detainees held at Guantánamo Bay); see also SAVAGE,
POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 516-17 (commenting that detainee transfers were also delayed
during former Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s time in office).
160 See Reitman, supra note 127 (citing an unnamed official as stating that “there are a thousand
ways that you can thwart policy through bureaucratic cunning or inaction, like when transfer packages
just sit there on the defense secretary’s desk and don’t move. Or that the people in the building don’t
get it to him”).
161 See Peter Finn, Terror Suspect Ghailani Brought from Guantanamo Bay to U.S. for Trial, WASH.
POST (June 10, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/09/AR200
9060900401.html [https://perma.cc/9PYL-RFFY] (noting that Ahmed Ghailani, a Guantánamo
detainee, was flown to New York to face a federal trial).
162 See Charlie Savage, In a Reversal, Military Trials for 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/us/05gitmo.html [https://perma.cc/F4BQ-HMNS] (observing that
Congress imposed restrictions that “banned the military from using its funds to transfer detainees
to domestic soil, even for trials”).
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to release or because of a sharp rise in the diplomatic difficulties of release. I
have offered evidence of that bureaucratic turn, and, more tentatively, suggested
a number of distinct explanations for this turn. The most persuasive, in my
view, hinges on a breakdown in intrabranch bargaining and President Obama’s
distinctive credibility problem with the military.163
Finally, the account developed here gestures toward the possibility—to be
amplified in subsequent sections—that the ultimate effect of bureaucratic
resistance to presidential agendas will be a function of the behavior of other
branches. For instance, bureaucratic resistance to Guantánamo transfers took
advantage of the procedures that Congress had legislated for such actions.164
This suggests that understanding the checking effect of the separation of
powers requires attention to the interaction between the internal elements of
each branch with coordinate actors in other branches. It is this possibility of
unexpected interbranch alliances that I explore next.
B. The Causes and Consequences of Legislative Intervention
Between 2002 and 2009, Congress imposed few constraints on detention
policy.165 Its main innovations either reinforced executive branch autonomy
(i.e., by eliminating federal court jurisdiction to hear challenges to executive
decisions) or created new, lower-cost options for processing detainees for
more credible long-term detentions (i.e., by setting statutory foundations for
military commissions).166 But in June 2009, legislators changed tack. Congress
for the first time interposed itself into the heartland of Guantánamo policy
regarding when and how detainees could be transferred or released.167 Why?
And to what effect?
This subsection explores the causes and consequences of Congress’s 2009
and 2010 statutory interventions as a way of better understanding why and
how legislative interventions constrain presidential policy options. I focus on
these legislative interventions because they coincide in time with the dramatic
shift in transfer rates identified in Part I. Using a mix of empirical and doctrinal
evidence, I first argue that legislative intervention cannot be ascribed to an
exogenous policy shock: there was no singular incident or series of incidents
involving a former detainee that catalyzed recidivism-related concerns.
Rather, the change in legislative attitudes toward detainee transfers is best
163 It is not clear whether qualitative research would do better: several of the theories I have
developed are unlikely to be confirmed by participants (e.g., the bargaining-chip theory and the race
theory). Hence, it is not clear if any definitive answer is possible.
164 See supra Section I.A.3 (discussing the institutional history of Guantánamo policy).
165 See supra Section I.A.3.
166 See supra Section I.A.3.
167 See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
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explained by an intragovernmental dynamic. This dynamic is squarely at odds
with the traditional separation-of-powers story, in which the legislature acts
as a brake on executive initiatives. Instead, it seems that public concern and,
in the end, statutory intervention to limit transfers and releases were the
result of an interbranch alliance between the military bureaucracy and
Congress. A disconsolate bureaucracy, in short, effectively turned Congress
against the White House.
Yet another piece of this dynamic merits emphasis up front. When
Congress responded to an uptick in public concern about recidivism risk, its
intervention did not depend on the force of law for its efficacy. Instead, the
ensuing regulation vested the military bureaucracy with discretion to resist
presidential initiatives by imposing political frictions on discrete release
decisions. It was thus an internal dynamic nested within bureaucratic politics,
rather than the sheer force of law, that hindered the White House. Just as the
causes of separation-of-powers constraints on presidential power cannot be
understood by looking exclusively at the actions of the branches as discrete,
monolithic entities, so too the consequences of those constraints cannot be
gauged without decomposing the branches into their discrete components.
1. The Roots of Legislative Intervention
Decisions whether or not to transfer or release detainees from
Guantánamo became a “hot-button” question for Congress in 2009.168 Why?
As Part I demonstrated, releases had been occurring at a vigorous pace for at
least three years by then; if anything, the rate of releases and transfers fell
under the new presidential dispensation. Standard accounts posit that
legislative attention was driven by a worry about detainee “recidivism.”169
Concern on that score “soar[ed]” between 2008 and 2010.170 To understand
the role of separation-of-powers dynamics in checking presidential power, it
is necessary first to reject the hypothesis that it was these extrinsic concerns
motivated by an exogenous shock—i.e., a vivid attack involving a recidivist
from Guantánamo—that derailed the White House’s agenda. Having rejected
this extrinsic explanation for policy change, I then demonstrate that a
bureaucratic–legislative alliance catalyzed public concern about recidivism
and, in turn, restrictive legislation from June 2009 onward. I focus on the key role
168 See Payne, supra note 45, at 883 (stating that post-Boumediene legislation has focused on issues
such as detainee transfer authority, rather than substantive changes or clarifications to habeas proceedings).
169 See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text (discussing the standard narrative regarding
recidivism).
170 See Thomas Joscelyn, Gitmo Recidivism Rate Soars, WKLY. STANDARD (Dec. 7, 2010, 4:12
PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/gitmo-recidivism-rate-soars_521965.html [https://per
ma.cc/FPY5-W6PU] (noting that in 2010 the U.S. government considered twenty-five percent of
all transferred former detainees to be confirmed or suspected recidivists).
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of strategic bureaucratic disclosure in shaping perceptions of recidivism-related
threats. Finally, I discuss the pivotal function of elite policy entrepreneurs, in
both Congress and the executive branch, in shaping public sentiments.
To assess the causes of legislative intervention on transfer policy, it is useful
to explore first the relative timing of legislative and public concern about
recidivism-related risk. To that end, Figure 5 reports the frequency of invocations
of Guantánamo recidivism in both major newspapers (as compiled in Westlaw’s
Major Newspapers Database) and the Congressional Record between 2004 and
2015. It is important to note that the latter search does not capture hearing
transcripts. Between April and June 2011, the House Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations convened three public hearings
and one closed hearing on Guantánamo recidivism.171 Because it is not clear
how to aggregate a tally that relies on mentions in the Congressional Record
and a tally of committee hearings, Figure 5 only reports the former.
Figure 5: Frequency of Invocation of Guantánamo Recidivism in Major
Newspapers and the Congressional Record (2004–2014)
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171 See HOUSE ARMED SERVS. COMM., Leaving Guantanamo: Policies, Pressures, and Detainees
Returning to the Fight 2 (Jan. 2012), https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.
house.gov/themes/rep_armed_services/largedocs/leaving_guantanamo_web_3_27.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/G5D8-RW7Q] (discussing the steps taken by the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee
during its “in-depth, comprehensive bipartisan investigation of procedures to dispatch detainees
from the Guantanamo Bay detention facility (GTMO) over the past decade”).
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The data presented in Figure 5, read in light of the available extrinsic
evidence of congressional motivations, does not support the hypothesis that
Congress responded to an exogenous shock, such as a terrorism-related event,
in moving aggressively to mitigate perceived recidivism risk. Rather, it suggests
that the public demand to which the June 2009 uptick in coverage responded
was a product of endogenous dynamics, i.e., the bureaucratic–legislative alliance
seeking to constrain the President.172
As Figure 5 shows, scant legislative or public concern about detainee
recidivism existed until late 2008. This was so despite some earlier reports of
former detainees engaging in insurgency or violence.173 The 2007 to 2009 news
reports extracted from Westlaw, as well as government statements about
recidivism, moreover, do not tend to single out a particular incident involving
a former detainee returning to the fight that could have sparked the increase
in legislative and public concern. The most likely catalyzing incident that
occurred in this period—a suicide attack in Baghdad allegedly executed by a
former Guantánamo detainee174—is not extensively cited in either news
reports175 or legislative or executive branch statements.176 The range of alleged
recidivism, even involving violence, is also quite heterogeneous. Some recidivists,
for example, are identified by the government as affiliated with forces fighting

172 Some observers cite a December 2009 incident on an international flight that almost
exploded over Chicago as catalyzing a shift in the White House’s preferences. See, e.g., SAVAGE,
POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 11-17 (recounting the details of a foiled airplane bombing and the
Obama Administration’s initial stance on the “war on terror”). I do not think that event can be relied
on to explain the dynamics observed here for two reasons. First, it simply comes too late to explain
the spike in congressional attention documented in this Article. Even the increase in public attention
to the recidivism issue precedes rather than follows the incident. Second, the December 2009
incident did not involve a former Guantánamo detainee, but a Nigerian tasked by al Qaeda. At best,
an explanation that focused on this incident would have to explain why this incident, or all other
successful and foiled terrorism plots, led to a change in views on Guantánamo. The incident itself
pointed to a new geographic source of terrorism. It requires an effort of imagination and political
entrepreneurship to link it to Guantánamo. But then, it is necessary to explain why and how that
effort came about.
173 See, e.g., C.J. Chivers, Russian Freed from Guantánamo is Killed by Police Near Chechnya, N.Y.
TIMES (June 28, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/world/europe/28russia.html [https://
perma.cc/Y5X4-J8MU] (describing evidence of recidivism dating back to 2005).
174 See Alissa J. Rubin, Bomber’s Final Messages Exhort Fighters Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES (May
9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/world/middleeast/09mosul.html [https://perma.cc/E
AP4-USLH] (describing the possibility that the prolonged detention of certain prisoners at Guantánamo
was the cause of their subsequent radicalization).
175 Indeed, the detainee alleged to have perpetrated the bombing, Abdallah Salih al-Ajmi, is
not mentioned in the other reports about recidivism in the data set.
176 For a useful collection of such statements, see Mark P. Denbeaux et al., Recividism Revisionism:
An Analysis of the Government’s Representations of Alleged “Recidivism” of the Guantánamo
Detainees 11-17 (June 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/Public
IntGovServ/CSJ/upload/GTMO_Final_Final_Recidivist_6-5-09-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/R89T-Q443].
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foes of the United States, such as Syria, rather than attacking either American
or allied interests.177
Instead of focusing on specific instances of recidivism, early news reports and
legislative statements are dominated by references to the recidivism statistics
produced by the military bureaucracy.178 The large role played by bureaucratic
statistics suggests that legislative and public perceptions of recidivism were,
at a minimum, mediated through the positions advanced by the military
bureaucracy.179 Beginning in July 2006, the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) began issuing informal periodic statements about detainee reengagement
or recidivism.180 From 2007 onward, the frequency of these official statements
increased. Their contents were framed, moreover, in increasingly alarmist
terms. Their drumbeat was amplified by other government agencies.
The first two formal Pentagon statements about detainee recidivism were
promulgated in December 2007 and May 2008.181 Thereafter, the military
bureaucracy issued formal reports in January 2009, April 2009, October 2010,
December 2011, and July 2012.182 In short, the acceleration of bureaucratic
reporting on recidivism is tightly correlated to the arc of legislative attention
to the issue.
Further, both the content and the form of military-bureaucratic statements
on recidivism shifted dramatically in this period. Consider first the changing
content of bureaucratic statements. The recidivism rate reported by the DNI
177 See Ex-Guantanamo Prisoner Killed in Syria, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 18, 2013, 8:16 PM), http://am
erica.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/18/ex-guantanamo-prisonerkilledinsyria.html [https://perma.cc/
WW49-JKW6] (noting that a former detainee died fighting for an antigovernment rebel group in Syria).
178 A key question, therefore, in allocating causal roles within the military bureaucracy is the
source of these leaks. Publicly available information does not disclose these sources.
179 For evidence of the effect of governmental frames on public perceptions of terrorism
threats, see Brigitte L. Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, & Robert Y. Shapiro, Post-9/11 Terrorism Threats,
News Coverage, and Public Perceptions in the United States, 1 INT’L J. CONFLICT & VIOLENCE 105, 110-11
(2007) (documenting effects of government statements on perceptions of terrorism threat).
180 See, e.g., DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, TRANSNATIONAL: GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES
RETURNING TO TERRORISM UPDATE (July 10, 2006), http://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/
FOIA/5%20USC%20%C2%A7%20552%28A%29%282%29%28D%29%20Records/Detainee%20Recid
ivism%20Reports/TRANSNATIONAL%20GUANTANAMO%20BAY%20DETAINEES%20RET
URNING%20TO%20TERRORIS.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX4P-MJLP] (reporting that a small
percentage of former Guantánamo detainees have returned to terrorism). A variety of terms were
employed by governmental spokespersons, seemingly interchangeably, for the same concept. See
THE REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT’S TASK FORCE ON DETAINEE TREATMENT 295
(2013), http://detaineetaskforce.org/read/ [https://perma.cc/9EAX-Q4DB] [hereinafter DETAINEE
TREATMENT REPORT] (noting the interchangeable use of the terms “re-engaging [in terrorism],”
“re-engaging in terrorist or insurgent activities” and “anti-coalition militant activities”).
181 See Katherine Tiedemann & Peter Bergen, Guantanamo: Who Really ‘Returned to the
Battlefield’?, NEW AM. (July 20, 2009), https://www.newamerica.org/fellows/guantanamo-whoreally-returned-to-the-battlefield-2009 [https://perma.cc/3T3M-RU7L].
182 See DETAINEE TREATMENT REPORT, supra note 180, at 297-98 (listing the number of
released detainees confirmed or suspected of reengaging in terrorism).
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increased from thirty-six confirmed or suspected cases in May 2008 to
eighteen confirmed and forty-three suspected cases in January 2009, and then
further up to twenty-seven confirmed and forty-seven suspected recidivists
in April 2009.183 The reported rate of recidivism changed from three percent
at one point in 2008 to eleven percent in 2009 to twenty-seven percent in
2012.184 In addition, the form and style of military-bureaucratic statements on
recidivism evolved between 2008 and 2009. On my reading, their tone
sharpened, increasingly conveying a sense of urgency. Consider one example:
information about the sharpest uptick in alleged recidivism was disseminated
not through a formal release, but instead through a March 2009 leak to news
media organizations of an enlarged list of purportedly classified recidivism
data.185 This “unreleased report” became front-page news, under banner
headlines proclaiming that “1 in 7” of the formerly detained “are engaged in
terrorism or militant activity.”186 This phrasing likely had more emotional
punch than talk of an eleven-percent recidivism rate. Yet, however framed,
this statistic was too high—even by the military’s own interpretation. Two
weeks after running a front-page report featuring the purported “1 in 7”
recidivism rate, the New York Times clarified that the report conflated the
Pentagon’s categories of suspected and confirmed cases.187 But it is hopelessly
optimistic to think this clarification, buried far within the newspaper, had any
discernable effect on public opinion.
Further, the use of a leak—rather than a more regularized form of
disclosure—is instructive: the news media leaks reflect greater salience since
the information is by definition new and noteworthy.188 Mid-level bureaucrats

Id.
Id. at 298.
See Fact Sheet: Former Guantanamo Detainee Terrorism Trends, ABC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/guantanamo_recidivism_list_090526.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9HNN-SCA2] (providing names and personal details of former detainees confirmed or suspected
of reengaging in terrorism).
186 See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Later Terror Link Cited in 1 in 7 Freed Detainees, N.Y. TIMES
(May 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/us/politics/21gitmo.html [https://perma.cc/
M6XT-KJMQ].
187 See id. (admitting that the original report mistakenly assumed—without proof—that “all the
former prisoners had been engaged in terrorism before their detention,” and also failed to distinguish
between the twenty-seven confirmed post-detention terrorists/militants and the forty-seven suspected
post-detention terrorists/militants).
188 See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones
Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 574 (2013) (“Leaks are often taken to be
unique sources of insight into the inner workings of power.”). But cf. LEON V. SIGAL, REPORTERS
AND OFFICIALS 120-21 (1973) (finding that between 1949 and 1969, 2.3% of the front-page stories in
the New York Times and Washington Post about national or foreign news relied primarily on leaks for
the information reported).
183
184
185
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often use leaks as a weapon189 to thwart the ambitions of elected supervisors.
Consistent with this political economy, early reports of the March 2009
recidivism leak focused on the ammunition it supplied to “critics . . . of
President Obama’s plan to shut down the prison.”190 One leading critic of that
plan, former Vice President Dick Cheney, immediately seized upon the
leaked “1 in 7” statistic as a partisan cudgel.191 Critiques of the Obama position
on detainee transfers, quite naturally, did not flag the military bureaucracy’s
own caveats and cautions about such statistics. Nor, unsurprisingly, did these
critics—or even the military bureaucracy itself—acknowledge the growing
body of evidence suggesting that even the confirmed instances of recidivism
were in fact much more ambiguous in quality.192 And of course, none reflected
on how unlikely it would have been if no instances of violence against the
United States had occurred: after all, this was a population of several hundred
men who had been swept up without legal process, detained for months or
years, subjected to coercive interrogation and torture, and then released
without explanation or apology. Even if none of the detainees had any initial

189 See SIGAL, supra note 188, at 140 (noting that leaks and other press tactics “can be employed
to get officials into the game, or keep them on the sidelines”).
190 Bumiller, supra note 186.
191 Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Commentary: How Many Gitmo Prisoners Return to
Fight, CNN (July 21, 2009, 9:40 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/20/bergen.guantan
amo/index.html [https://perma.cc/S245-6MBF]; see also Jim Rutenberg, A ‘Freer’ Cheney Makes Case
(With Dual Focus), N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/22/us/politics/
22cheney.html [https://perma.cc/8QKC-EXWK].
192 Criticism of the military’s recidivism numbers rested on two grounds. First, a review of
publicly available evidence of recidivism in 2009 found a rate of “about half ” that reported by the
DNI. Bergen & Tiedemann, supra note 191. Subsequent updates of this study continued to find rates
substantially lower than the figure proffered by the DNI. See Peter Bergen et al., How Many Gitmo
Alumni Take Up Arms?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 11, 2011), http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/11/howmany-gitmo-alumni-take-up-arms/ [https://perma.cc/AEW2-AL54] (finding that only six percent
of released detainees were confirmed or suspected recidivists). The striking and persistent
divergence between independent and government assessments of recidivism rates raises a serious
question of how government data should be evaluated. Second, the term “recidivism” was borrowed
from the criminal law and imported into the national security context. See Jonathan Hafetz, Detention
Without End?: Reexamining the Indefinite Confinement of Terrorism Suspects Through the Lens of Criminal
Sentencing, 61 UCLA L. REV. 326, 344 (2014) (stating that recidivism is a concept borrowed from
criminal law and contributes a stigma associated with a criminal penalty—even when the prisoner
was never convicted of an offense). But unlike criminal defendants, Guantánamo detainees have
never been found guilty of a specific offense. Thus, to use the term recidivism is to assume that the
false positive rate for initial seizures and transfers to custody at the base was zero. This seems
unlikely. Moreover, the term obscures the possibility that individual detainees may have had no
connection to terrorism until they were confined in close quarters to many members of al Qaeda
and the Taliban, in addition to being subject to what at best were onerous conditions of detention.
See, e.g., Rajiv Chandrasekaran, From Captive to Suicide Bomber, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2009), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/21/AR2009022101234_pf.html [https://p
erma.cc/WD7Z-EDA5]. The possibility that Guantánamo had a criminogenic effect is erased by the
use of the term “recidivism.”
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connections to terrorist groups, their subsequent animosity against the United
States might well be anticipated.
And this was not the only leak. Legislators also received information
directly from the military bureaucracy, which they then used to embarrass
and contradict the White House. In July 2010, for example, Senator Kit Bond,
the Republican vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, revealed in
a Senate hearing that the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence
Agency “did not concur” in certain detainee releases endorsed by the White
House.193 Leveraging putatively classified information that had leaked from
the national security bureaucracy, a partisan foe of the White House thus
made political capital out of internal bureaucratic strife.
This timing, framing, and partiality of pivotal disclosures about recidivism
suggests an attempt by the military bureaucracy to influence national policy
in a fashion antithetical to the White House’s interests and agenda. This
ambition is consistent with, and corroborated by, the military bureaucracy’s
resistance to diplomatic efforts to facilitate detainee transfers.194 These
dynamics suggest that congressional intervention into detention policy was
precipitated as much by forces endogenous to the three branches, including
discontent within the bureaucracy and partisan opposition to a new President.
The “thick political surround,” in short, was a catalytic part of the interbranch
dynamic usually labeled as our separation of powers.195
This tight functional nexus between Congress and the military bureaucracy
reflects a deeper set of institutional relationships. These are plausibly understood
as grounded upon the long-term political economy of military spending and
the ensuing network of connections between legislators and the military. As
the political scientist Rebecca Thorpe has demonstrated, many representatives
from the House are elected by districts heavily reliant on military expenditures.196
They hence tend to support military initiatives notwithstanding “partisan and
ideological divisions.”197 Robust, and even bipartisan, support for the military
bureaucracy—and a concomitant sensitivity to its policy concerns—rests on a
foundation of convergent economic and electoral interests. While these economic
interests might not be directly engaged by detainee policy, they may help
illuminate the tight nexus between the military bureaucracy and the legislature.
Moreover, there is an intriguing relationship between elite expressions of
concern about recidivism and more general public awareness. In contrast to
193 SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 312-13.
194 See supra text accompanying notes 127–44
195 For a fuller exposition of this concept, see Huq & Michaels, supra note 25, at 391.
196 See REBECCA U. THORPE, THE AMERICAN WARFARE STATE: THE DOMESTIC
POLITICS OF MILITARY SPENDING 95 (2014) (characterizing such representatives as prioritizing

military spending more than representatives from more economically diverse districts).
197 Id.
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legislative concern, the broader public’s awareness of recidivism (at least
insofar as it can be measured by the frequency of media hits) begins in 2009
and peaks in 2011.198 It was seemingly catalyzed by the March 2009 leak and
the resulting media coverage it sparked. Public awareness lagged roughly two
years behind the congressional cycle of attention. Mobilization among political
elites on the recidivism question, in other words, seems to have anticipated
public concern. This is consistent with an emergent political science literature
finding elite cuing effects on public opinion.199
The findings presented here, however, are distinctive in one regard. Much
of the literature of elite cuing effects focuses on interplay between legislators
(or other elected actors) and public opinion. The causal arrow hypothesized
here, though, runs from the military bureaucracy through Congress to the
general public. In other words, executive actors within the military engaged
in highly effective policy entrepreneurship through leaks and other forms of
backroom communications in ways that hypothetically exacerbated rifts in
the political landscape. These rifts do not exactly track partisan lines.
Nevertheless, the partisan coloration of the fight between Congress and the
presidency is hard to miss. Political polarization, which has been identified as a
motivating cause of bureaucratic authority,200 here is a consequence of mid-level
administrative freelancing.
That politics—as opposed to events—drives security-related policies
should not be a surprise. To the contrary, the gap between the security threat
on the ground and the level of public concern has been well documented in
other domains where public safety is at stake. In one of the most incisive
political-economy accounts of the criminal justice system offered to date,
Katherine Beckett demonstrated that public concern about crime was not driven
by shifting crime rates, but rather by political entrepreneurship on crime.201
Crime rates nationally were rising “for almost a decade before it was defined as a
problem in the machinery of politics.”202 And public concern about crime has

See supra Figure 5.
For a recent, methodologically rigorous study examining the relationship between elite
consensus and public opinion within the context of European integration, see Matthew Gabel &
Kenneth Scheve, Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on Public Opinion Using Instrumental
Variables, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1013, 1013-14 (2007).
200 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 35, at 971-74 (describing the partisan roots of executive
authority with respect to certain forms of policymaking).
201 See KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY 15 (2000) (noting that public concern about
crime did not precede policymaking, but rather is shaped by political initiatives targeting these concerns).
202 Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy, 21 STUD. AM. POL.
DEV. 230, 235 (2007); see id. (“[T]he historical record is replete with cases when crime rose but was not
followed by punitive legislation or a national campaign, including rising crime in the post WWII period.”).
198
199
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endured long past the sharp drop in crime rates first recorded in the mid-1990s.203
The disconnect between external threat levels and public perceptions of threat
has also been documented on a smaller scale in Stuart Hall’s 1978 study of “the
moral panic” over muggings in the United Kingdom. In that case, the public’s
fear could be traced back to changes in police procedures—and not exogenous
policy shocks.204 These findings in other contexts of security policy suggest
that the existence of elevated crime rates is not a sufficient, and perhaps not
even a necessary, condition for public concern about criminal-victimization
risk. Analogously, in this national security context, public concern about
recidivism risk (at least as reflected in media coverage) follows rather than
leads political elites’ mobilization on those questions. It also does not depend
on the actual magnitude of that threat. To the contrary, given the contested
and fragile empirical foundations of the government’s own assessments,205
and the surprising paucity of specific incidents of recidivism targeting U.S.
interests, it is quite possible to conclude that the extent of the recidivism
concern was not always accurately presented by bureaucratic statements on
the subject. Accuracy, perhaps unsurprisingly, is not a necessary precondition
of effective elite mobilization.
To summarize, the available evidence suggests that Guantánamo recidivism
became an object of legislative attention not because of an external shock (such
as an extraordinary terrorism attack) or public concern about the detainees.
Rather, political elites within both Article I and Article II bodies expended
valuable political and professional capital—through leaks, through the
framing of recidivism in the gravest terms possible, through high-profile public
speeches, and through the allocation of scarce congressional resources—to
make recidivism into an issue. Just as bureaucratic resistance was enabled by
legislative intervention, members of Congress deployed information from the
military bureaucracy to undermine a President who they viewed with antipathy.
Legislative constraints on Guantánamo transfers are hence best understood as
endogenous products of an interbranch alliance of bureaucrats and legislators
against the President.
203 See Daniel Romer, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, & Sean Aday, Television News and the Cultivation
of Fear of Crime, 53 J. COMM. 88, 88 (2003) (“According to the 1994 Gallup Poll, concern about crime
reached its highest point in history in that year. Nevertheless, both police arrest records . . . and annual
victimization studies . . . show that violent crime declined throughout the 1990s.”). More generally,
increasing public punitiveness supplies one potential explanation of the increasing reliance on
incarceration notwithstanding declining crime rates. See Peter K. Enns, The Public’s Increasing
Punitiveness and Its Influence on Mass Incarceration in the United States, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 857, 858, 862 fig.1
(2014) (charting increasing punitiveness through the 1990s and identifying it as a “primary” cause).
204 See STUART HALL ET AL., POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND
ORDER 16-28 (1978) (using the theoretical device of a “moral panic” to frame and explore the social
construction of crime perceptions).
205 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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2. The Substance of Legislative Intervention
When Congress finally interposed itself in 2009 and 2011 on the flow of
detainee transfers, it might have been expected that the resulting enactments
would fully exploit the force of law to impede the President’s agenda. It is
conventional wisdom that the checking function of the separation of powers
is associated with the binding effect of laws restricting executive discretion.206
In a similar vein, but in more general terms, Frederick Schauer has recently
argued that coercive law is needed to restrain even well-intentioned
officials.207 But a close analysis of the pivotal first and second waves of
transfer-related legislation, enacted respectively in 2009 and 2011, suggest
coercive prohibitions were not dispositive in this case. Instead, the statutes
precipitated by military-bureaucratic and legislative mobilization on recidivism
did not of their own force constrain the White House. Most importantly,
these initial measures did not absolutely bar all transfers. Rather, they left
surprisingly ample room for the executive to continue pursuing the goal of
dispersing the whole detainee population. Contrary to standard accounts,208
therefore, the collapse of transfers from Guantánamo was not the product of
Congress enacting restrictive legislation. Congress instead instigated an
internal politics, rather than using a rule with the force of law, to constrain
presidential action.
To see this, it is necessary to examine in some detail the initial legislative
restrictions imposed on detainee transfers. Congress enacted the first
iteration of transfer restrictions in June 2009.209 This regime had several
components. It allowed transfers into the United States for criminal
prosecution, though it required the President to provide Congress with “a
plan regarding . . . proposed disposition” of the detainee.210 Transfers to other
countries were also allowed, provided that the Pentagon reported the identity,
risk, and plans for handling a detainee.211 Each of these reporting requirements
elicited information that was already within the possession of the military
bureaucracy, but not of Congress. The military bureaucracy was probably not

206 Cf. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1246 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (explaining that “[t]he ‘check’ the judiciary provides to maintain our
separation of powers is enforcement of the rule of law through judicial review”).
207 SCHAUER, supra note 32, at 109.
208 See supra note 45 for studies relying solely on the limited particularized evidence gleaned
through litigation to analyze the detainee population as a whole.
209 See Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, §§ 14103(c)–(e), 123 Stat.
1859, 1920 (2009) (restricting the use of funds to transfer Guantánamo detainees and creating other
barriers to transfers).
210 Id. Another provision of this Act required periodic reports about the remaining detainee
population at Guantánamo. Id. § 319.
211 Id. § 14103(e).
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even required to expend any additional effort in gathering the information
about detainees: it seems safe to assume it was already gathering information
about receiving nations. All the 2009 legislation required was disclosure of
this information; it did not identify any specific transfers as prohibited.212 As
a result, it is by no means clear from the face of the June 2009 limitations that
the executive branch could not have continued the pace of detainee transfers
previously maintained by the Bush Administration.
More onerous restrictions on detainee transfer and release were not
enacted until after the rate of transfers and releases had already dropped to
zero. But even under the subsequent legislative dispensation, the military
bureaucracy preserved substantial de facto discretion. The second set of
transfer restrictions, enacted on January 7, 2011, differed along several margins
from their June 2009 antecedent.213 Most, but not all, changes were explicitly
motivated by a sharpened concern about post-transfer recidivism. On the one
hand, transfers to the United States were categorically barred.214 On the other,
the certification requirements were waived for all transfers “to effectuate an
order affecting the disposition of [an] individual that is issued by a court or
competent tribunal of the United States having lawful jurisdiction.”215 Hence,
the legislation explicitly recognized a safety valve for detainee transfers—albeit
one mediated through the third branch of government. This exception alleviated
the difficult constitutional question that might arise if a judicially ordered
transfer were expressly blocked by legislation falling short of a suspension of
the habeas writ. It also implied that both bureaucratic and congressional resistance
to transfers could be diminished if another branch took responsibility for that
decision. From January 2011 onward, therefore, judicial review provided a
mechanism to alleviate even the disclosure-based transaction costs of release.
Yet in all other ways, the 2011 transfer legislation installed a more onerous
latticework of constraint. This statutory hardening of the prison’s walls found
explicit justification in recidivism concerns. In a provision labeled “Recidivism,”
the January 2011 statute barred transfers to nations “if there is a confirmed
case of any individual who was detained at [Guantánamo] . . . who was
transferred [there] . . . and subsequently engaged in any terrorist activity.”216
The certification requirements imposed on the Secretary of Defense as a
condition precedent to a transfer, moreover, were more reticulated and precise
than their 2009 antecedents. Under the 2011 statute, the Secretary of Defense
had to certify, among other things, that a receiving nation “has agreed to take
See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
See Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383,
§§ 1031-1034, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
214 Id. § 1032.
215 Id. § 1033(a)(2).
216 Id. § 1033(c)(1).
212
213
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effective steps to ensure that the individual cannot take action to threaten the
United States, its citizens, or its allies in the future”217 and also “has taken
such steps as the Secretary determines are necessary to ensure that the
individual cannot engage or re-engage in any terrorist activity.”218
Notwithstanding these onerous demands, the January 2011 restrictions
may still have had more bark than bite. Most importantly, Congress once
again depended on the bureaucracy for information relevant to compliance.
Unlike other regulatory domains, Guantánamo policy lacks “fire-alarm” interest
groups that can alert Congress to false positives among those released.219 It
seems likely, that is, that only the military, rather than any private interest
group, would have accurate and timely information about recidivism in the
first instance. Further, the actions of potential recipient states are generally
unobserved by Congress or the public. Evaluation of whether those actions
are sufficiently rested again quite explicitly with the Secretary of Defense. Failures,
in the form of high-profile recidivism, could be ascribed straightforwardly to a
receiving nation’s breach of good faith or negligence. Finally, although this
statute required recidivism reporting, it relied exclusively upon the military
bureaucracy to calculate and report raw numbers of confirmed or suspected
recidivists. In short, the force of the 2011 restrictions depended once more not
on the credible threat of future sanctions,220 but rather on the extent to which
officials had internalized either a legalistic mentality or a common set of
incentives or objectives. External interest groups, moreover, are not plausibly
seen as a dispositive friction on executive discretion given their dearth of
information about recidivism trends.221 For these reasons, it is not quite
Id. § 1033(b)(4).
Id. § 1033(b)(5). By explicitly envisaging a situation in which a detainee has not engaged in
unlawful actions before detention, and then does so afterward, this provision arguably constitutes a
legislative recognition that Guantánamo could have a criminogenic effect. The statute does not
address the difficult normative questions raised by a dynamic in which the state creates the
conditions for violent criminality and then invokes those conditions to justify a coercive action.
219 See generally Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984). For a discussion of the use of “fire
alarm” oversight mechanisms in the national security context, see Huq, Structural Constitutionalism,
supra note 12, at 925-26.
220 But cf. SCHAUER, supra note 32, at 52 (exploring the possibility that “if those who take the
very fact of law as a reason for action . . . are few,” then law’s effectiveness depends on coercion).
221 There is also little evidence that pro-detainee interest groups altered the political calculus in
any meaningful way. Offering too little too late, the Obama Administration intimated a veto threat
to 2012 detainee transfer restrictions. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President,
Statement of Administration Policy: S. 1867—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012, at 3 (Nov. 17, 2011) (warning that “[a]ny bill that challenges or constrains the President’s critical
authorities to collect intelligence, incapacitate dangerous terrorists, and protect the Nation” would
result in the recommendation of a veto). He relented, quite quickly, on this threat. See Charlie
Savage, Obama Drops Veto Threat over Military Authorization Bill After Revisions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/us/politics/obama-wont-veto-military-authorization217
218
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enough to say that certification requirements were effective because they
imposed personal responsibility on the Secretary of Defense alone: there
must be a reason to believe that a personalized form of responsibility was in
fact capable of bite.222
In the political context in which they were enacted, these disclosure
mandates are best understood as efforts to impose political costs on the
President’s agenda. Detainee transfers, that is, forced the executive into
exposing information that could be embarrassing or be used to attack him or
his agenda in the political sphere. Indeed, it is telling that these disclosure
mandates were asymmetrical in effect. Congress has never imposed any
disclosure provisions in relation to other controversial aspects of Guantánamo
operations that might undermine the case for enlarged detention. For
example, it has elicited no definitive accounting of the number of detainees
who were subjected to coercive interrogation methods or torture; no
accounting of the physical or psychological cost of coercion and indefinite
detention;223 no official examination of the rate of false positives among the
detainees; and no tally of whether or how countries that receive detainees have
mistreated or abused them. Congress, that is, has demonstrated a persistent
unwillingness to consider—let alone act upon by disclosure mandates—the
plethora of seemingly pressing moral issues raised by the detentions. Instead,
it has shone the disinfecting light of transparency solely where it is most likely
to entrench deprivations of human liberty.
*

*

*

In summary, close inspection of the substance of the 2009 and 2011
legislative constraints on detainee transfers corroborates and extends the
finding of a bureaucratic alliance with Congress. In this account, the collapse
in transfers from Guantánamo depended upon implicit cooperation between
the military bureaucracy and Congress, both in the production and the
operation of legislative bindings. The contrary assumption that Congress
alone extinguished the flow of releases via restrictive legislation motivated by
changes in the external security environment does not survive close scrutiny.
bill.html [perma.cc/HZM9-DKS5] (stating that the changes “made by a House-Senate conference
committee” had satisfied the White House and that a veto would not, therefore, be recommended).
This hardly suggests that civil society’s “engines of liberty” had much steam.
222 Bruck accepts at face value former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s hyperbolic claim that
the “provision required that I sign my life away.” Bruck, supra note 28, at 42. However sincerely felt,
such resistance relies on something more than the reasonably anticipated effect of the certification.
223 See Matt Apuzzo, Sheri Fink, & James Risen, How U.S. Torture Left a Legacy of Damaged
Minds, N.Y. TIMES. (Oct. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/world/cia-torture-guanta
namo-bay.html [https://perma.cc/56MW-YHKQ] (describing the enduring effects of imprisonment,
inter alia, on Younous Chekkouri, a Moroccan detainee at Guantánamo).
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C. The Role of Judicial Supervision
In contrast to legislative attention to the Guantánamo detentions, judicial
review after Boumediene might have been expected to abet the presidential
agenda of dispersing the detainee population. Conventional wisdom across
the ideological spectrum predicts that judicial review tends to narrow
executive discretion by enforcing “the rule of law.”224 This entails, at a
minimum, judicial invalidation of the executive’s ultra vires actions. Courts
are thought especially well-placed to identify false positives in the detention
context. The judiciary is often thought to be less risk-averse than the political
branches, and hence more willing to recognize errors and end a detainee’s
custody where the underlying evidence is weak.225 In the detention context,
moreover, recall that Congress in 2011 created a statutory exception to its
limitations on detainee transfers for court-ordered releases.226 To the extent
certification preconditions on transfers imposed weighty frictions on release,
judicial review could have offered a useful and relatively uncontroversial
safety valve. If the executive branch sought to maximize the rate of transfers,
it could have declined to litigate cases or even conceded error, triggering the
statutory exception for court-ordered releases. For both constitutional and
statutory reasons, it would therefore seem that the engagement of Article III
as an element of the separation of powers ought to be associated with an
elevated pace of transfers.
Close attention to empirical evidence, institutional behavior, and the substance
of judicial interventions, however, points toward a quite different story. I
decompose and analyze the effect of judicial intervention along two margins.
First, courts are responsible for adjudicating individual cases, which can
yield orders of release. My empirical analysis finds that among the handful
of detainees with habeas petitions adjudicated to final judgment, a favorable
outcome is indeed positively associated with release. But that group is a very
small slice of the detainee population. Almost half of all detainees did not
seek judicial review. And almost four-fifths of those who did failed to litigate
their petitions to final judgment.
Second, the effect of judicial review is not confined to retail adjudication.
Courts also play a role in declaring the law. If courts interpret statutory
authority to detain more narrowly than the executive branch does, they might
224 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1246 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment).
225 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that “the branch of the Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on
which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and the cost
in liberty on the way to victory”).
226 Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383,
§ 1033(a)(2), 124 Stat. 4137, 4352 (2011); see supra text accompanying note 215.
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generate pressure to thin the detainee population even absent litigation. A
rational government, that is, will forego the expense of litigation when the
law changes to render a judicial defeat likely. But this did not happen. An
empirically informed comparison of the law produced by the federal courts
in habeas cases with (1) the government’s litigation positions and (2) its de
facto practice reveals that courts were more risk-averse than either the
bureaucracy or its lawyers. With the possible exception of a small handful of
detainees released after favorable judgments, the overwhelming majority of
the detainee population was hindered—not aided—by Article III involvement.
1. The Impact of Discrete Adjudication
To understand the impact of post-Boumediene habeas review, it is necessary
to know how many detainees filed habeas petitions, how many litigated those
petitions to final judgment, and how many of those who did so secured a
favorable disposition. This Article is the first to present comprehensive data
on any of these questions.
Individual adjudication of detainees’ challenges to the lawfulness of their
custody became possible on June 12, 2008, when Boumediene v. Bush issued.227
Detainees, however, had been filing habeas petitions since 2002. I have
identified 408 Guantánamo detainees who filed habeas petitions before or
after Boumediene through an examination of the federal court’s PACER
database.228 These petitions vary widely in the extent to which they were
litigated. Ten of the identified dockets have only one or two entries (i.e.,
filings by either the petitioner, the government, or an amicus). Thirty-one
have more than 2000 entries. This suggests that the petitioners exerted widely
varying degrees of effort when litigating their cases.
Any tangible effect from this litigation cannot be ascribed to government
lawyers’ efforts to facilitate transfers. Examining government briefs in several
typical cases litigated to final judgment, I have not identified a single instance
in which government lawyers made outcome-relevant concessions to enable a

227 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). One case had already been decided under a
different statutory scheme, although the litigants in that case went on to file habeas petitions. See
Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 853-54 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that a detainee’s designation as an
enemy combatant was inconsistent with the requirements of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005).
228 For further details, see infra Appendix. I exclude from this statistic John Doe petitions filed
on behalf of all detainees at Guantánamo; such petitions, although lodged, were never litigated
beyond the petition stage.
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release,229 unless forced to do so by contrary law.230 This would have required
the government to make an affirmative filing conceding error, since the mere
failure to file a return in a habeas proceeding does not generally trigger a
default judgment.231 Instead, when government litigators found their legal
theory for detention at odds with a White House position, they simply
changed their theory of the case.232 To the extent cases were litigated to final
judgment, the Justice Department never slackened in its zealous advocacy in
favor of robust carceral authority.233 Consistent with this evidence, one
former State Department official described the government’s approach to
detention litigation by explaining that the Department of Justice trial lawyers
“internalized” the defensive posture advanced between 2002 and 2008 and so
were inclined to “defend [positions] zealously if at all possible.”234
Nor did rotation in the White House elicit meaningful mitigation of the
government’s position. In January 2009, Judge John D. Bates of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia ordered the Obama Justice
Department to clarify its new position on detention authority.235 According
to news reports, Bates’s demand precipitated a rapid process of internal
deliberation within the executive branch and the White House.236 The
229 For a similar assessment of the government’s litigation positions, see Jed S. Rakoff, A Fear of
Foreign Law, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec 3. 2015, at 16 n.1 (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND
THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES (2015)). Rakoff writes, “[O]ver
one hundred people remain in detention [in Guantánamo], at least half of whom have neither been
charged with any crime nor cleared for release. Yet the Department of Justice has opposed every habeas
petition on their behalf, arguing, among other things, that their detention is only temporary.” Id.
230 The exception is In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 34 (D.D.C.
2008), where the government conceded that it could not hold seventeen Uighur detainees in the
wake of the D.C. Circuit’s determination in Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2008), that
the group to which they were affiliated had no connection to al Qaeda. Even in In re Guantanamo
Bay Detainee Litigation, government lawyers insisted that authority to detain still existed as part of
the government’s power to “wind up” detentions. 581 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
231 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mattox v. Scott, 507 F.2d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 1974) (explaining
that releasing a habeas corpus petitioner in response to the government’s “failure to make a timely
return” would inappropriately place the burden “upon the community at large”); Watmuff v. Perini,
427 F.2d 527, 528 (6th Cir. 1970) (stating that a detainee’s contention that he was “entitled to default
judgment and immediate release” because the government’s return to a show cause order was filed
late was “without merit”).
232 SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 149-52.
233 Id. at 301.
234 Ingber, supra note 37, at 384-85; accord J. Wells Dixon, President Obama’s Failure to Transfer
Detainees from Guantánamo (stating that the Obama Administration continued prosecuting the
detainee cases “as vigorously as the prior administration”), in OBAMA’S GUANTÁNAMO, supra note
7, at 48-49.
235 See Order at 3, Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 05-2378) (“[I]t
is hereby [ordered] that by not later than March 13, 2009, respondents shall submit any refinement
of their position on the appropriate definition of ‘enemy combatant.’”).
236 DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE SOUL OF THE
OBAMA PRESIDENCY 58-60 (2012).
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government hewed largely to the same standard of detention authority used by
the Bush Administration.237 Its definition plainly encompassed members and
supporters of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated groups, but it added the new
qualification that independent support must be “substantial” to trigger eligibility
for detention to the definition proposed by the Bush Justice Department.238
This shift did not require a different result in any case then (or subsequently)
under judicial consideration.239 One district court judge even witheringly
described it as “a distinction of purely metaphysical difference.”240 Yet the
“substantial support” threshold generated heated intramural debate. Rejecting
the State Department’s narrow view of that language, the Pentagon argued
that it encompassed “mere supporters . . . picked up far away from enemy
forces.” 241 This debate ended in an interagency compromise allowing detention
beyond the battlefield when a person performed “functions that made them
effectively part of the terrorist organization.”242 The debate is relevant here
because it underscores once more the role of internal military-bureaucratic
resistance in forestalling leniency toward detainees.243
Regardless of the government’s legal position, judicial review might still
have nudged the arc of transfer policy via orders directing release or
anticipatory transfers or releases by the government to alleviate or avoid the

237 See Chesney, Military Detention, supra note 45, at 830-31 (stating that the Obama standard
made some minor changes in nomenclature, but generally adhered to the substantive requirements
of the “Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) standard” employed by the Bush
Administration). The Obama Administration also eschewed reliance on evidence gained by torture.
See SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 152. It is not clear the Bush Administration ever
attempted to introduce such evidence in court.
238 Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative
to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009)
(No. 05-0763).
239 See Noah Feldman, Opinion, A Prison of Words, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/03/19/opinion/19feldman.html [https://perma.cc/24UJ-7LAM] (noting that
the government’s refined position on its detention authority, requiring a showing of “substantial
support” for terrorism, “is potentially broad enough to continue detaining everyone whom the
Bush administration put in Guantánamo in the first place”).
240 Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 70 (D.D.C. 2009).
241 Charlie Savage, Obama Team Is Divided on Anti-Terror Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/29/us/politics/29force.html [https://perma.cc/38GE-CZBP].
242 Id.; accord Chesney, Military Detention, supra note 45, at 842 (recounting a disagreement
between Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson and State Department Legal Advisor
Harold Koh about the nature of support required to detain, which resulted in the government’s
litigation position that “functional members of al Qaeda” could be detained).
243 Ingber suggests that the Obama Administration’s ultimate position on detention authority
might have been different had it not been for the habeas litigation. See Ingber, supra note 37, at 387-88
(suggesting that the “extremely defensive context of defense of individual clients” limited the
President’s flexibility in assessing the rights of Guantánamo detainees). I am skeptical. The evidence
assembled here suggests the internal balance of power would still have favored the military
bureaucracy’s perspective.
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costs of judicial review. I focus first on this more easily measured direct
effect.244 To determine this, I compiled from Westlaw a database of reported
and unreported judicial decisions resolving individual detainees’ petitions.
This dataset includes sixty-seven reported and one unreported decision.245
Within the subpopulation of petitioners who litigated their cases to final
judgment, detainees prevailed in thirty-three (forty-nine percent) of those
cases. At its upper bound, judicial review could have influenced 4.23% of the
total number of 780 detentions at Guantánamo.246
The magnitude of the effect of judicial review can be ascertained more
precisely by an econometric analysis of the determinants of release within the
pool of sixty-eight litigated cases. That is, conditional upon having filed and
litigated a habeas petition, it is possible to estimate whether a judicial grant
of relief changed the odds of actual release from the Cuban base. In asking
this question, it is also useful to consider whether the government’s own risk
evaluations, in addition to (or in contrast to) judicial determinations,
influence the likelihood of release. Table 2 presents the results from an ordinal
logistic regression of sixty-six detainees with litigated cases,247 where the
dependent variable is the fact of a transfer out of custody. This specification
includes controls for whether there was a judicial order of release (“detainee
prevails”), and whether the detainee was assigned a high-risk status (as opposed
to a medium- or lower-risk status).

244 Indirect effects are hard to identify because of an omitted variable problem. My data does
show that a large number of detainees who did not litigate their petition extensively nonetheless
obtained release. This is at least consistent with an indirect effect. But it may also be that filing, but
not litigating, a habeas petition and early release (cutting short the litigation) are both predicted by
a variable I cannot observe—such as a dearth of evidence in the government’s possession justifying
detention, or the underlying absence of any such evidence in the first instance.
245 The unreported case is Idris v. Obama, No. 05-1555 (RCL) (Oct. 4, 2013) (on file with author).
246 Cf. Huq, What Good, supra note 22, at 428 (reporting an upper bound of 3.75%).
247 Two cases are omitted because they involved detainees classified as low-risk, and would
have distorted the binary variable used as a control here.
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Table 2: Ordinal Logistic Regression of Transfer
Decisions Among Litigated Cases

Transfer Likelihood
Detainee Prevails

3.952
(3.63)**

High risk

-0.905
(1.13)

Constant

-0.077
(0.11)

N
Pseudo R2
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

66
0.4160

Table 2 suggests that within the circumscribed domain of judicial review, a
court’s decision that detention was unlawful played a statistically (and practically)
significant role in predicting release. When included in the same specification,
the government’s risk evaluations did not have a statistically significant effect.
These would have been expected to be negative. Intriguingly, this suggests that
the government’s own risk assessments did not predict which detainees would
be released by judicial order. The results thus demonstrate a gap between the
executive’s and the judiciary’s standards for detention.
In summary, post-Boumediene discrete adjudications of individual petitions
did not play a large role in changing the rate of transfers for three reasons.
First, government litigators did not leverage statutory exceptions to accelerate
transfers. Second, only about half (fifty-two percent) of detainees filed habeas
petitions, either before or after Boumediene. Third, of those who filed petitions,
less than one in five (sixteen percent) managed to litigate their petition to a final
judgment. It was only once a detainee had passed the substantial obstacles of
filing and litigating a petition that discrete adjudication of the legal merits of
detention seemed to make any difference at all. At this point, however, that
difference appears real.
2. The Impact of the Courts’ Law-Declaration Function
Courts do not only decide discrete cases and controversies. They also
articulate authoritative interpretations of statutory and constitutional law.
This law-declaration function is a second—and independent—vector of
judicial power. Courts exert influence via their clarification and creation of
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new law; their influence is conceptually and practically independent of their
remedial function.248 To estimate its effect, this subsection contrasts the
doctrinal products of habeas litigation with both government litigation
positions and de facto bureaucratic practice.
Recall that the 2001 AUMF was silent on the precise scope of related
detention authority or the procedures necessary to ascertain whether a
specific individual may be detained.249 It effectively delegated to executive
branch officials and federal judges the task of developing substantive and
procedural rules.250 Executive and judicial positions on these questions are
expected to differ. The nature of this divergence is an empirical question. The
data I have assembled allow two distinct comparisons between the revealed
preferences of the executive and judicial branches. Both suggest that the
federal courts staked out positions more hostile to detainees’ liberty interests
than those taken by government lawyers or military bureaucrats.
To begin with, post-Boumediene habeas litigation generated legal precedent
that was more favorable to the executive than even the positions sought by
the Justice Department. As a procedural matter, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals allowed the government to use a preponderance of the evidence
standard;251 installed a “presumption of regularity” for government documents;252
and reversed district court habeas grants for taking an insufficiently holistic
view of the government’s evidence.253 The Court of Appeals also repeatedly

248 In other work, I have criticized the Court’s pervasive failure to provide an adequate level of
constitutional remedies. See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Judicial Remedies, 65
DUKE L.J. 1, 12-40 (2015) [hereinafter Huq, Judicial Independence] (arguing that violations of constitutional
rights are systematically disregarded because of a lack of constitutional remedies). The contrast
developed here between comparative remedial scarcity, see supra Table 2, and robust, statist law
declaration is consistent with the analysis of constitutional law more generally developed in that work.
249 See 2001 AUMF, § 2(a) (authorizing the President to use all “necessary and appropriate
force” to prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519
(plurality opinion) (noting that “the AUMF does not use specific language of detention”).
250 Congress often delegates authority to coordinate branches on controversial and divisive
policy questions, such as the scope of military detention policy, by using ambiguous language. See
DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST
POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 197 (1999) (stating that
policy areas shrouded in uncertainty are more often delegated).
251 See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding no indication that a
preponderance standard is unconstitutional); see also Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 403 n.3 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (stating that the preponderance of evidence standard is constitutionally sufficient).
252 See Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that official intelligence
documents were entitled to a presumption of regularity).
253 See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105-06 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that the district
court wrongly looked at each piece of evidence in isolation rather than evaluating the government’s
evidence in totality). The Court, however, has held that a failure to find whether a detainee belonged
to one terrorist group or another (e.g., al Qaeda or the Taliban) is not a reversible error. See Suleiman
v. Obama, 670 F.3d 1311, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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invited government litigators to seek a lower burden of proof than the
preponderance standard upon which they relied in their briefs.254
On substantive-law questions, the Appeals Court again favored expansive
government direction. District courts had demanded that the government
demonstrate that a detainee was part of an AUMF-covered organization’s
“command structure” to render detention lawful.255 In effect, this forced the
government to tie a detainee to one of the terrorist organizations covered by
the AUMF. The Circuit Court rejected this test as too narrow, directing
instead that the government show either that a detainee was “a ‘part of’ [or . . .]
sufficiently involved with” a covered organization.256 The Circuit Court also
underscored that the government can satisfy the “part of ” element of this
definition by an accumulation of otherwise innocuous facts.257 Evidence of
affiliation was not necessary.258
Appellate judges also repeatedly offered suggestions about how detention
authority could be inflated. For instance, more than one appellate judgment
intimated that the test for lawful detention might be satisfied solely on a
showing that an individual had stayed at a Taliban or al Qaeda guesthouse.259

254 See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[O]ur analysis here does not
establish that preponderance of the evidence is the constitutionally-required minimum evidentiary
standard.”); see also Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878 & n.4 (noting that American citizens are likely entitled
to greater procedures than noncitizens seized abroad during the war on terror). In addition, the
court has attached a “presumption of regularity” to government documents that precludes accuracy
challenges in many cases. Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 748-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
255 See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The key inquiry, then,
is . . . whether the individual functions or participates within or under the command structure of
the organization . . . .”); see also Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68-69 (D.D.C. 2009)
(asserting that “[s]ympathizers, propagandists, and financiers” who do not “receive and execute orders
within [the terrorist group’s] command structure” “cannot be considered part of the enemy’s ‘armed
forces’ and therefore cannot be detained militarily unless they take direct part in the hostilities”).
256 Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2011); accord Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1,
10 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (detailing the analysis used to find that Awad was “part of ” al Qaeda).
257 See Hussain v. Obama, 718 F.3d 964, 969-70 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding possession of a
Taliban-supplied weapon near the Afghan lines, residence at a Jama’at al-Tablighi mosque, and
inconsistent responses to interrogators to be sufficient evidence), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1621 (2014).
258 Id.
259 See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2 (holding that evidence of al-Bihani visiting al Qaeda
guesthouses was sufficient justification for his detention); see also Alsabri v. Obama, 684 F.3d 1298,
1302 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[S]taying at [al Qaeda] houses can be ‘powerful’ evidence that a detainee was
part of al Qaeda and/or the Taliban.”); Suleiman v. Obama, 670 F.3d 1311, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(finding that a voluntary decision to move into an al Qaeda guesthouse used as a staging area for
recruits going to a military training camp is strong evidence that the individual was a recruit);
Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 6 n. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that proof “that a petitioner trained
at an al Qaeda camp or stayed at an al Qaeda guesthouse ‘overwhelmingly’ would carry the
government’s burden” of justifying detention); Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071, 1075 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (noting that staying at an al-Qaeda guesthouse or training camp constitutes
“overwhelming” evidence “that the United States had authority to detain that person”); Uthman, 637
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This position appears more generous than the definition limned by the
Department of Justice in its litigation documents. The weighty significance
assigned by federal judges to this particular fact is especially striking because
residence at such a guesthouse is the most frequently occurring trait identified
in the detainee assessments (n=414).260 Courts hence identified, and argued
for the dispositive significance of, the one trait with the largest marginal
inflationary effect on the state’s legal authority to detain.
Given their willingness to treat guesthouse residence as per se factual
justification for detention, federal judges evinced a notable incuriosity about
what exactly counted as a terrorist guesthouse. The D.C. Circuit instead
peremptorily suggested that “[i]t is highly unlikely that a visitor to Afghanistan
would end up at an al Qaeda guesthouse by mistake, either by the guest or by
the host.”261 That court also asserted that guesthouses were “heavily fortified
terrorist den[s].”262 Neither conclusion, though, reflects factual evidence
about specific facilities.263 Indeed, there is remarkably little record evidence
about what ranks as a terrorist guesthouse, and how that designation was
assigned or verified.264 In some instances, guesthouses were identified and
raided by Pakistani, rather than American, forces.265 This raises the possibility
that lawful detention could hinge upon factual assertions made by a foreign
intelligence service, assertions that a federal judge would be in no position to
analyze or verify. Of course, those assertions may or may not be true in
F.3d at 406 (calling the fact of capture at an al Qaeda guesthouse “overwhelming” evidence that a
detainee is a member of that organization).
260 By way of comparison, membership in al Qaeda is flagged in 402 assessments.
261 Uthman, 637 F.3d at 406.
262 Ali v. Obama, 736 F.3d 542, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
263 In some cases, the government relied on expert testimony from a political scientist specializing
in the Arabian Peninsula. See al-Adahi v. Obama, 698 F. Supp. 2d 48, 60 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing the
declaration of Dr. Sheila Carapico). Studies of al Qaeda presence in Pakistan in the early 2000s, to the
contrary, suggest that al Qaeda “did not have a dedicated infrastructure to recruit Pakistanis for Al
Qaeda operations,” but rather “use[d] informal networks with Pakistani organizations to obtain
logistical support.” C. Christine Fair, Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and
Other Organizations, 27 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 489, 494-95 (2004).
264 The Department of Defense’s “Threat Matrix,” a document used by analysts at the Cuban
base to reach determinations about individual detainees, does not define the term “guesthouse,”
although that term is used in several locations. In its opening pages, it talks about “suspected
compound[s] or safe house[s],” which are identified using a “tip-off ” or based on “suspicion about
the occupants.” Dep’t of Def., JFT-GTMO Matrix of Threat Indicators for Enemy Combatants 2-3,
8-9 (on file with author). This might be read to suggest that a site is designated as a terrorist
guesthouse because of suspicions about the specific individuals identified therein. If a court later
uses the guesthouse designation to confirm that a detainee is a member of a proscribed organization,
a circularity might arise in the underlying logic of detention: suspicions about individuals conduce
to the designation of a guesthouse, which in turn “confirms” that suspicions about such individuals
are well-founded.
265 See Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that Pakistani police
officers raided the guesthouse to arrest the appellant).
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discrete cases. The relevant point here is that federal judges evinced no
concern with precisely defining what counts as a “guesthouse” or figuring out
how the specific allegation of guesthouse residence could be proved or
disproved, even as they pressed for indefinite detention authority pivoting on
that one allegation alone.
A second way to evaluate the federal courts’ position in relation to the
executive’s is to compare expressed judicial preferences with the expressed
preferences of the military bureaucracy. Courts have treated detention as a
binary: either a person can be detained, or they cannot, “pursuant to . . . relevant
law.”266 In contrast, the military bureaucracy is not confined to binary
decisions (although, in fact, it never conceded the illegality of any individual’s
detention).267 It can also hold individuals for more or less time, making
thereby nonbinary, granular distinctions on the intensive margin of detention
authority. The duration of detention, even in early 2016 with ninety-three
detainees still in custody, varied widely.268 It ranged from only 137 days to
more than 5000 days.269 As of December 2015, the mean length of detention for
all detainees was 2180 days, and the standard deviation was 1525 days.270 It is
possible to use the variance in this intensive margin to evaluate how the revealed
preferences of the military bureaucracy compare with the law on the books.
To understand the relation between judicial and executive practice, I
constructed an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression that tested the
relationship between the duration of detention for the subpopulation of
detainees who have been released on the one hand, and a range of factors
identified as justifications for detention in the detainee assessments or in
judicial opinions.271 Figure 6 presents the marginal effects of governmental
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008).
The Obama Administration reviewed all detainees still in custody at the beginning of 2009,
and determined that 126 of the 240 were “approved for transfer.” TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 104,
at 9-10. The Task Force that reached this decision indicated that “for most of the detainees approved
for transfer, there were varying degrees of evidence indicating that they were low-level foreign
fighters affiliated with al-Qaida or other groups operating in Afghanistan.” Id. at 16. A decision to
transfer, in short, did not constitute an admission of erroneous detention in the first instance.
Clearances for transfer, moreover, are treated as “protected” information that cannot be disclosed,
or discussed by, detainees’ counsel. Ameziane v. Obama, 699 F.3d 488, 498-99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
268 See Aziz Z. Huq, The Predicates of Military Detention at Guantánamo: The Role of Individual
Acts and Affiliations, 13 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 567, 580 fig.3 (2016).
269 See id. at 581 tbl.2.
270 See id.
271 The analysis presented here is only one way of analyzing the relationship between detention
duration and underlying factual predicates. In a related empirical article, I employ a wider range of
more sophisticated instruments. Most importantly, I use a Cox’s Survival Analysis corrected for
nonproportional hazards with scaled Schoenfeld residuals to explore these relationships. I use OLS
here not only because it supplements the analyses used in the latter article, but also because it is a
method that allows for a crisp visual depiction. The survival analysis does generate different
estimates for some independent variables. In particular, it detects an effect of training on detention
266
267
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attributions of six behavior-related traits found in the detainee assessments:
residence at a guesthouse; attendance at a terrorist training camp; participation
in hostilities; allegiance to a radical mosque; making explicit threats against
the United States; and having a classified “SCI filing” noted in an assessment.
The last trait is a potential indicator of more serious allegations.
The point in each line presents the average percentage change in the duration
of detention observed when a specific trait is attached to a detainee. The bars
around each of the dots represent the ninety-five percent confidence interval
for that estimate. A confidence interval containing zero implies that the hypothesis
that the durational effect of attributing a given trait to a detainee is zero
cannot be rejected.272
Figure 6: The Marginal Effects of Selected Behavioral Findings in Detainee Assessments

Figure 6 shows that, within the population of detainees who have been
transferred, only one-of-six behavior-related traits flagged in detainee
assessments have statistically significant effects on detention duration that are
duration that the OLS method fails to capture. The relative effect associated with different independent
variables, however, is roughly parallel.
272 See ALAN AGRESTI & BARBARA FINLAY, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 110 (4th ed. 2009) (describing a confidence interval as an interval of numbers within
which the parameter is hypothesized to fall).
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distinguishable from a null finding273—the finding that an individual stayed
at a guesthouse. There is no evidence from the OLC specification employed
here that other traits identified in the assessments had any effect on detention
duration, including attending a terrorist training camp, participating in
hostilities, visiting a radical mosque, making threats against the United States
during captivity, and the existence of classified evidence that would be
presented in what is called an SCI filing.
How does this compare to the law on the books? Federal courts have
relied, as I have noted, on guesthouse attendance to find detention lawful.274
But they have also leaned heavily on factors that have had no significant de
facto effect on the duration of detention. For example, district courts—who
have typically taken a less minatory view of habeas petitions than the Court
of Appeals275—have cited attendance at a training camp to endorse the legality of
a detention.276 Because training-camp allegations appear in 236 of 765 detainee
assessments released by Wikileaks, in one-in-three potential cases, the
government can invoke in federal court a legally sufficient basis for detention
that its own institutional practices may not have employed, and that certainly
was not dispositive in the fashion that federal courts have suggested.277
In sum, whereas a close study of discrete adjudication shows that courts
directly helped liberate a very small number of detainees, analysis of their
law-declaration function suggests that federal judges refused to spur
indirectly a higher rate of transfers by contracting the space of lawful
detention authority. To the contrary, the law as embodied in formal rules of
decision elaborated by Article III judges has turned out to be considerably
more punitive than either the posture of government litigators or the practice

273 For a discussion of the importance of seeking both statistical and practical significance defined
in these terms, see Justin H. Gross, Testing What Matters (If You Must Test at All): A Context-Driven
Approach to Substantive and Statistical Significance, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 775, 779-80 (2015).
274 See supra text accompanying notes 261–64.
275 My analysis of Westlaw’s relevant databases shows that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
has reversed or remanded all nine district-court grants of habeas it has considered, while affirming
all but two of nineteen district-court denials it has considered.
276 See, e.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, 698 F. Supp. 2d 48, 61-62 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that a detainee’s
attendance at a training camp makes it more likely than not that he knew he was associating with al
Qaeda); accord Ali v. Obama, 736 F.3d 542, 546 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
277 Aziz Huq, Recidivism Mentions in Major Papers and Congressional Record (unpublished
data set) (on file with author). The radical mosque trait appears in thirty-three assessments, while
explicit threat allegations appear in fourteen assessments. Id. Hence, neither is numerically as
significant as training camp allegations. The one instance in which the government invoked
attendance at a radical mosque (in London) as justification for detention received a district-court
rebuke. Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2009).
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of the military bureaucracy. As a model of the “duty to supervise,” in short,
post-Boumediene habeas may leave something to be desired.278
3. Understanding the (Non-)Effect of Judicial Review
Why did federal courts take positions friendlier to state power than the
executive branch itself? We can better understand the limited checking function
of the federal courts in the detention context by nesting the operation of
judicial review within a larger separation-of-powers context along two margins.
The first reason for chastened expectations of judicial review turns on
timing. Judicial decisions in habeas petitions are necessarily after-the-fact.
When a court is called upon to evaluate the legality of state coercion, and in
particular detention, this often occurs only after the executive has made
decisions about (1) who to target for detention, (2) on the basis of what evidence,
and (3) who within the custodial population to release in order to obviate
judicial review.279 This sequencing empowers the executive to select which
fact patterns will be litigated from the larger population. By molding the
distribution of observed cases, the executive furthers several goals, not the
least of which is shaping judges’ perceptions of executive branch conduct.
In this regard, recall that Figure 4 suggested that post-Boumediene habeas
courts confronted a significantly riskier selection of detainees than the
population as a whole. This nonrandom array of detainees results from the
early release of less risky detainees—and hence need not be ascribed to
improper motives. Nevertheless, it introduces a form of “path-dependency”
into the resulting litigation.280 Legal precedent is shaped by fact patterns in
which the underlying impetus toward continued custody is more strongly felt
than in the modal detainee case. Judges’ perceptions of the costs and benefits
of different legal standards are inflected by the heightened salience of false
positives, rather than false negatives.
In addition, the executive’s discretionary control of federal court case flow
works as a means of preventing the disclosure of the bureaucracy’s evidentiary

278 See Metzger, Constitutional Duty, supra note 31, at 1924-25 (citing Boumediene as a possible
example of judicial execution of the duty to supervise).
279 Judicial review is ex ante in the context of arrest warrants and (sometimes) in the context
of pretrial detention.
280 In the political science literature, this has been defined as the quality of “exhibit[ing]
increasing returns or positive feedback. Each step along a particular path produces consequences
which make that path more attractive for the next round. As such effects begin to accumulate, they
generate a powerful virtuous (or vicious) cycle of self-reinforcing activity.” Paul Pierson, Increasing
Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 253 (2000). Path dependency
can arise when a population is sorted even when the principle of selection is random. See Oona A.
Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law
System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 609-10 (2001).
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or analytic errors (or worse). Stated most crudely, the government can select
individuals for release to ensure that flawed or illegal governmental practices
remain undisclosed. For example, consider the possibility that the intelligence
services relied on informants of imperfect quality to identify al Qaeda safehouses
and guesthouses.281 Revelation of this error might undermine courts’ and
legislators’ confidence in other factual predicates, or more generally sap
judges’ willingness to treat government evidence as accurate and authentic.282
Or consider the (hardly far-fetched) possibility that litigation of a habeas suit
would reveal as-yet-unrevealed torture or cruel treatment.283 Although habeas
litigation has brought some coercive treatment to light,284 other egregious
instances of coercive interrogation may remain unaired.285 Strategic deployment
of the release power can limit public criticism and maintain institutional
legitimacy in such cases.286
Although the magnitude of these effects here remains unknown, the basic
dynamic can be observed in other contexts. Consider criminal prosecutors’
power to condition plea bargains on the waiver of appeal rights, a power
exercised in some two-thirds of federal criminal cases.287 Empirical studies
281 See supra text accompanying notes 261–65 (discussing the fragility of the guesthouse finding
in many cases).
282 Cf. Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (assigning a presumption of
regularity to government records produced on the battlefield).
283 A 2009 study that interviewed fifty-five former detainees found thirty-one alleged abusive
interrogations. LAUREL E. FLETCHER & ERIC STOVER, THE GUANTÁNAMO EFFECT: EXPOSING
THE CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PRACTICES 62-68 (2009); see
also MOHAMEDOU OULD SLAHI, GUANTÁNAMO DIARY 202-63 (Larry Siems ed., 2015) (describing,
with redactions, but still in harrowing detail, a litany of coercive interrogation methods used at
Guantánamo against one detainee). While Slahi’s treatment was exceptionally harsh, it is worth
noting that physical abuse appears to have been pervasive. When detainees arrived at the base, many
report being “punched and kicked” and then subjected to medical processing “whose harshness and
humiliation was hard to forget.” GREENBERG, supra note 2, at 79.
284 Several habeas cases involve allegations of torture found to be credible by district court
judges. See, e.g., Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5-9 (D.D.C. 2010), aff ’d sub nom. Al-Madhwani
v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (documenting a case in which the government’s
primary evidence of twenty-three reports and summaries of interrogations were not reliable because
they were obtained through coercive means).
285 There are nine detainees at Guantánamo who have died in custody, several at their own
hands. The Detainees, N.Y. TIMES: THE GUANTÁNAMO DOCKET (Nov. 18, 2016), http://projects.ny
times.com/guantanamo/detainees [https://perma.cc/CW37-B2HR]. At least in these cases, there
will never be an accounting of how the detainees were treated.
286 An extension of this point is that strategic delay in habeas litigation may serve the same
reputation-preserving goal. For example, the habeas petition filed by Abu Zubaydah, a known
subject of coercive interrogations, has languished on a district court docket for over six years without
explanation. Raymond Bonner, The Strange Case of the Forgotten Gitmo Detainee, POLITICO (May 12,
2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/abu-zubaydah-tortured-waterboarded-cia-d
c-circuit-court-guantanamo-117833.html [https://perma.cc/92A3-HTV5].
287 See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55
DUKE L.J. 209, 212 (2005) (describing findings from a study of 971 plea bargains reached in Fiscal Year
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have demonstrated that prosecutors use appellate waivers to prevent certain
legal and constitutional challenges from being litigated.288 Ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, for example, are typically amenable to challenge only via
collateral review processes that are often extinguished by waiver.289
The second reason for chastened expectations for judicial review turns on
the courts’ institutional character. The Framers imagined that abuses by the
federal government would be constrained by the separation of powers because
each branch would have an institutional motive to resist ultra vires actions by
coordinate branches.290 Institutional interests enabled by the separation of
powers, however, may not incentivize interbranch checking. This is true of
Article III as much as the other branches.291
The institutional interests of the Article III judiciary are plausibly
understood to include the maximization of prestige and the minimization of
the institutional costs of litigation, which include the burden of adjudicating
politically contentious cases with potential public blowback.292 But these interests
can create institutional incentives to avoid responsibility for controversial
policy decisions, thereby enlarging a coordinate branch’s effectual authority.
In my view, the evidence suggests that risk-averse federal judges perceived
post-Boumediene habeas as an onerous assignment of low prestige with large
attendant risk of public backlash. One suggestive piece of evidence on this
score is the absence of ideological division in habeas cases. This datum
contradicts criticisms proffered by liberal commentators, who explain the
government-friendly results in detention cases by blaming “ideologically
extreme” judges.293 With only a small number of exceptions, the major
2003 and finding that in nearly two-thirds of cases settled by plea agreements, the defendant waived
his or her right to review); accord Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 127, 211 (1995) (describing appellate waivers as common in the context of plea bargains).
288 See King & O’Neill, supra note 287, at 249-50 (noting that “once a defendant waives his
right to appeal the sentence, that waiver blocks any claim that the sentence violated his rights under
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments”).
289 Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 546-47, 580-81 (2014).
Sentencing courts, aware of their own constitutional flaws, may also strategically sentence defendants
to shorter terms to avoid appellate review. See id. at 580-81.
290 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 257 (James Madison) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008)
(“[T]hose who administer each department [possess] the necessary constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”); see also Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 771 (2012) (extolling the virtues of rivalrous separation of powers).
291 See Huq, Judicial Independence, supra note 248, at 40-67 (analyzing the connection between
Article III institutional interests and the doctrinal limits upon constitutional remedies).
292 See id. Federal judges and Justices have long expressed antipathy to adjudicative obligations
that would tarnish the luster and prestige of Article III courts. See Judith Resnik, Trial As Error,
Jurisdiction As Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 972 (2000)
(tracing back arguments of preserving the prestige of Article III courts to Chief Justice Taft).
293 See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, The Law Free Zone and Back Again, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 551,
594-95 (2013) (“The D.C. Circuit . . . has stubbornly resisted the recognition of detainee rights . . . .”);
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appellate decisions on the procedural treatment of habeas petitions and the
substantive law of detention have been unanimous. Dissents in favor of detainees
have been rare.294 This suggests that the judicial response to post-Boumediene
litigation should not be reduced to facile ideological terms. Indeed, in a much-noted
concurrence, Judge Laurence Silberman explicitly pointed to institutional
concerns that extend to liberal and conservative jurists alike; he expressed his
“doubt [that] any of [his] colleagues [would] vote to grant a petition if he or
she believe[d] that it [were] somewhat likely that the petitioner [was] an al
Qaeda adherent or an active supporter.”295 The breadth of this statement—covering
liberal and conservative jurists alike—and the absence of any rebuttal by liberal
judges in subsequent opinions suggests that Judge Silberman’s comments indeed
fairly characterize Article III actors’ convergent institutional incentives.
Prestige concerns also plausibly explain the Supreme Court’s failure to
intervene in post-Boumediene habeas litigation, even though the decision to
grant certiorari in one of the post-Boumediene cases demanded less than the
five votes needed for the Boumediene majority.296 Having obtained a measure
of public commendation for its ruling in Boumediene, the Court could delegate
to inferior courts the more hazardous and mundane business of granular
adjudication. That is, since judicial prestige was advanced by the “great
victory”297 of a constitutional ruling on the Suspension Clause, the Court
only stood to lose from further engagement.
Finally, judges may be particularly leery of narrowing government power
in detention cases because of spillover effects that could be blamed on Article III
actors. The AUMF defines the bounds of legal force not just for detention,
but also for other species of military power, such as targeted killings.298
Scholars had by this time already highlighted the filial relations of targeting
and detention law.299 Although the first targeted killing of al Qaeda suspects
occurred in 2002, the program’s acceleration and expansion primarily occurred
in 2008 and 2009, just as post-Boumediene habeas petitions were starting to be
Vladeck, supra note 45, at 1488 (arguing that detainee cases show a “fundamental unwillingness by the
D.C. Circuit” to follow the Court’s analysis in Boumediene).
294 Probably the most important dissenting opinion is Justice Tatel’s in Latif v. Obama. See
Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 746, 770-90 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
295 Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
296 See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
297 Ronald Dworkin, Why It Was a Great Victory, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.
nybooks.com/articles/2008/08/14/why-it-was-a-great-victory/ [https://perma.cc/S8HV-3F67].
298 See Chesney, Military Detention, supra note 45, at 773-74 (documenting that although targeted
killing decisions “ordinarily are not directly subject to judicial review,” they can fall under the
“notional scope of detention authority”).
299 For the leading work on this point, see Matthew C. Waxman, Detention As Targeting:
Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1385 (2008),
arguing that “detention decisions can be understood analogically as targeting decisions, sharing many
of the same policy and moral issues.”
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litigated.300 Jurists may have been conscious that their decisions in the
detention context would have unanticipated consequences for other
programs, such as the use of targeted killing. That possibility of unanticipated
spillovers with ambiguous welfare effects during a period of flux and
experimentation in national security policy may have generated additional
constraint on risk-averse federal judges.
In sum, even if the judiciary’s institutional interests are engaged, they
yield no guarantee that courts’ intervention will constrain the political
branches. To the contrary, the Guantánamo example suggests that Article
III’s institutional bent can lead, unexpectedly, to an increase in the effectual
scope of executive branch discretion.
D. Conclusion
This Part has developed a granular account of how the separation of
powers constrains presidential initiatives by closely parsing bureaucratic,
legislative, and judicial incentives and instruments. It has, in other words,
attempted to describe the separation of powers from the ground up, rather
than from the top down.
In the aggregate, my account suggests that President Obama’s ambition
of closing Guantánamo confronted disabling frictions as a result of a dynamic
entanglement between military bureaucracy and legislators. Each abetted the
other in generating barriers against an aggressive rate of transfers. The
military bureaucracy impeded diplomatic efforts to expedite transfers and
winnow the detainee population. It also strategically disseminated claims of
rising recidivism rates in a fashion timed and framed to disrupt maximally
the White House’s ambition. Legislators in turn seized on bureaucratic
estimates of recidivism, notwithstanding their facial ambiguities and potential
flaws, to prime the pump of public anxiety. Ensuing statutory curtailments of
the executive’s transfer authority, in turn, worked by vesting larger discretion
in the military bureaucracy to resist presidential pressure.
By contrast, standard accounts of President Obama’s failure tend to focus
on recidivism-related security risk and political opposition in Congress.301
Neither of these explanations supplies the full story. It is not the case that the
flow of transfers from the Cuban base slowed and ceased because of a dearth of
plausible transferees. Ultimately, there may be a group of detainees who cannot
be transferred, and for whom some sort of trial or alternative disposition is
necessary. But transfers ended before this dilemma was even reached. Instead,

300 See Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681, 685 (2014)
(describing the changing pace of the targeted killing program).
301 See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
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political opposition to Guantánamo transfers, and concomitant perceptions of
recidivism-related risk, were shaped and channeled by a bureaucratic–legislative
alliance out of institutional and partisan incentives. The absence of any judicial
spur to transfers, by contrast, reflects the path dependency of judicial review
upon prior executive branch choices, and also the parochial institutional
concerns of the Article III judiciary. In short, the separation of powers
matters—but in unanticipated ways.
III. WHAT CONSTRAINS PRESIDENTIAL POWER?
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS REVISITED
The persistence of Guantánamo is a case study in the constraint of
presidential ambition. In its particulars, it might be ranked either as a
constitutional success, or as a species of tragedy. On the one hand, Congress’s
use of appropriations riders to reign in executive power reflects Justice Story’s
prediction that Congress “must have[] a controlling influence over the executive
power, since it holds at its own command all the resources, by which a chief
magistrate could make himself formidable.”302 Alternatively, one might conclude
that courts’ use of the “Great Writ” of habeas corpus to write a jurisprudence
of statist authorizations for detention is cause for dismay. Reactions will
diverge, I suspect, based on readers’ priors as to whether the Guantánamo
detentions were warranted, not so much as a matter of law, but more as a
matter of political morality.
I offer no answer here to that difficult moral question (although I have a
view on the matter). My more modest aim in this Part is to ask whether the
dynamics identified in Parts I and II have broader implications for our theoretical
understanding of the separation of powers as an element of constitutional
design. Only afterward will I ask whether they also have implications for
possible pathways to President Obama’s initial goal of ending detention
operations at Guantánamo. The analysis is developed here without any
assumption that readers will support that goal, but rather is conducted in the
spirit of positive inquiry into how Presidents can achieve their democratically
credentialed policy agendas.
The central theoretical contribution of this Article comprises three
discrete observations about the mechanics of the separation of powers. First,
the separation of powers, insofar as it works to bind presidential authority,
does not necessarily operate in a mechanical fashion between branches
operating as unitary entities. Instead, more granularly, it can rely on actors

302 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 531, at
372 (2d ed. 1851); see also Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking,
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 142-53 (1994) (discussing the Framers’ insistence on checks and balances).
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both within and outside the government that comprise elements of a thick
political surround. Second, the effect of law within the separation of powers
can turn on political dynamics, rather than the coercive force of statutory
prohibitions and commands. This has two further implications: important
constraints on the presidency are produced first by interbranch politics and,
further, that those legal constraints can depend primarily on the expected
political cost of violation. Third, notwithstanding recent work that
emphasizes partisan considerations over institutional ones in the separation
of powers, institutional incentives at the branch and the sub-branch level play
a large role in generating interbranch constraints. Together, these three points
do not amount to a new theory of the separation of powers; rather, they
gesture toward the value of more retail analysis that looks beyond the labels
of branch and at the constituent actors, motives, and localized politics around
a given policy question. Only by taking account of those micropolitics can
sensible predictions be reached about which of the separation of power’s
plural and contradictory goals will play out in practice.
I develop each of these retail-mechanism-related points in turn. Then, I
draw some more general conclusions for the normative projects often hitched
to the separation of powers. Finally, I return to the specific question of what
path forward could lead to the closure of the Guantánamo detention facility.
A. Beyond Branches: The Role of the Thick Political Surround
One larger theoretical implication of the analysis in Parts I and II
concerns the range of actors relevant to interbranch dynamics. The separation
of powers is often analyzed as a “three-branch problem.” 303 Yet the constraining
effect of the separation of powers cannot be understood without attention to
actors within the branches. In separate work, Jon Michaels and I have called
attention to the important causal role played by a “teeming ecosystem of
institutional, organizational, and individual actors within as well as outside of
government” that comprises what we term the “thick political surround.”304
Depending on which elements of this thick political surround are engaged,
the separation of powers can have different results in practice.
The account developed in Parts I and II draws attention to the fact that neither
the executive nor Congress act as a unified whole. In the political science
argot, both are a “they”—not an “it.”305 For example, the analysis in Part II

303 William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 831, 898 (2001).
304 See Huq & Michaels, supra note 25, at 352, 391.
305 For an application to Congress, see generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not
an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992), which argues that
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suggested that the State Department and the Pentagon pursued distinct, and
sometimes conflicting, policy priorities regarding the Guantánamo detentions.306
Similarly, close observers of intrabranch dynamics have insisted on the
independent preferences and motivations of trial-level attorneys tasked with
responding to habeas petitions.307 Nor are the federal courts a unified entity.
Critics of the post-Boumediene habeas jurisprudence may err in blaming
“extremist” judges.308 But it is still striking that trial and appellate judges had
such divergent responses to the Guantánamo habeas petitions. Had the
Department of Justice not chosen to appeal its losses, and instead used trial-level
defeats as a platform for statutorily enabled releases,309 the trajectory of the
net detainee population might have been quite different. In short, each branch
acts not as a unified whole but through component entities. As in any other
principal–agent relationship, there is a consequent possibility of slippage
between what “the branch” wants (however that may be determined) and what
a constituent element wants.
All of this has implications for the separation of powers.310 Reifying the
“branches” as homogenous, unitary entities and ignoring the variegated ecosystem
of institutional factions hiding within and around them invites serious
misdiagnosis of the causes and consequences of interbranch interactions. The
choice of which institutional faction engages in an interbranch transaction
can alter the nature and the consequences of that interaction. Congressional
responses to Guantánamo’s persistence likely hinged upon which faction
within the executive was better able to mobilize legislative attention. The
downstream adjudicative treatment of an action can also be influenced by the
exact path that a challenge takes through the Article III hierarchy.
The pivotal role of an internal ecosystem of institutional players that I
highlight here both complements and complicates a recent and growing
literature celebrating “internal” separation of powers.311 Gillian Metzger, in a
leading exemplar of the genre, cites Boumediene as a decision that gave the

legislative intent of a “collective body” is a contradiction; for extension to the national security
executive, see Huq, Structural Constitutionalism, supra note 12, at 904-05.
306 See supra text accompanying notes 124–31.
307 See Ingber, supra note 37, at 384-86 (noting that personalities of individuals, as well as
bureaucratic dynamics, play a role).
308 See supra text accompanying note 293.
309 See supra text accompanying note 215.
310 Judicial doctrine on the separation of powers is surprisingly sensitive to the diverse
institutional preferences and motivations of both internal and external actors. In separate work, I
show how much of the anarchic quality of separation-of-powers jurisprudence can be glossed
sympathetically as an effort to tame this institutional heterogeneity. See generally Huq & Michaels,
supra note 25.
311 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006).
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executive “an incentive to craft internal administrative procedures that address
the constitutional weakness the majority identified in the current system.”312
The account of bureaucratic responses to increasing pressure to wind down
the Guantánamo detentions developed in Part II confirms Metzger’s
hypothesis that dynamics internal to the executive are a necessary component
of any understanding of the separation of powers. The same account, contra
Metzger’s claim, also suggests that bureaucratic responses to those pressures
can generate policy outcomes at odds with the ends anticipated by internal
separation-of-powers proponents.
But whereas the internal separation-of-powers literature has celebrated
the recreation of checks and balances within the executive branch as a
substitute for the weakness of external interbranch checks,313 the account
offered here suggests that bureaucratic actors are salient not because of
internal dynamics but only because of their outward-facing influence on
Congress and the judiciary. They are complements to, not substitutes for,
interactions among the three branches. Intrabranch checks, I have suggested,
are partially caused by and mediated through bureaucratic forces. Hence,
legislative resistance to presidential pressure to close Guantánamo hinged on
information produced by the bureaucracy. More tentatively, I have also
hypothesized that bureaucratic entrepreneurship on the recidivism question
may have increased the divisiveness of the larger political landscape. As much
as being a product of partisan deadlock in Congress, therefore, bureaucratic
policymaking authority was a contributing factor to partisan polarization.
The role of Congress as a constraint on the President, moreover, is yet
more complex still. Legislative barriers to transfers depended upon the
executive for their efficacy. These statutes elaborated new opportunities for
bureaucratic foot-dragging and resistance to the presidential agenda. A close
parallel here is the legislator–prosecutor alliance identified by William Stuntz as
the source of “pathological” criminal-law politics.314 Similarly, the opportunities
for judicial intervention, and the relative salience of its costs and benefits,
were a function of the military bureaucracy’s choices. Interbranch constraints
on presidential power, in short, are best understood as flowing from a matrix
of actors stretching across all three branches and implicating more than just

312 Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
479, 498 (2010).
313 See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 311, at 2335-42 (discussing the White House Office of Legal
Counsel’s interactions with the Attorney General on John Yoo’s torture memos as an example of
intrabranch checks).
314 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 510
(2001) (noting the “tacit cooperation” between prosecutors and legislators that is a historic foundation
of American criminal law).
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the three textually specified actors enumerated in Articles I through III of
the Constitution.315
In short, the analysis here points to the value of moving beyond the unit
of the “branch” to more granular determinants of interbranch relations. In
addition, it suggests that the idiom of the “internal separation of powers” is
hopelessly disconnected from the actual vectors of institutional behavior.
The question I have not answered is how far to drill down with this
analysis: I have demonstrated that it is feasible to decompose branches into
relatively coarse particles, such as “the Justice Department,” and “the military
bureaucracy.” I have not gone farther because the evidentiary record that
would enable an even more precise analysis of specific individuals or offices
within executive departments simply does not exist. But that is not to say
that others cannot gain traction with more granular data. Ultimately, the unit
of analysis employed in institutional analysis will depend on the purposes of
the analyst, the available evidentiary record, and the potential toeholds for
reform. Nevertheless, I suspect that the shift in focus from branches to
intrabranch actors will prove an enduring one in legal scholarship with a
positive, descriptive ambition.
B. The Interaction of Law and Politics in the Separation of Powers
My analysis suggests that the operational vector of the separation of powers
may be political, rather than legalistic, in character. The force of law—understood
as affirmative prohibitions on certain actions—proved at best a secondary
constraint on President Obama’s agenda. It was instead politics—first internal
to the executive branch, and then externally in and around Congress—that
fatally entangled his ambitions. By “politics” here, I do not mean simply
electoral politics.316 I mean the term in its broader sense. So understood, the
term picks out the dense public network of evaluative claims, assertions, and
315 In my estimation, external elements of the thick political surround may have been
responsible for framing Guantánamo as an important public-policy problem, and even motivating
the robust early rate of releases. See Huq, What Good, supra note 22, at 422-23. However, I see less
evidence that external actors shaped post-Boumediene policy. But see Deeks, supra note 22, at 844-48
(offering examples of Obama detention policy that may have been shaped by a concern to head off
subsequent litigation). This suggests that different policy environments—characterized by different
status quos, and different perceived priorities—can empower and emasculate different actors.
316 Other scholars do reduce constraints on the presidency to a crude function of electoral
reward or punishment. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE
UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 4-10 (2010) (asserting that the “major constraints
on the executive . . . do not arise from law or from the separation-of-powers framework . . . but from
politics and public opinion”). That conception, however, is far too reductive and, even in its
accounting of electoral effects, too imprecise to be useful. For a response and critique that
underscores the role of institutional norms and preferences for legality, see Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the
Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 777 (2012).
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counterarguments in which we jockey over what the state should do. Officials
reside in politics so conceived. Absent some pathology, whether personal or
institutional, that environment infuses their judgment and shapes the rewards
and penalties of political action.
Hence, it was first of all an intramural political falling out between the
Pentagon and the White House that generated the legislative environment in
which restrictions upon detainee transfers could be perceived not merely as
prudent but necessary, even at the risk of courting a presidential veto.317 And
further, the effect of transfer restrictions enacted in 2009 and 2011 did not
depend on coercive law. Rather than blunt prohibitions, these “restrictions”
worked by imposing certain disclosures on the executive before making a
transfer; no countervailing transparency mandates revealed the costs of
continued detentions, erroneous or otherwise. Because these disclosures
required nothing more than publication of information already in the
executive’s possession, they are best understood as efforts to impose political
costs on detainee transfers by providing ammunition for the White House’s
internal and external foes. In short, the dynamics observed here confirm
Frederick Schauer’s hypothesis that “the question of legal compliance is
answered in the realm of politics, rhetoric, and the other determinants of
public [and official] opinion,” and not by coercion or the force of law.318
Political costs and benefits, Parts I and II suggest, are not a product of
external factors alone: they can arise endogenously from internal control
within or between the branches.
This analysis also has bite with respect to our understanding of courts’ role.
As Justice Thomas recently described the standard account of the judiciary’s
position within the separation of powers, “[t]he ‘check’ the judiciary provides
to maintain our separation of powers is enforcement of the rule of law through
judicial review.”319 This pivots courts’ role on the measurement and
implementation of formal legal prohibitions or mandates. But a consideration
of post-Boumediene habeas cases points in another direction. This litigation
supplied a negligible push toward release in individual cases, while at the same
time producing a body of law asymmetrically indifferent to the risk of false
positives. In contrast, politics internal to the executive branch generated leaked
disclosures of recidivism emphasizing (and arguably exaggerating) their costs.
Political entrepreneurs in Congress then leapt upon the disclosures, leveraging
them (and further exaggerating them) to gin up public opposition and new
317 President Obama threatened in 2012 to veto certain transfer restrictions, but backed down
without carrying out the threat. See supra note 221.
318 Frederick Schauer, Official Obedience and the Politics of Defining “Law,” 86 S. CAL. L. REV.
1165, 1177 (2013).
319 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1246 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment).
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platforms for bureaucratic resistance. An exclusive focus on law—understood
as positive enactments that prohibit or mandate action—as the channel for
interbranch dynamics thus misses much of causal importance.
C. The Motivational Foundations of Interbranch Relations
A third implication of this study relates to the motivational foundations of
the separation of powers. It casts some doubt on an important body of recent
work on the pervasive role of partisan incentives in separation-of-powers
controversies. In a widely cited Article, Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes
argued that “almost from the outset,” political parties and partisan motivations
“overwhelmed” the Madisonian conception of the separation of powers.320
Other commentators have echoed their skepticism of the possibility that
officials, at work in any of the three branches, will discard ideology and
partisan allegiances to prioritize the mission of their institution.321 In a
similar vein, empirical scholars of the judicial branch have flagged ideology,
rather than institutional affiliation, as the most powerful determinant of
judicial behavior.322 Ideology and partisanship are now assumed to be the
dominant motivating forces at work among and between the branches.
The persistence of Guantánamo, however, cannot be explained by ideological
or partisan conflicts alone. As Part I demonstrated, bureaucratic resistance
arose in 2009 and 2010 even though there was a deep operational continuity
between the Bush and Obama Administrations.323 In policy terms, there was
no ideological divide to engender resistance. Nor does a narrow focus on
partisan incentives illuminate why national security bureaucrats contrived to
undermine the White House. Rather, I have posited a number of more subtle
internal dynamics in which bureaucratic actors are moved to protect their own
visions of appropriate policy or to shore up their own local institutional
prerogatives. This is evidence of what Daniel Carpenter and George Krause
describe as “organizational socialization and shared identities” within federal
agencies and departments directly shaping policy from the bottom up.324
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 33, at 2313.
See, e.g., David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L.J. 548, 602 (2009) (“[W]hen
one political party captures all of the levers of power, then the American system of separation of
powers fails.”).
322 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 64-65 (1993) (presenting an “attitudinal model” of Supreme Court
decisionmaking which posits that Justices vote largely based on their “ideological attitudes and values”);
Harold J. Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model (asserting that Supreme Court Justices make decisions based
partly on “personal policy preferences”), in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 296 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
323 See supra text accompanying notes 104–07.
324 Daniel Carpenter & George A. Krause, Transactional Authority and Bureaucratic Politics, 25
J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 5, 13 (2014); see also JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING,
SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 3 (1999)
320
321
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Partly informed by Carpenter’s powerful historical accounts of how bureaucrats
have crafted their own agencies’ missions,325 Carpenter and Krause emphasize
that bureaucrats, no less than their elected principals, may cultivate
freestanding sources of institutional support and public legitimacy.326 Among
those pillars of bureaucratic sustenance is the ability of officials “to induce”
congressional majorities to legislate in accord with bureaucratic preferences.327
Protecting local institutional priorities—such as Pentagon control over
detainee releases or the priority of counterterrorism over counternarcotics in
Afghanistan328—can undermine a wider strategic agenda pursued by the
White House, such as closing Guantánamo.
Similarly, partisan affiliation does not fully explain the observed degree
of legislative resistance. Congressional opposition to President Obama’s
agenda instead has evinced a consistently bipartisan character. A crucial 2009
vote on funding to close the Cuban base’s detention operations was derailed
by six leading Democratic Senators,329 notwithstanding the contemporaneous
support among Democratic voters for the President’s agenda.330 My account
thus suggests that partisanship is not a necessary condition of interbranch
constraint. Instead, legislators’ interests can align with those of an internal
governmental constituency, such as the military.331 The institutional interests
of the bureaucracy exert a gravitational pull on legislative action that defies
intraparty identification. Separation of parties, in short, is not the whole story.
Equally, when the Boumediene Court extended the reach of the Suspension
Clause to Guantánamo, tasking district courts with a role in retail habeas
litigation, it forcefully underscored the federal bench’s role in serving as a
beneficial separation-of-powers check on executive discretion and a protector

(summarizing historical research that shows the influence of “the bureaucrat’s own preferences, peer
bureaucrats, supervisors, and the bureaucrat’s clients” on agency work decisions).
325 See DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS,
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, 255-89 (2001).
326 Carpenter & Krause, supra note 324, at 12-13.
327 Daniel Carpenter, The Political Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy: A Response to Kernell,
15 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 113, 113 (2001).
328 See supra text accompanying note 137.
329 See David M. Herszenhorn, Funds to Close Guantánamo Denied, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/us/politics/21detain.html [https://perma.cc/6HWH-J9P7] (noting that
the “six Democrats who voted against the measure include some of their party’s most prominent
voices on military affairs and criminal justice issues”).
330 See Alec Tyson, Should Guantanamo Be Open or Closed? Either Way Democrats Have Stuck
with Obama, PEW RES. CTRS. (May 29, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/29/
should-guantanamo-be-open-or-closed-either-way-democrats-have-stuck-with-obama/ [https://per
ma.cc/25QG-JW46] (reporting a survey finding that fifty-nine percent of Democratic voters
supported Obama’s goal in late 2009).
331 See THORPE, supra note 196, at 93-108 (demonstrating the fiscal basis of many relations between the
military and Congress).
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of individual liberty.332 In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy contrasted a judiciary
“disinterested in the outcome and committed to procedures designed to ensure
its own independence” with an executive branch in which these beneficial
traits “are not inherent.”333 In contrast to Justice Kennedy’s prediction, federal
courts adjudicating post-Boumediene habeas petitions systematically assigned
greater weight to false positives over false negatives.334 They were influenced
by the flow of factual scenarios presented to them as a downstream result of
executive branch decisions. Even apart from that path-dependent effect,
federal judges’ behavior also reflected their own institutional interest in
evading public blame for controversial decisions. In so doing, they perhaps
inadvertently enlarged the executive’s sphere of discretion. Attention to the
institutional incentives of the federal judiciary, in short, helps us understand
the gap between Boumediene’s soaring rhetoric and the more ambiguous legacy
of judicial intervention on the ground.
D. The Microfoundations of the Separation of Powers:
Normative Implications
The three elements identified here—the thick institutional surround, the
entangling of law and politics, and the prevalence of institutional incentives—help
illuminate a basic puzzle in the practical operation of the separation of
powers. That puzzle emerges from the normative and causal pluralism of the
separation of powers. The latter concept can be invoked as a way of achieving
different, and mutually inconsistent, ends. For example, in 2011, a unanimous
Court stated that the separation of powers “protect[s] each branch of
government from incursion by the others” and thereby also “protect[s] the
individual.”335 But it is also a commonplace notion that the separation of
powers operates to check presidential initiatives.336 The tension here is
palpable. When a presidential initiative aims to promote individual liberty
notwithstanding the other branches’ failure to act, separation-of-powers
332 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (“The Framers’ inherent distrust of governmental
power was the driving force behind the constitutional plan that allocated powers among three independent
branches. This design serves not only to make Government accountable but also to secure individual
liberty.”); accord Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[U]nless Congress
acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a necessary
role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as an important judicial check on
the Executive’s discretion in the realm of detentions.”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004)
(since “[e]xecutive imprisonment” without judicial review is “oppressive and lawless,” “this Court
has recognized the federal courts’ power to review applications for habeas relief in a wide variety of
cases involving executive detention, in wartime as well as in times of peace” (citation omitted)).
333 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783.
334 See supra text accompanying notes 275–77.
335 Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011).
336 See supra text accompanying note 302.
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devices will tend to thwart both goals. Worse, the separation of powers will
often impede libertarian policy goals. For at least a century, political scientists
have observed that the division of governmental power between the
legislative and executive branches tends to raise the costs of large policy
shifts.337 All else being equal, the President acting alone will thus have an
easier time promoting liberty than the President acting with necessary concurrence
from Congress and the courts. The mere fact that separation-of-powers constraints
on the executive have been triggered, in short, tells us little about the likely
final policy outcome. Without knowing more about the micropolitics of the
specific interbranch dynamic at issue, it is difficult to know what will result
from engaging with the separation of powers.
A recent example illustrates this simple point: the recent interbranch
dynamic over the federal refusal to recognize same-sex marriages under
Section 2 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). After two federal courts
held that Section 2 of DOMA was unconstitutional, Attorney General Eric
Holder decided to renounce any defense of that provision.338 The House of
Representatives, through its Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, responded by
hiring private counsel to defend the statute.339 In the Supreme Court,
legislators’ counsel offered “sharp adversarial presentation of the issues.”340
Although that adversarial presentation ultimately failed, legislative resistance
to same-sex marriage illustrates one of the manifold ways in which the
separation of powers enables resistance to executive efforts to promote
individual liberty. Without understanding the entangled legal-political
pressures on the Attorney General to defend Section 2 of DOMA, and
without accounting for the internal fragmentation of Congress, the effect of
the separation of powers on DOMA’s demise would be hard to understand.
Or consider the effect of the separation of powers on the quality of political
deliberation. Constitutional scholars have persuasively described the Court on
337 For the locus classicus of this observation, see WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 54-81 (Transaction Publishers 2002) (1908). It has recently
been argued that the separation of powers would not necessarily have this effect where the President
would, in the absence of a legislative veto, be constrained by electoral punishment. See Jide O.
Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational Voting,
and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 643-45 (2010). This theory requires not only
exceptionally epistemically well-endowed voters—it also assumes electoral sensitivity on the margin
to presidential actions on a particular policy question. Neither condition is likely satisfied here.
338 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to the Hon. John A. Boehner, Speaker
of the House, Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/Febru
ary/11-ag-223.html [https://perma.cc/DH53-8RA3].
339 Unopposed Motion of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of
Representatives to Intervene for a Limited Purpose, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10 CIV 8435), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Ho
use-intervene-mtn-Windsor-4-18-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DGX-NY8X].
340 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013).
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occasion as shifting policymaking from exclusively within the executive onto
the field of interbranch contestation as a means of promoting better outcomes.
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, for example, the Court invalidated a military
commission system that was the result of an executive order promulgated by the
White House, rather than a product of Pentagon expertise.341 Jody Freeman
and Adrian Vermeule have plausibly argued that the Hamdan ruling was in
part animated by the perceived inadequacy of an intrabranch policymaking
dynamic in which agencies possessing relevant expertise played no role.342
Similarly, the Court decided to hear the Boumediene case, after having first
denied the detainees’ petition for certiorari, only when presented with
evidence of dysfunctional intrabranch process.343 In other domains of law,
purely internal decisional processes are viewed with like skepticism. In
evaluating non–Article III adjudicative fora in recent cases, for example,
Justices have expressed skepticism about their purely internal character.344
But is the Court correct in assuming that adding a dose of the separation
of powers to a policy debate will improve outcomes? That migration can
promote some constitutional goals while undermining others. On the one
hand, it may induce more extensive democratic debate and invite more
focused internal deliberation. On the other hand, deliberation need not
conduce to more empirically grounded, rational decisions. In the case at hand,
elevating the visibility of detainee transfers into an interbranch conflict did
not lead to more rational policymaking.345 The ensuing debate was distinctly
asymmetrical, with disclosures highlighting the costs but not the benefits of
transfers. It invited opportunistic political entrepreneurship. This in turn
stoked public fears of detainee recidivism, and eventually crystallized into
legislative constraints on transfers that derailed even transfers of detainees
already cleared for release, such as Shaker Aamer. The interbranch context
produced periodic bouts of panic about recidivism risk, policy elite opportunism,
and intermittent restrictions unmoored from nuanced assessments of recidivism

341 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006); see also Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Noncitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2000) (reporting the President’s
military order that established military tribunals).
342 Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007
SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52.
343 See Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 417, 448-49 (2012)
(exploring the circumstances of the certiorari grant in Boumediene in more detail).
344 See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1956 (2015).
345 Where competitive pressures on policy are more diverse and multifarious, by contrast,
changing the institutional sites of a policy question in a way that increases its salience can have the
opposite effect. See Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural
Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1166 (1993) (arguing that “[t]ax
institutions, because of their greater visibility and more competitive nature, are less susceptible to
interest group capture”).
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risk. Richer process, in short, paradoxically produced normatively impoverished
outcomes. This is hardly the stabilizing, legalistic, and legitimizing outcome
anticipated by traditional accounts of the separation of powers. Nor is it a species
of democratic deliberation and interbranch dialogue that is obviously desirable.
The sort of bureaucratic–legislative alliance observed here, moreover, is not
unique. Another example is the Obama Administration’s efforts to mitigate
the extent of deportation’s shadow on young migrants who were brought into
the country as children. These efforts were quickly, if unsuccessfully, challenged
by elements of the federal bureaucracy.346 The bureaucrats’ challenge
complemented and reinforced legislative resistance to immigration reform,
and provided a platform for legislative criticism of mitigation efforts led by
the executive.347 The joint action of bureaucrats and legislators—subsequently
supported by several states—succeeded in delaying and ultimately derailing
those mitigation efforts.348
Another instance in which an internal separation-of-powers dynamic may
have influenced the shape of external, interbranch contestation is Attorney
General John Ashcroft’s 2001 effort to use the Controlled Substances Act to
preempt Oregon’s assisted suicide regime without consulting “anyone outside
his department.”349 In rejecting General Ashcroft’s proposed regulation, the
Supreme Court emphasized the absence of approval from medical experts
within the federal government and in particular the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.350 Hence, the initial fact of disagreement within the executive
branch catalyzed an interbranch conflict, one that was ultimately resolved by
looking to the positions of actors within the Article II sphere.
In sum, attention to the microfoundations of the separation of powers—the
diversity of relevant institutional actors, the entanglement of law and politics,
and the force of institutional incentives—point to a previously unacknowledged
measure of complexity within interbranch relations. The separation of powers
should, in this light, no longer be treated as something fixed and immoveable,

346 See Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-0, 2013 WL 8211660, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. July 31,
2013) (dismissing the challenge on jurisdictional grounds).
347 See Stephen Dinan, Immigration Agents Sue to Stop Obama’s Non-Deportation Policy, WASH.
TIMES (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news2012/aug/23/immigration-agents-sue
-stop-obamas-non-deportation [https://perma.cc/83FH-KVF4] (discussing legislators’ invocation of
immigration officials’ suit against the Obama Administration to criticize the President).
348 A follow-on challenge filed by twenty-six states resulted in an injunction against the
President’s program that remained in place after the Supreme Court split 4–4 on the matter. Texas
v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff ’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
349 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 241, 250 (2006).
350 Id. at 253.
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or something “sacred.”351 Rather, it should be the object of careful and detailed
inquiry in a fashion that accounts for the discrete local dynamics adumbrated here.
E. The Road to Guantánamo’s Closure Reconsidered
The foregoing analysis has implications for understanding the scope of
existing restrictions on detainee transfers imposed by Congress.352 Arguments
for the narrow construction of those limitations to date have focused on
Article II as a limit on congressional regulation of detainee transfers.353 But the
Supreme Court has endorsed such congressional control of detainees since
the early 19th century.354 The failure of Article II arguments for narrowly
construing transfer restrictions should not, however, end matters: transfer
restrictions might still be read narrowly to vest with the President broad
authority to override bureaucratic resistance. Although it seems highly
unlikely that such power will be exercised in the coming four years, I explore here
the legal question as a lens onto more general separation-of-powers dynamics.
The pivotal question in the construction of statutory transfer restrictions
is the partition of discretion between the President and the military bureaucracy.
Like earlier iterations, the 2015 statute vests the Secretary of Defense with
authority to make pivotal determinations, for instance, about whether post-transfer
conditions will “substantially mitigate the risk of recidivism.”355 The analysis
presented in Part II suggests that the restrictions will likely have the effect of
thwarting a presidential agenda that would wind down detentions. The
greater the loss of presidential control, the longer in expectation that process
will take. If, conversely, transfer restrictions are construed to maximize
presidential control, they are more likely to promote the speedy flow of
detainees from the facility.

351 See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1954 (2015) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 604 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
352 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, §§ 1031-34,
129 Stat. 726, 968-71 (Nov. 25, 2015) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). This
current version of the transfer restriction again exempts judicially mandated transfers. Id. § 1034(2).
It also bars transfers to Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and Syria. Id. § 1033.
353 See, e.g., Gregory Craig & Cliff Sloan, The President Doesn’t Need Congress’s Permission to
Close Guantanamo, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/thepresident-doesnt-need-congresss-permission-to-close-guantanamo/2015/11/06/4cc9d2ac-83f5-11e5-a
7ca-6ab6ec20f839_story.html [https://perma.cc/G2BT-6R67] (“Under Article II of the Constitution, the
president has exclusive authority to determine the facilities in which military detainees are held.”).
354 See Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128-29 (1814) (determining that whether
to confiscate enemy property during the War of 1812 was a question of policy, “proper for the
consideration of the legislature, not of the executive or judiciary”).
355 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. 114-92, § 1034(b)(3), 129
Stat. 726, 969 (2015) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note).
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Scholars diverge on whether statutory grants of discretion to cabinet-level
officials implicitly limit White House control. Justice Elena Kagan argued for
maintaining presidential control.356 In response, Kevin Stack developed
powerful arguments for limiting presidential control over such statutory
delegations.357 A central normative element of Stack’s argument, though, was
the utility of external constraints on executive power.358 But this assumption
does not hold here. The etiology of transfer restrictions demonstrates that
they are not wholly external, but rather flow from bureaucratic efforts to
stymie a contested presidential agenda-item. The structural justifications for
resisting presidential control of the statutory delegation to the Secretary of
Defense, therefore, are absent in this case. Further, the normative justifications
for constraining presidential power are much weaker here than in other
contexts. The separation of powers is typically justified as a means of promoting
liberty and good governance.359 That instrumental justification loses its force
when the separation of powers is associated with arbitrary deprivations of liberty
and a political environment dominated by deliberately inflated security fears.360
If instrumental rationales for constrained executive power lack traction,
statutory interpretation of transfer restrictions should instead be infused with
a direct concern for liberty interests. That rights-oriented approach is more
defensible than Article II constitutional-avoidance arguments given the
political economy of federal legislation. Whereas the executive branch always
has an opportunity to raise Article II concerns during the legislative process,
individual rights claimants often go unattended by Congress.361 Just as the
rule of lenity can be justified by a worry about the asymmetrical influence of
defendants and prosecutors in the legislative process,362 so a narrow view of

See Kagan, supra note 10, at 2326-31.
See Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 263, 276-99 (2006) (arguing that congressional delegation of authority to executive officials
alone should not be read as a grant of “directive authority” to the executive).
358 Id. at 269.
359 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592-93 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Constitution’s government-structuring provisions are “critical to preserving
liberty”); id. at 2559 (majority opinion) (“We recognize, of course, that the separation of powers can
serve to safeguard individual liberty . . . .”); see also Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S.
Ct. 1932, 1954 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (commending the framers for devising a government
structure promoting “liberty and accountability”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Concentration of power puts personal liberty in peril of arbitrary action
by officials, an incursion the Constitution’s three-part system is designed to avoid.”).
360 See supra text accompanying notes 178–94.
361 See Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L. REV. 1001,
1076 (2012) (arguing that the “political circumstances of the moment” impact whether individual
interests are represented in the legislative process).
362 See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
LEGISLATION 182 (2008) (arguing that courts should systematically rule against those groups or
356
357
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transfer restrictions can be defended as a means of correcting for asymmetries
in the federal legislative process.
To summarize, transfer restrictions can and should be interpreted to
maximize presidential control and to minimize bureaucratic obfuscation and
delay tactics. The statutory construction advanced here would promote a speedier
drawdown of detentions whenever that becomes politically feasible, even if it
provides no panacea for hard cases in which release is not viewed as plausible.
CONCLUSION
This Article has presented the first comprehensive, empirically based
account of how the prison at Guantánamo developed and, more importantly,
persisted in the teeth of presidential directions to wind it up. This story,
rather surprisingly, has not yet been told despite being a flash-point for
partisan and policy debate. Attention to the specific dynamics of a particular
separation-of-powers dynamic, I have suggested, yields dividends not only in
our understanding of a particular, important policy question, but also more
significantly in our sense of how the separation of powers operates in practice.
Combining econometric tools with doctrinal and institutional analysis, I
have isolated several previously underappreciated incentives and causal
mechanisms animating the observed separation-of-powers constraints on
presidential initiatives. In particular, my account foregrounds the role of
bureaucratic–legislative alliances; the importance of politics rather than law;
and the exiguous effects of judicial review given Article III actors’ perverse
institutional incentives. Similar dynamics, I have suggested, are likely to arise
in whole or in part whenever the executive seeks to mitigate the harshness of
baseline federal policy. Rather than taking the separation of powers for
granted, this Article establishes the utility of more granular analysis of its
effects and new theories of presidential power. Rather than a “sacred”363
element of our legal order, I have tried to show that the separation of powers
should be taken as a contingent, complex institutional assemblage. This
assemblage cannot be disentangled from its larger normative and political
context without considerable analytic loss. And it reveals its inner working
less by the application of an abstract, theoretical lens than by granular, retail
inquiries into the working dynamics of discrete policy questions.

interests most likely to have “a significant advantage in commanding the legislative agenda compared
to those favored by an alternative interpretation”).
363 See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1954 (2015) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the separation of powers as a “sacred” principle of the Constitution).
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APPENDIX: THE WIKILEAKS FILES AND
OTHER DATA ON GUANTÁNAMO
This Appendix details the three sources of data about policymaking at
Guantánamo employed in this Article.
A. Wikileaks
On April 29, 2011, the Wikileaks organization disclosed 765 classified
“detainee assessments”—one for all but about fourteen detainees held at the
Cuban base.364 These documents were dated between 2002 and 2009, and
were written by intelligence analysts within the military Joint Task Force
(JTF) responsible for counterterrorism detention operations at Guantánamo.365
Although widely varying in length, detail, and date of production, almost
every detainee assessment contains a narrative of the reasons that the
government credited for detaining that individual Guantánamo detainee.366
The narratives pick out certain acts and affiliations of the individual detainee
as relevant to the security risk posed by the detainee and to his intelligence
value.367 In effect, the assessments provide prima facie evidence of the specific
factual predicates used for decisions to detain (or release) an individual. Most
assessments contain ordinal risk and intelligence values on a four-tier scale.
Although these assessments are not self-authenticating, there is reason to
believe they provide a unique snapshot of the government’s reasons for
individual detention decisions. First, the government treated the assessments
as classified documents. The Department of Justice initially instructed the
private counsel who represented detainees at the Cuban base in habeas
proceedings that the assessments were classified, and thus could not be
viewed.368 Second, the government prosecuted the leaker, Private Chelsea
Manning, on charges of having shared classified material, including the
assessments, with Wikileaks.369 Third, of the six news publications across four

364 Charlie Savage et al., Classified Files Offer New Insights into Detainees, N.Y. TIMES: GUANTÁNAMO
FILES (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/world/guantanamo-files-lives-in-an-am
erican-limbo.html [https://perma.cc/UC8E-JUFG].
365 Id.
366 Id.
367 Id.
368 Scott Shane, Guantánamo Detainee’s Lawyer Seeks a Voice on WikiLeaks Documents, N.Y.
TIMES, April 28, 2011, at A16. More than a month later, the Justice Department relented and allowed
detainees’ counsel to view the assessments under the same conditions in which other classified
information could be viewed. Charlie Savage, Lawyers for Detainees Allowed to See Leaked Files, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2011, at A8.
369 Charlie Savage, Soldier Faces 22 New WikiLeaks Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, at A6.
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nations that initially received the assessments, not one has published
allegations that the documents are anything other than what they appear to be.370
Perhaps most strongly probative of the assessments’ nature and status is the
prosecution witnesses’ testimony offered in the military court-martial of
Private Manning.371 Two pieces of testimony—by Jeffrey Motes, counterterrorism
analyst at Guantánamo Bay, and by Colonel Morris Davis, the former
commander of the JTF-Guantánamo—directly address how the assessments
were produced and employed by military leaders to craft detention policy.372
Together, these two pieces of testimony suggest that the assessments were
government-wide distillations of all available intelligence concerning given
detainees, and as such were used by JFT-Guantánamo commanders to make
release decisions.
According to Motes’s and Davis’s testimonies, an intelligence analyst
would produce a detainee’s assessment by reviewing all available intelligence
concerning a detainee in the Task Force’s classified databases and other
intelligence databases.373 The analyst would then use the resulting intelligence
to draft an assessment and to reach an evaluation of an individual’s riskiness
and his intelligence values. These were recorded on four-tiered scales ranging
from “no” to “low” to “medium” to “high.” Assessments had to contain the
reasons for the detainee’s transfer to Guantánamo. The assessments were then
peer reviewed; evaluated and reviewed by senior intelligence analysts and
officers; reviewed by lawyers in the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for legal
content; and then submitted to the Deputy Commander of JTF-Guantánamo
for final approval. Each assessment in net required eighty to ninety hours to
produce. According to Davis, military personnel at Guantánamo prepared
individual detainees assessments for “senior officials and other administration
processes.”374 Although the assessments did not contain primary source
intelligence material, Davis explained that they would be used by government
personnel when making decisions concerning individual detainees. For
example, Davis testified, he “would look at the [assessment] . . . to get an idea
of who [a detainee] was” before signing off on a transfer to another country.375
370 Michael Calderone, WikiLeaks’ Guantanamo Bay Documents: The Backstory on News Outlets’
Race to Publish Them, HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/
25/wikileaks-gitmo-documents-backstory_n_853126.html [https://perma.cc/88EZ-9YU8].
371 DAVID LEIGH & LUKE HARDING, WIKILEAKS: INSIDE JULIAN ASSANGE’S WAR ON
SECRECY 20-31 (2011).
372 See Stipulation of Expected Testimony from Jeffrey Motes, United States v. Manning (June
23, 2007), http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/716014-pe131-stipulation-of-expected-testimonymr-motes.html [https://perma.cc/PY9U-GCHJ]; see also Transcript of Trial Testimony of Col. Morris
Davis at 44, 58, United States v. Manning (2013) [hereinafter Davis Testimony] (on file with author).
373 The following paragraph draws on the sources cited supra note 372.
374 Davis Testimony, supra note 372, at 44.
375 Id. at 58.

592

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 165: 499

For purposes of this Article, I have downloaded, transcribed, and coded
all 766 detainee assessments. I have recorded, inter alia, individual demographic
details; the enumeration of specific factual grounds reasons cited for each
man’s detention; and the risk and intelligence classifications assigned by
JTF-Guantánamo analysts from a four-point scale. Using the unique
“Internment Serial Number” (ISN) contained in every assessment, I then linked
the information contained in the Wikileaks documents to data about when
detainees transferred in and out of Guantánamo kept by the New York Times.
The remaining three sources used here can be more briefly identified.
First, the New York Times maintains a comprehensive archive of both
documents and data concerning the Guantánamo detainees.376 A Python
script was written to scrape this website for data concerning the timing of
each individual detainee’s entry and exit from Guantánamo. Two caveats are
important here. First, the data used in this Article’s analysis was last updated
on November 16, 2016. Second, the data used here captures only the period
of custody at Guantánamo. But many detainees were either in custody before
their transfer to the Cuban base, or remained in custody in the hands of a
foreign state thereafter. Unfortunately, there is no public-domain data that
captures this additional custody. Hence, this study relies on the available data,
and should be read accordingly.
B. Westlaw
Second, using the Westlaw database of opinions from the District of
Columbia Circuit and district courts, I finally created a database of all
published and unpublished resolutions of habeas corpus petitions by either
district courts or the Circuit Court in the wake of the Boumediene decision
(n=68). I have coded these decisions by their outcome (i.e., whether the petition
was denied or granted, or alternatively whether the case was ongoing), and
associated them with detainee assessments by matching ISNs. In combination,
these three unique data sets allow unprecedented longitudinal analysis of the
institutional trajectory of the Guantánamo detentions.

C. PACER
Finally, I wrote code to search the federal courts’ PACER to identify all
cases filed in the federal district courts in Washington, D.C. by Guantánamo
detainees. I further examined documents in each docket to identify ISNs
related to each individual petitioner. Where these underlying documents did
376 See A History of the Detainee Population, N.Y TIMES: THE GUANTÁNAMO DOCKET (Oct.
20, 2016), http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo [https://perma.cc/7P29-VP8N].
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not contain ISN data, I cross-referenced docket numbers against lists
produced by the government of resolved cases that relate docket numbers to
ISNs. In forty cases, this did not yield a matching ISN. In those cases, I directly
contacted petitioners’ counsel as listed on the docket to obtain ISN data. In
all but seven cases, this generated ISN data. Treating each petitioner in each
docket as a single observation, this process generated 466 observations. I was
unable to identify ISNs for seven individual petitioners. Once petitioners
who filed more than one petition were accounted for, I identified 408
detainees who filed habeas petitions.
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